




34561

THE TEMPLE PRIMERS

THE PROPERTY OF
THE LAW SOCIETY

MAY 1 - 1919


ROMAN HISTORY

Translated from the German of


DR. JULIUS KOCH

By

LIONEL D. BARNETT, M.A.



CICERO



ROMAN HISTORY



BY DR JULIUS
KOCH

TORONTO, GEORGE N.
MORANG & COY. LTD.

1901 2, 90 WELLINGTON STREET, WEST

All rights reserved

Hand
K 764
C

CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION

FROM THE PREHISTORIC PERIOD OF ROME AND ITALY—

- § 1. The Sabine and Latin Settlements on the Tiber.
- § 2. Italy and its population at the time of Rome's foundation.

Section 1. The Romans down to the Conquest of Italy (266 B.C.).

CHAPTER I

THE AGE OF THE KINGS—

- § 3. The Seven Kings.

CHAPTER II

FROM THE BEGINNINGS OF THE REPUBLIC TO THE CODIFICATION OF THE LAWS OF THE TWELVE TABLES, 509-450 B.C.—

- § 4. The Beginnings of the Republic and the Commencement of the Struggles of the Orders.
- § 5. External Events of this Period.

CHAPTER III

FROM THE DECENVIRATE TO THE GALLIC VISITATION, 450-387 B.C.—

- § 6. The Decemvirate and the Laws of the Twelve Tables.
- § 7. Further Gains of the Plebeians.
- § 8. External Events of this Period.

CHAPTER IV

FROM THE GALLIC VISITATION TO THE UNION OF ROME
WITH THE CAMPANIANS, 387-338 B.C.—

- § 9. The Continuation and Conclusion of the Struggle of the Orders.
- § 10. Wars and Acquisitions from 387-338.

CHAPTER V

FROM THE CONQUEST OF CAMPANIA TO THE REDUCTION OF
ITALY, 338-266 B.C.—

- § 11. The Samnite Wars, 326-290.
- § 12. The War with Tarentum and Pyrrhus, 282-275.
- § 13. The Struggles of this Period with Etruria and the Gauls.

Section 2. From the Subjection of Italy to the Fall of the
Republic, 266-29 B.C.

CHAPTER VI

ESTABLISHMENT OF SUPREMACY IN THE COUNTRIES OF THE
MEDITERRANEAN, 266-133 B.C.—

- § 14. The First Punic War, 264-241.
- § 15. The Gallic and Illyrian Wars, 238-219.
- § 16. The Second Punic (Hannibalic) War, 218-201.
- § 17. The Immediate Results of the Hannibalic War.
- § 18. The Wars with Macedon and Syria, 200-168.
- § 19. The Completion of Roman Supremacy in the Mediterranean, 149-133.

CHAPTER VII

FROM THE ACQUIREMENT OF THE SUPREMACY IN THE
MEDITERRANEAN TO THE FALL OF THE REPUBLIC
(REVOLUTIONARY PERIOD), 133-29 B.C.—

- § 20. Internal Development from the Conclusion of the Struggle of the Orders to the Appearance of the Gracchi.

CONTENTS

vii

- § 21. The Attempts at Reform by the Gracchi (Beginning of the Revolution), 133-122.
- § 22. External events to the Social War, 121-101.
- § 23. Marius and the Party of Revolution.
- § 24. Livius Drusus and the Social War, 91-88.
- § 25. The Sullan Disturbances and the First Mithradatic War, 89-84.
- § 26. Sulla's Return, Change of the Constitution, and Death, 83-78.
- § 27. The Disturbances after Sulla's Death to the Fall of the Sullan Oligarchy, 78-70.
- § 28. Events in the East and Pompeius, 74-64.
- § 29. Italian Events to the Triumvirate (Caesar and Cicero), 70-60.
- § 30. The First Triumvirate and Caesar's Conquest of Gaul, 60-49.
- § 31. The Rule of the Triumvirs to Caesar's Passage of the Rubicon, 60-49.
- § 32. Caesar's Victory, Monarchy, and Death, 49-44.
- § 33. The Struggle for the Inheritance of Caesar, 44-29.

Section 3. The Age of the Emperors until Diocletian,

29 B.C.—285 A.D.

CHAPTER VIII

THE EMPERORS OF THE JULIAN AND FLAVIAN HOUSES,

29 B.C.—96 A.D.—

- § 34. Augustus and the Construction of the Monarchy.
- § 35. Reign of Augustus, 29 B.C.—14 A.D.
- § 36. Tiberius, 14-37.
- § 37. Gaius (37-41), Claudius (41-54), Nero (54-68).
- § 38. The Flavians — Vespasian (69-79), Titus (79-81), Domitian (81-96).

CHAPTER IX

THE 'GOLDEN AGE' OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE, 96-180 A.D.—

- § 39. Nerva (96-98) and Trajan (98-117).
- § 40. Hadrian, 117-138.
- § 41. The Antonines — Antoninus Pius (138-161). Marcus Aurelius (161-180).

CHAPTER X

THE DECAY OF THE EMPIRE UNDER THE SOLDIER-EMPERORS
(FROM COMMODUS TO DIOCLETIAN), 180-285 A.D.—

- § 42. Commodus and the House of Septimius Severus,
180-235.
- § 43. The Chief Emperors from Alexander Severus to
Diocletian, 235-285.

Section 4. From the Reorganisation of the Empire by
Diocletian and Constantine to the Fall of the Western
Throne (Age of Absolutism), 285-476 A.D.

CHAPTER XI

FROM DIOCLETIAN TO THE DEATH OF THEODOSIUS THE
GREAT, 285-395 A.D.—

- § 44. Diocletian and his Age, 285-305.
- § 45. Constantine the Great, 306-337.
- § 46. From the Death of Constantine the Great to the Death
of Theodosius the Great, 337-395.

CHAPTER XII

FROM THE DEATH OF THEODOSIUS THE GREAT TO THE FALL
OF THE WESTERN THRONE, 395-476 A.D.—

- § 47. The Severance of the Realm and Fall of the Empire of
the West.
- § 48. The last Emperors of the West.

LITERATURE.—

- I. REPUBLIC.
- II. AGE OF THE EMPERORS.
- III. SEPARATE ACCOUNTS.

ROMAN HISTORY

INTRODUCTION

From the Prehistoric Period of Rome and Italy

Sources.—The tradition as to the oldest period is almost without exception very late, and consequently possesses but little claim to belief. Historical composition in the true sense (for of the oldest Roman Annals we know practically nothing) was first brought by the Greeks to the sister race; but here misunderstanding and distortion of fact to adorn a tale, and often also to point a moral, have disguised the historical kernel. This is the case with the great compilations of the Augustan age, the 'Historical Library' of Diodorus Siculus and the 'Roman Archaeology' of Dionysius of Halicarnassus; nor are things any better with the monumental work of Roman historical composition, Titus Livius' History, comprising 142 books, but only to a small extent surviving (Books 1-10 and 21-45), for Livius' historical sagacity was dulled by his childishly worked out idea of the predestination of the Roman people to the dominion of the world; and moreover he had at his disposal but scanty and distorted sources for the earliest period. These comprehensive works, especially Livius, were the sources of the later historians, as Florus (end of the second century), Eutropius (second half of the fourth century), Aurelius Victor (about 350), Orosius (early fifth century), and others, who are of importance particularly where they drew upon the portions of their great predecessors now lost to us. Similarly much passed over from the magnificently designed but only fragmentarily preserved Roman History of Cassius Dio (early third century, written in Greek) into the so-called 'Compilers.' Good material for the oldest period of his people is furnished by Cicero, especially in his work 'On the State'; for chronology, the learned antiquarian of the age of Caesar, M. Terentius Varro, is of great importance, and to him too is due much of our knowledge of the history of ancient civilisation. Finally, we have to consider the careers of famous men (as Romulus, Numa, and so on) described in the period of the Flavian emperors by Plutarch of Chaeronea, the 'biographical Shakespeare of world-history.' For the history of the country of Italy

and the Italian races reference should be made to the fifth and sixth books of the learned Augustan geographer Strabo (a Greek).

What is here briefly said with reference to the sources of the oldest Roman history applies equally to a large part of the narrative of Republican times.

§ I. THE LATIN AND SABINE SETTLEMENTS ON THE TIBER, AND THEIR COALITION

Of the hills of the Tiber, the *Mons Palatinus*¹ was inhabited by Latins and the opposite *Mons Quirinalis* by Sabines long before the foundation of Rome, which credulous and often over-subtle historians ascribed to the middle of the eighth century B.C. Allured from their inhospitable hill-towns into the once so fruitful 'Roman Campagna,' they pressed onwards through it until the broad stream of the Tiber summoned them to halt, and favourably situated uplands vouchsafed securer settlements. From them arose 'Eternal Rome.'

The attempt to derive from the name of the city of Rome certain conclusions as to its origin has been unsuccessful; those who would connect the word *Roma* with the name of the primitive river-god *Rumon* perhaps approach nearest to the truth, for the navigable stream was naturally the most important factor for the settlement on the Tiber, and old Roman coins actually exhibit to us as stamp the stern of a ship, which we therefore may regard as the city's first escutcheon.

Like the meaning of the city's name, the time and fuller history of its origin lie in obscurity. However, the old folk-tale has certainly preserved for us the kernel of the truth when it informs us of the mighty struggle between the Latins of the Palatine and the Sabines of the Quirinal, of which we must conceive the lowland between these two hills, the later *Forum Romanum*, to have been the scene. Though all the individual features of the stories about the Rape of the Sabines

¹ [On the topography of Rome see Lanciani's sketch, chap. i. of Ramsay's *Manual of Roman Antiquities*, 15th edition, London, 1894.]

and its results may belong to the sphere of purest fable, so much is certain, that the feud between the Latin and the Sabine settlements ended with the extortion of *conubium*, i.e. the right of legal intermarriage. Thus first is the union completed and Rome founded.

§ 2. ITALY AND ITS POPULATION AT THE TIME OF ROME'S FOUNDATION

Before we pursue the history of Rome and the Roman Empire, it is needful to cast a glance at the country in general which the city of the Tiber was destined to lead, and at its population. We usually understand by 'Italy' the whole Apennine peninsula; but for the period of Rome's foundation this is as incorrect as it is to assume a uniform population in it. We cannot follow in detail the gradual extension of the name *Italia*, which originally was applied only to a small part of the south-western projection of the peninsula; it must suffice to mention that the Upper Italy of to-day, the great fertile plain between the Apennines and Alps, was not finally incorporated in the Roman dominion until the last century of the Republic. In the south, especially in the Calabrian peninsula, the Iapygians formed probably the last remnant of the original Indo-Germanic population, which had entered from the north. From the fact that this race easily and rapidly merged in the Hellenism that later pressed in so vigorously upon them, the inference has also been drawn that their speech was allied to the Greek.

The remainder of the South and almost all Central Italy were occupied by the *Italici*, that primal stock to which belong Latins and Sabines, as well as numerous other peoples, and whose individual dialects (as Oscan, Umbrian, and Sabellian), still recognisable to some extent in tolerably numerous fragments, were gradually swallowed up by the Latin as these races themselves were incorporated in the *imperium Romanum*. On the north-west their neighbours were the Etruscans, also known as *Tusci* (whence the modern *Toscana*) or *Tyrrheni*.

(whence 'Tyrrhenian Sea'), a race which hitherto it has not been possible to range among the other families, although there exist numerous relics of their language and still more numerous remnants of their art, and whose relation to the Indo-Germanic stock is disputed by distinguished scholars. On the Tiber they bordered on the Latins and Sabines, which often enough led to weary wars waged with varying success. Northwards the Etruscans had already in the oldest period known to us a remarkable extension; they spread far over the Po into the valleys of the Raetian Alps.

Later they were pushed backwards by the Keltic Gauls, who after surmounting the Alps established themselves in Upper Italy (*Gallia Cisalpina*, 'Hither Gaul') and played a great part in the history of the peninsula. Of their different tribes may be mentioned as most important the *Insubres* with Mediolanum (Milan), the *Cenomani* with Brixia (Brescia), the *Boii* with Bononia (Bologna), and the *Senones* with Sena Gallica (Sinigaglia). The east and west of Upper Italy were occupied by two peoples of uncertain origin, the *Veneti* in the modern province *Il Veneto*, and the *Ligures*, formerly extending far beyond the Alps, in modern Liguria.

Two nations however which cannot be termed in the proper sense Italic peoples, since they never formed on this soil a coherent national community, had a far greater influence on the development of Italic history than many of the above-mentioned groups. These are the Greeks and the Phœnician *Poeni* (Carthaginians), both allured hither by the advantages and riches of the land, and to some extent its first discoverers.

The *Poeni* indeed exerted their influence rather as traders than as settlers; they confined themselves, at least as regards the mainland, to factories, though in the island of Sicily they also possessed fixed settlements. The Greeks gained a vastly greater influence; of their colonies the most important are Tarentum (Tarento), Rhegium (Reggio), and above all Cumae on the Campanian coast, of which now but inconsiderable ruins remain, and which became immortal alike by

founding Neapolis (Naples) and by transmitting the alphabet to the Italic. Through these colonies Greek culture was spread abroad to such a degree that the whole of Lower Italy could be termed 'Great Greece' (*Magna Graecia*). And to this day the breath of Greek genius is felt by one who sees uprising in the loneliest corner of the Gulf of Salerno the magnificently preserved temples of Paestum, the Greek *Poseidonia*.

In Sicily the Greeks met with a more stubborn resistance than in Italy from the Poeni, with whom they gradually came to share the possession of the island. In this process the native population, the Sicani and Siculi, were entirely driven into the background. The Greek cities of Syracuse, Messana (Messina), and Agrigentum (Girgenti) were the centres of culture for the island.

The islands of Corsica and Sardinia, geographically a part of Italy, did not play a prominent part in ancient history; their primitive population was early mingled with foreign elements, such as Ligurians, Greeks, Poeni, and others.

SECTION I

THE ROMANS DOWN TO THE CONQUEST OF ITALY (266 B.C.)

CHAPTER I

The Age of the Kings

CREDIBILITY OF TRADITION

No one in these days feels a doubt that the whole of the information supplied by the ancients as to the founders and foundation of the city of Rome is undeserving of belief, and that moreover the whole Royal Age lies in the obscurity of the realm of fable. Not only the deeds ascribed to the individual kings but their very names are wholly without authority—a fact however which does not exclude the possibility of the stories approaching nearer to historic truth as they descend in time.

Even if the year-books (*Annales*) kept in the older times [by the priests were already usual in the Royal Age, and were themselves less curt and scanty than all appearances compel us to assume them to have been, they nevertheless were lost to students of later ages through the awful visitation of the Gauls, which befell Rome at the beginning of the fourth century B.C. Hence when afterwards pride in the greatness of their native city aroused in the Romans, disinclined as they were to all literary activity, the craving to study its past, full scope was given to the boldest combinations and the purest imagination. Greek history too, which early directed its interest to Italic matters, suffered from the same lack of sources of positive information; it too contributed its share to the distortion of the picture by applying Greek conceptions to the circumstances of Rome.

§ 3. THE SEVEN KINGS

1. Romulus and Remus, whom imagination later associated with him as his twin brother, were scions of the royal race of Alba Longa, the capital of Latium, and thus descendants of Aeneas's son Ascanius or Iullus (whence the *gens Iulia*). They founded upon the Palatine Hill by the Tiber a city on the spot where they had been exposed as babes. In walling round the city (*Roma Quadrata*) Remus lost his life in a quarrel with his elder brother. After the coalition of this Latin settlement on the Palatine with that of the Sabines on the Quirinal Romulus shared the government with the Sabine Titus Tatius, but became again sole sovereign after the death of the latter. He now figures as the founder of the State organisation, 'the prototype of magistracy and its rights'; he brings in the Senate, divides the people according to rank into the fully privileged patricians (*patres*) and the less privileged plebeians (*plebs*); he separates the patricians again into thirty *curiae* and each *curia* into ten families (*gentes*), while for military purposes parting them into three knightly *centuriae*, the Ramnes, Tities, and Luceres; and by the arrangement of the *auspicia* (observation of divine omens) he subordinates the whole State to the guidance of the gods. No wonder that after such services he himself was raised to the gods, under the mysterious name of Quirinus.

2. Numa Pompilius, a Sabine, is a pure Prince of Peace,

and thus the antithesis of Romulus. His long reign was exclusively devoted to the extension and reorganisation of the State Church and the guardianship of internal order. Under the inspiration of the nymph Egeria he founded new cults and introduced new priestly colleges. He also divided among the burghers the districts conquered under his predecessor, and set up an altar to the god of boundaries, Terminus, on the Capitoline Hill.

3. Tullus Hostilius, another Latin and like Romulus a warlike prince, had to defend the youthful settlement against the jealous neighbouring cities, especially against the Etruscan Veii, which lay northwards and was bounded by the Tiber, and against the old Latin capital Alba Longa. The latter, after successful battles, was destroyed by him, and the inhabitants were forced to immigrate to Rome. The Romans now entered upon the heritage of their vanished parent-city, and Rome became head of the League of the Latin Cities.

4. Ancus Martius is a Sabine, and is accounted grandson of Numa Pompilius. The peaceful course of his government, which in the main was devoted to internally strengthening the State, was interrupted by a revolt of the Latins, which Ancus successfully repressed. The consequence of it was the colonisation of the Mons Aventinus with subdued Latins. To him too is ascribed the fortification of the Mons Janiculus, occupied in the Etruscan wars, on the right bank of Tiber, and the junction of the two banks by the first bridge over the river (*pons sublicius*, 'pile-bridge'), which probably led to the *Forum Boarium* ('cattle market'), a space between the slopes of the Aventine, Palatine, and Capitol. He also is said to have founded the port of Ostia at the mouth of the river.

5. Tarquinius Priscus marks a turning-point in the history of the kings; for he, as well as the two last kings, is of Etruscan origin, and this striking phenomenon can hardly be interpreted otherwise than as meaning that the Romans had not always emerged so successfully from the wars with their

mighty northern neighbours as the patriotically falsified tradition reports.

The age of Tarquinius appears in tradition as one of peculiar brilliance. After making additions to the Roman community by decisive victories over the neighbouring peoples, he devoted himself in a magnificent way to improving the condition of things in the city. The laying down of the *Cloaca Maxima*, which to this day evokes the admiration of posterity, to drain the unhealthy lowland between the Palatine, Capitol, and Quirinal; the conversion of the reclaimed hollow between the Palatine and Aventine into a ground for races and sports on the Etruscan model, the *Circus Maximus*; the construction of the most famous of all Roman temples, that of Jupiter on the Capitol, which was burnt down in the year 83 B.C., but was restored by Sulla with still greater magnificence¹—these are the great works of Tarquinius. Even before the last construction was finished the mighty king fell a victim to the vengeance of Ancus Martius's sons, whom he had excluded from the succession.

6. Servius Tullius, from whose name (*servus*, 'slave') the ancients fancifully inferred his origin from a slave-woman, is the representative of one of the most important measures of internal politics in ancient Rome, the so-called 'Servian Constitution,' the fundamental idea of which was to make the political privileges of burghers correspond to their military and financial obligations. The whole people was distributed into five classes for taxation, of which each was subdivided again into a certain number of Hundreds (in all 193 *centuriae*, hence the name 'centurial constitution'). Outside these, that is, apart from those holding privileges and obligations in the State, stood those whose incomes did not reach the amount prescribed for the fifth class; these were the 'proletarians,' literally, 'those blessed with offspring.' Political rights were determined according to tax-assessment, but in such a way that the patricians, who in themselves already represented

¹ Ruins of this temple of Jupiter Capitolinus are to be found in the garden of the Palazzo Caffarelli.

the well-to-do portion of the population, still remained the favoured and almost solely privileged class. Servius also divided the whole Roman dominion into administrative districts, the so-called *tribes*, of which four belonged to the city, seventeen (later thirty-one) to the extra-mural domain.

With the surrounding Latins Servius concluded an everlasting league of friendship, to ratify which a common federal sanctuary was raised to Diana on the Aventine. But there is another construction which came to be of vastly greater importance for the development of Rome; its name will for ever remain associated with that of Servius, although it cannot have been built until at least a hundred years after the date assigned for his reign. This is the so-called 'Servian Wall,' which for the first time included the seven hills of Rome within the circuit of the city.¹ Servius fell by the hand of his son-in-law and successor, the son of Tarquinius Priscus.

7. Tarquinius Superbus—probably the same as the older king of that name, whose exploits are attributed to him also—appears on the other hand as a caricature of monarchical excesses, falling before republican principles. His violent seizure of the throne, his boundless oppression of the people, and the outrage on Lucretia, wife of his cousin Collatinus, characterise him as a tyrant of the worst sort, like those who in this age were not rare in the Greek cities. By the agency of his own relatives, especially Junius Brutus, a revolt was stirred up against him which ended in the banishment of the tyrant family.

¹ Its course may be fairly accurately fixed, as still numerous remains survive.

CHAPTER II

From the Beginnings of the Republic to the Codification of National Law in the Twelve Tables (509-450 B.C.)

The delimitation of this period, like every division of the past into definite epochs, is essentially arbitrary; nevertheless the year of the Decemvirate may be regarded as a culminating point and boundary stone in the development of Rome. Internally, the codification of the national law by the decemvirs marks a great gain in the struggle for rights which the plebeians waged for two centuries with the patricians; externally, Rome thus strengthened begins about this time to proceed offensively against the neighbouring peoples, against whom she had hitherto been often barely able to defend herself.

§ 4. THE BEGINNINGS OF THE REPUBLIC AND THE COMMENCEMENT OF THE STRUGGLE OF THE ORDERS

Kingship and Republic.—The reasons which brought about the fall of the kingship are not clearly discernible, for the traditional account of them still belongs entirely to the domain of fable. This much however may be laid down: unlike most revolutions of modern times, this movement was not one of democratic or anarchic principles assailing a dominant class, but in it the whole body of the nation, patricians and plebeians together, cast off the sovereignty of an individual, without thereby materially altering the form of the constitution and the distribution of privileges. The rule of the two Consuls (originally styled *praetores*) was distinguished from that of the kings above all by its twofold or *collegial* form, and further by its annual duration and the responsibility arising after their resignation of office. One branch indeed of the functions of the king, who had been supreme judge, supreme general, and supreme priest, was now removed from the power of the Consuls, namely the office of the Sacrificial King (*rex sacrorum*), which owing to religious scruples could not be severed from the royal title. but by its subordina-

tion to the High-Priest (*pontifex maximus*) came to be without political significance.

Only in the event of supreme need and for a limited space of time could the plenary powers of sovereignty be handed over to an individual, namely when extreme stress of war necessitated the Dictatorship, which we may compare with our modern 'state of siege.' The Dictator, nominated on the direction of the Senate by a Consul, had unlimited powers, but for not more than six months. His assistant was the Master of the Knights (*magister equitum*), who was selected by him and resigned with him.

In the further development of the republican constitution an ever increasing number of official duties were severed from the consulate and new offices or magistracies constituted, which brought into existence a clearly defined official class.

Patricians and Plebeians.—The patricians alone were full burghers, in the enjoyment of all constitutional privileges; they alone had to maintain relations with the State's gods, only they sat in the Senate, and only from their midst could the highest officers come. The honour of belonging to this favoured order could only be won by birth and equal marriage, while the offspring of a mixed marriage belonged to the plebeian caste.

This condition of things was all the more intolerable to the plebeians as they shared the burdens of military service and tax-payment with the patricians, and therefore bore a disproportionately greater load. So directly after the removal of the two orders' common enemy, the royal power, the struggle for rights began between plebeians and patricians, which was waged on both sides with great bitterness and varying success. The patricians in particular were often enough able to render the concessions made to their opponents valueless by availing themselves of the law, which was accessible and familiar to them alone.

Already under the first Consuls, Junius Brutus and Tarquinius Collatinus (509 B.C.) it is said that plebeians were granted seats in the Senate, though only in limited numbers,

and the election of Consuls was committed to the centuriate assemblies, which represented both orders, instead of to the curiate assemblies of the patricians; but these are measures which hardly seem credible in the first period of the republic.

To the same year are attributed the important laws of Valerius Publicola, the successor of the banished Collatinus, of which one laid down that no person without a commission from the people might exercise supreme power, while by the second, the *lex de provocatione*, the centuriate comitia were made into a court of appeal against the severest penalties, bodily chastisement and sentence of death, later also against heavy fines in money.

The unprotected condition of the plebeians, who had no representatives among the magistrates, was felt with especial acuteness, as the prosperity of the plebeian population, on whom military service pressed most sorely, was steadily sapped by the continued feuds of this period, and debtors, like the Attic peasantry in the age of Solon, suffered the most pitiless oppression from their patrician creditors. At last the return from a campaign gave occasion to an open revolt.

This was the so-called *secessio plebis in Montem Sacrum*, that is, the emigration of the commons to the 'Sacred Mount.'¹ The consequence of this rising was the establishment of the 'Tribunate of the Commons.' The plebeians were allowed to have two (or five, later ten) officials, to be elected from their own ranks, the Tribunes of the Commons (*tribuni plebis*), whose special task was to be the protection of the plebs against patrician aggression. In order that they might exercise without hindrance this peculiar office, which stood outside and to a certain extent above the law, they were declared to be inviolable (*sacrosancti*). Later the privileges of these Tribunes of the Commons grew to such an extraordinary plenitude of power that the emperors derived from this magistracy one of the chief titles of their office. The

¹ The hill lying north of Rome beyond the Ponte Nomentano has no historical claim to the title Monte Sacro.

assistants of the Tribunes were two Aediles (*aediles plebis*), likewise plebeian magistrates.

To this period too are ascribed the beginnings of a movement which runs like a red thread through the history of the republic, and often led to severe internal convulsions, —the *agrarian* demands of the plebeians, who hitherto had been excluded in the distribution of the State's landed property won by wars (*ager publicus*). In the year 486, it is said, the Consul Spurius Cassius brought out the first agrarian bill; he had however no success, and fell a victim to the vengeance of the infuriated members of his order.

A new period in this struggle is marked by the law of Publilius Volero (471), which converted the comitia of the Tribes, hitherto common to both orders, into a body solely representative of the plebeians, and transferred to them the election of the Tribunes of the Commons. The regulation was further made that the decisions of the comitia of the Tribes might be laid before the Senate, where of course they had at first merely the value of petitions. Two further laws also were made in the plebeian interest, the *lex Icilia de Aventino publicando*, by which the Aventine was allowed to the plebeians as a dwelling-place (456), and the *lex Tarpeia Aternia*, which limited more sharply the Consul's powers of punishment (454).

§ 5. THE EXTERNAL EVENTS OF THIS PERIOD

Dominance of Rome in Latium.—Two documents of unquestionable credibility reveal to us the position of Rome in Latium better than the stories of successful battles with which Roman legend decorated the history of the oldest times. The one is a commercial treaty with Carthage, ascribed to the very first pair of Consuls (509). In it the Carthaginians have to pledge themselves not to attack the Latin cities standing in friendly relations to Rome, while they are permitted warfare with the cities not connected with Rome; and thus Rome comes forward as head of a Latin

league. The other document is a list of the thirty cities which in the year 493 concluded with Rome an official alliance (the Latin Confederacy), which was also joined a few years later by the Hernici, a race bordering in the south-east on the Latins. But the youthful republic had to wage many and not always successful wars before it secured its position of authority.

Wars with the Etruscans.—As regards the Etruscan wars which the last Tarquinius in his banishment is said to have stirred up, and of which that conducted by Porsenna of Clusium¹ seems to have been especially critical, tradition in the main is able to supply nothing but heroic legends (Horatius Cocles, Mucius Scaevola, Cloelia); yet in spite of all its distortion of truth to point its moral it has not quite succeeded in glossing over the fact that the Romans must have often suffered severe defeats in them and stooped to surrender territory. Moreover the long war with the city of Veii, Rome's old foe, lacks reliable authority and is made none the more probable by the tale of the struggle and fall of the 306 patricians of the Fabian race who sought to establish on the Cremera a bulwark against the Veientes (483-474).

Wars with the Volsci, Aequi, and Sabines.—The Volsci dwelt south of Rome; a vigorous race possessed of strong cities, they were not disposed to join the Latin league. A full account of these struggles cannot be given; for the story of Coriolanus, who on account of his assaults upon the Tribunes had to leave Rome and in revenge led the Volsci against his native city, must be relegated to the sphere of folk-tale. Behind it, however, is certainly concealed a defeat of the Romans.

The Romans too must have fared ill in the wars with the Aequi, a race of highland freebooters dwelling to the east of Rome; for they found themselves forced to nominate a Dictator, which only occurred in cases of supreme need.

¹ Clusium is the modern Chiusi, where numerous remains of Etruscan buildings still exist.

Naturally the personality of L. Quinctius Cincinnatus, who was summoned from the plough to crush the Aequi, stands on the same level as that of Coriolanus. Finally the old Annals have also tales to tell in this age of Sabine wars. And thus we see Rome at this period threatened on all sides, in a struggle for existence that often, we may be sure, was desperate. A change takes place in the second half of the fifth century, as the Romans pass from the defensive to the offensive, and by founding colonies gain a firm footing in hostile territory.

CHAPTER III

From the Decemvirate to the Visitation of the Gauls (+51-387 B.C.)

This period marks both internally and externally a steady advance: in the struggle for rights the plebeians extort really valuable privileges, by which the political development of the republic inwardly is materially furthered; outwardly Roman power is strengthened by successful wars, foundation of colonies, and extension of the *ager publicus* through the conquered regions.

§ 6. THE DECENVIRATE AND THE LAWS OF THE TWELVE TABLES

In the Tribunes of the Commons the plebeians had indeed obtained officials drawn from their own order; but their influence of needs remained a limited one so long as the knowledge of the law and jurisdiction remained, like a religious secret, solely in the hands of the patricians. Already in the year 462 the tribune Terentilius Arsa is said to have made in the comitia of the Tribes the proposal to establish a commission for publishing or codifying the authoritative customary law. The patricians indeed strove for ten years to put off the proposal of Terentilius; but the Tribunes did not yield, and finally in the year 451 the commission demanded was established, the *decemviri legibus scribundis*. That the Ten might devote themselves to their by no means light

task without pressure and hindrance, the whole powers of government were also put into their hands; in other words, the constitution was suspended during the decemvirate. The commission was able at the end of the year to present ten tables. The great work was not yet ended with this; a new election for the coming year was therefore needful. In this a member of the previous decemviral board with plebeian sympathies, Appius Claudius, carried through a proposal that five plebeians should be elected upon the commission; and this is probably the reason why tradition, which almost without exception favours the patricians in its painting, can give only an unfavourable account of the second year and conclusion of the decemvirate. Thus the story of Appius Claudius' development into a tyrant and his outrage upon Virginia, which led to the fall of the decemvirs, deserves no belief. It is however possible that the patrician decemvirs after the completion of their activity delayed the restoration of the old constitution in order to remove the hated tribunes; for the next Consuls who succeeded the decemvirs, among other things, expressly guaranteed anew the inviolability of the tribunes (449 B.C.).

The so-called Laws of the Twelve Tables were thus no change in the constitution and had nothing to do with constitutional law; they were a publication of regulations of the penal and civil law. The story that the decemvirs studied Greek law and actually availed themselves of it in their work is not incredible, especially as we know that after the decemvirate the Greek measure was adopted by the Romans.¹ The law of Gortyn in Crete also shows points of likeness.

§ 7. FURTHER GAINS OF THE PLEBEIANS

The *Leges Valeriae Horatiae*, introduced by the first Consuls after the decemvirate (449), reassert the inviolability of the Tribunes of the Commons, bring again into force the *lex*

¹ This measure was used in building the so-called Servian city wall, which thus was not constructed until after the decemvirate.

Valeria de provocatione that had been passed in 509, and lay down a new principle of deep significance, 'what the plebs shall determine in the comitia of the Tribes shall be binding upon the whole people' (*ut quod tributim plebs iussisset populum teneret*). So together with the importance of the comitia of the Tribes grew the influence of the Tribunes, who henceforth are to be regarded as lawful magistrates.

Two years later the quaestorship (447 B.C.) was separated from the consulate, and the management of the State's property was thus removed from the Consuls. The quaestors, two in number, were necessarily patricians; but their election was made in the comitia of the Tribes.

A great gain for the plebs was marked by the *lex Canuleia*, which gave the plebeians community of marriage with patricians (*conubium*) and opened the way to the consulate (445). The importance of this law however was for the time lessened by the patricians, in their unwillingness to see the first office of the State desecrated by a plebeian, passing a regulation by which it was allowable to elect in place of Consuls 'Military Tribunes with Consular Power' (*tribuni militum consulari potestate*).¹ So great still was the influence of the privileged class upon the course of elections in the centuriate comitia that in the first forty years after this law, in which Military Tribunes were elected nearly twenty times, not one plebeian rose to this office.

That the patricians however already realised the possibility of the election of a plebeian Consul is proved by the establishment of the censorship (*censura*), which took place already in the next year (443). This was an office by which the important duties of selecting senators and holding the census in accordance with the so-called Servian Constitution were severed from the consulate and transferred to new patrician magistrates, the censors, who were to be elected for five years.

In general the dominance of the patricians was for the

¹ Their number varies between 3, 4, 6, and 8.

present still unbroken. Nothing proves this better than the murder of the rich plebeian Spurius Maelius, which is recorded in this age (439). On the occasion of a famine he is said to have distributed corn gratis to the poor; hence he came to be suspected by the patricians of aspiring to tyranny, and was put out of the way by them without any legal proceeding. The case recalls the equally unhappy end which fifty years earlier had befallen Spurius Cassius on account of his popular agrarian law.

But the struggles of the plebeians for constitutional equality with the patricians, now crowned with brilliant successes, went on in an unceasing course. In the year 421 they were able to gain access to the patrician office of the quaestorship, by which they obtained a share in one of the most important branches of the administration.

§ 8. THE EXTERNAL EVENTS OF THIS EPOCH

Foundation of Colonies.—In the second half of the fifth century the Romans begin to gain a firm footing in the domains of hostile neighbouring races. The colonies established by them were not new foundations, but consisted in the immigration of a number of Roman burghers into a conquered town, which surrendered to them perforce a corresponding part of its real estate. The oldest colonies appear to be Ardea on the south-west by the Alban Hills, which had the territory of the crushed Volscian city of Corioli added to its domain (442), and Fidenae, originally Latin, but constantly inclining to the Etruscans, though later, when it sought to cast off the Roman yoke, it was wholly destroyed and its land reverted to the Romans as *ager publicus* (426). The continued wars with the Volsci and Aequi also led to the foundation of colonies, as Labici (now Colonna) and Bolae, both on the road to the country of the friendly Hernici, Velitrae (Velletri), and Satricum (near Conca?), and above all Anxur or Tarracina, founded in 406, and a power by sea.

War with Veii.—The incorporation of the domain of Fidenae in the *ager publicus* (see above), which brought the Romans up to the borders of the Veientes, must have led to new quarrels with the jealous mistress of Southern Etruria. The contest, which is reputed to have broken out in 406 and to have lasted ten years, has been expanded by historical imagination into a second Trojan War, the central point of which is the personality of M. Furius Camillus. It ended with the destruction of Veii, and brought to the Romans a very considerable extension of territory, in which the confederated Latin States also shared.

From this war is derived a change in the organisation of the Roman army which later had important political results. On account of the long duration of the war, which moreover demanded for the first time winter campaigns, it was decided to introduce *payment*. Hence there arose from the well-to-do circles alike of patricians and plebeians who rejected such support a new troop outside the military *centuriae*, a volunteer cavalry, out of which in course of time developed a new civil order, that of the Knights.

The advance of Roman power, in which we may mark the annihilation of Veii as a culminating point, was rudely interrupted by the visitation of the Gauls (387). Kelts, styled by the Romans *Galli*, by the Greeks *Galatai*, had forced their way from modern France into Upper Italy and won more and more ground, especially from the Etruscans, who formerly had extended even into the valleys of the Raetian Alps.

The struggles for possession of the district of the Po may have already been going on for many years before the collision with the Romans occurred. The story is told that when the Etruscan town of Clusium was beleaguered a Roman embassy haughtily summoned the Gauls to an immediate retreat and then again, in defiance of all international law, took a share in the contest. When the Roman people refused satisfaction, the Gauls pressed onwards along the Tiber and inflicted by the Allia such a defeat upon the Roman army that but few are said to have escaped, and the 'day of the Allia,' *dies Alliensis*, was one of the Romans'

most terrible memories. So great was the dismay at Rome that they gave up the city for lost, bestowed the women and children together with the removable objects of religion into the neighbouring towns, and decided to defend the Capitol only. Three days after the battle the Gauls appeared, and Rome fell a prey to the flames. Only the Capitol was maintained, and for seven months the barbarians, unskilled in the arts of siege, strove in vain to force it to surrender.¹ Finally, we are told, the Romans induced them to withdraw by the payment of 1000 pounds of gold.

It is a singular coincidence that this deep humiliation of Rome occurred in the very year in which Athens too received a deadly blow by the so-called Peace of Antalcidas.² While however the heyday of the Greek metropolis was already past and her dominance for ever lost, Rome in the strength of youth recovered with surprising quickness from her discomfiture.

CHAPTER IV

From the Visitation of the Gauls to the Alliance of the Romans with the Campanians (387-338 B.C.)

In this period the struggle of the orders is practically concluded, and Rome develops from a dominant city of Latium into a Great Power in Italy.

§ 9. THE CONTINUATION AND CONCLUSION OF THE STRUGGLE OF THE ORDERS

The so-called Leges Liciniae Sextiae.—The plebeian tribunes Lucius Licinius Stolo and Lucius Sextius, we are told,

¹ Here belongs the legend of Marcus Manlius Capitolinus, who when awakened by the cackle of the geese saved the fortress.

² [This peace was really a rescript from King Artaxerxes Mnemon, which laid down that the Persians should hold the Greek cities of Asia, and that all other Greek States should be independent, Athens retaining nothing but Lemnos, Imbros, and Skyros.]

waged for ten years a struggle of intense bitterness against the patricians in championship of the following three proposals: (1) that, to diminish the burden of debt on the poor, interest paid be deducted from the capital and the remainder paid within three years; (2) that no burgher possess more than 500 *iugera*¹ of public land; (3) that the Military Tribunes be done away with, and *one* Consul be of necessity a plebeian.

Clearly the first two regulations sprang from solicitude for the poorest class of the population, who must have been also especial sufferers from the devastations of the Kelts; but it is equally certain that the first, from the unintelligibility of its matter, lacks historical authority, while the second assuredly cannot have then been passed, since the small extent of the State's possessions of itself precluded such an average size of individual estates. The third law however, which restores the consulship and divides it henceforth permanently between patricians and plebeians, may be regarded as the conclusion of the struggle between the two orders for equalisation of rights (366 B.C.).

The Praetorship and the Curule Aediles.—The patricians made another attempt to reserve for themselves a portion of the highest official powers by transferring the chief jurisdiction to a new patrician magistrate, the Praetor. In order not to lose the influence on the people obtained by their organisation of the national games, the *Ludi Romani*, it was determined that the management of these games should remain in the hands of two patricians, the Curule Aediles. But these two positions also were won in the course of the next thirty years by the plebeians. To bring at once to an end our description of the contest of the orders—down to the last years of this century one office after the other fell into plebeian hands, dictatorship, censorship, and finally too by the *lex Ogulnia* (300) all priestly posts of political value, so that now nothing remained of the preserves of the patricians but the

¹ [The *iugerum* contains 28,800 square feet, or 2523.3 square metres.]

private cults and the insignificant office of the Sacrificial King (above, § 4).

After the conclusion of the contest of the orders there gradually arose a new grouping of parties, which bore in it the germ of a fruitful development in state life. From the prosperous and noble families of the two now reconciled orders emerged a new nobility (*nobilitas*), the 'nobility of office,' as it has been called, since henceforth the offices of State were filled up from its circles. The patriciate indeed lived on, but only as a private society united by race, without political influence.

§ 10. THE WARS AND CONQUESTS FROM 387 TO 338 B.C.

Wars as Results of the Gallic Invasion.—The old tradition tells us of wars with the Aequi, Volsci, and Etruscans, which began immediately after the retreat of the Gauls and were prolonged for many years. The foundation of colonies and organisation of new tribes which we see arising in this period teach us better than any annalistic exaggerations that finally the Romans had the advantage everywhere. On Etrurian soil Sutrium and subsequently Nepete were founded, thus keeping in check South Etruria, where in particular the cities of Falerii and Tarquinii long resisted the Romans. In the south the colonies of Satricum and Setia secured Roman influence on Volscian territory. Stories too are told of disturbances among the Latins; the strong hill-town of Praeneste (the modern Palestrina) in particular figures often in contests with the Romans. That no great reliance was to be placed on the loyalty of the Latins is shown also by the fact that in 358 the Latin Confederation had to be renewed.

Romans and Samnites.—In the inhospitable heights of the Apennines, south-east of Latium, dwelt the rude hill-folk of the Samnites, who like the Latins were of Sabellian origin and were subdivided into many families. Their civilisation was slight, but their ability for war was all the

greater; they had attested it by the conquest of the southwestern part of the peninsula, while Rome was winning her dominant position in Latium. Lucania, Bruttium, and, above all, flourishing Campania had been occupied by this Sabellian race. But the bond between these projected portions of the Samnite nation and the parent stock was a loose one, and indeed gradually broke off altogether, especially in Campania, where the high civilisation of the country, due equally to Etruscans and Greeks, turned the wild children of the mountains almost into a new people. So it came about that the Highland Samnites soon confronted the Campanians as enemies and cast lustful eyes on their favoured land.

It may be that the Romans took notice of these warlike neighbours of theirs in consequence of their too frequent troubles with the Gauls; it may be that the striving for expansion which was common to both races aroused a community of interest between them. However it was, the Romans in this period entered into friendly relations with the Samnites and in the year 354 concluded a formal alliance. Protected by this, the Romans finished the subjugation of the Volsci and the Aurunci, who dwelt south of the latter, while the Samnites subdued the neighbours of the Aurunci, the Sidicini.

Later, when fierce wars had been fought out between the two peoples, a so-called 'first Samnite war' was constructed out of this peaceful meeting. This 'war' is described to us in exact detail but it deserves no credit because—to say nothing of other cogent arguments—we find the Samnites acting as neutral spectators, perhaps indeed as allies of Rome, in the great Latin war just at this time breaking out.

The Latin War and Dissolution of the Latin League (340-338).—Seemingly the confederate Latin cities, to whose aid Rome owed her successes, felt themselves neglected and claimed greater recompenses for the heavy demands upon them. The Romans regarded the Latins' requests as a declaration of war, and at once began military operations,

which on this occasion did not consist of the rude straight hitting hitherto usual, but imply a deliberate plan. They did not directly advance southwards against the rebellious Latins, but marched through the territory of the friendly Hernici and other small peoples into the valley of the Liris and thus inserted themselves between the Latins and their allies the Campanians. Here, on the border between Latium and Campania, near to the little town of Sinuessa, were fought two battles, in which Rome was victorious.

The Latin Confederation, that is, the union of the Latin cities with one another, was dissolved; each city entered on its own account into a particular relation with Rome, which for the most of them amounted to complete subjugation. A number became 'burgher corporations without suffrage' (*civitates sine suffragio*), that is, they undertook the duties without the rights of Roman burghers, and received a supreme judge from Rome (*praefectus iuri dicundo*). Others were less considerately treated; either they wholly lost their communal existence and were turned into a Roman tribe, or at least they were forced to receive a Roman colony, usually of 300 burghers, to whom they had to assign the best part of their real estate. At this time too the powerful sea-town and old foe of Rome, Antium (Porto d'Anzio), became her subject. Only two of the most important Latin towns, Tibur (now Tivoli) and Praeneste, remained independent and concluded a private alliance with Rome.

The Conquest of Campania.—An important result of these victories was the conquest of Campania, which on the whole was accomplished peacefully. The most powerful cities of the land, Capua, Cumae, and Acerrae, entered into confederate relations with Rome, which gave them community of law and matrimony with the Romans, bound them to army service, but left them their independent administration. Henceforth the Roman name appears on Campanian coins.

CHAPTER V

*From the Conquest of Campania to the
Subjugation of Italy (338/4-266 B.C.)*

In this period internal politics are overshadowed by the mighty wars which were a result of complications with the Samnites and for many years raged through the whole peninsula. The final victory was on the side of the Romans, who at the conclusion of this period may be regarded as masters of Italy. In regard to culture also this age is one of great significance, as the Romans come into the closest connection with the Greek civilisation then at its zenith in Southern Italy, and henceforth Hellenism pervades Roman life.

§ 11. THE SAMNITE WARS, 326-290 B.C.

The First (so-called 'Second') Samnite War (326-304).
—The Romans' intrusion into Campania naturally disturbed the Samnites most sorely; and when their important military station on the Liris, Fregellae, was occupied by the Romans, and moreover Neapolis, the most flourishing commercial town in the country, followed the example of Cumae and Capua by entering into the same confederate relations with Rome, the Samnites took up arms. As regards this contest too tradition is of little service. The fortunes of war long vacillated. After a severe defeat, the confinement in the Caudine Forks (passes leading from Capua to Beneventum) in 321, the Romans lost among other places Fregellae; and although they succeeded later in forming a union with the Apulians and Lucanians, their position in Campania was so shaken as a result of a second defeat near Tarracina that Capua fell away from the confederacy (315). But the desperate exertions now made by the Romans met with better success. In 314 Capua and in 313 Fregellae were recovered, and they could even venture to found a new colony, Interamna, still further south upon the mountain-road leading through the valley of the Liris. Though forced to struggle in this period against the Gauls and Etruscans and against many

revolted allies as well, the Romans yet succeeded in the end in maintaining their positions, and by the year 304 we may regard the first Samnite War as at an end; the Samnites were bound down within the limits occupied by them and almost wholly cut off from the sea.

The Second (so-called 'Third') Samnite War (298-290).—The Romans at once proceeded to secure their new conquests by the foundation of fortified military colonies and of roads. They completed too the *Via Appia*, the 'queen of roads', which had already been commenced during the first war by the Censor Appius Claudius, and by means of two new roads leading eastwards from Latium through the country between Etruria and Samnium they made the Samnite territory accessible to their armies from the north also.

Against these advances of the Romans the Samnites, probably in collusion with the Gauls and Etruscans, and with the support of the races of Central Italy and the Lucanians,¹ took up arms anew under the able leadership of Gellius Egnatius. The Romans themselves regarded the contest as so critical that they enrolled in the legions married men and even freedmen. But in the decisive battle near Sentinum, in Umbria (295), the fortune of war was on the side of their leaders, Q. Fabius Rullianus and P. Decius Mus. The coalition was broken up, Umbria came into the hands of the Romans, and in spite of many successes the Samnites by themselves were unable permanently to stand against the superior power of Rome. They kept their home in the mountains; but the subjection of Campania to the Romans and their conquests in Lucania and Apulia were now finally assured (290).

¹ The successes in Lucania are associated with the name of L. Scipio Barbatus, the oldest of the Scipios known to us, whose sarcophagus, with an inscription referring to this war, was found in the family grave on the Via Appia in the present century (now in the Vatican Collection).

§ 12. THE WAR WITH TARENTUM AND PYRRHUS,
282-275 B.C.

In these wars, which brought a large part of Lower Italy also under the dominion of the Romans, no share had been borne by the most powerful State of the south, the Greek commercial city of Tarentum. It had been well content to see its ever hostile neighbours the Lucanians in distress. When however the Romans supplied a garrison to Thurii, a city on the Tarentine Gulf and now hard pressed by the Lucanians (284), and a few more of the southern Greek colonies fell to them, collision between them and the commercial republic dominating in the Ionic waters was inevitable.

As regards the origin of the war, Roman history has published an account which obviously is only intended to put the opponent in the wrong. In reality, the appearance of a Roman squadron in Tarentine waters, which by an old treaty were closed to them, was a filibustering attempt, which the Tarentines repelled by armed force (282). For the Romans a serious war was now very inconvenient; but as the Tarentines raised it at once by the occupation of Thurii and refused all mediation, the former had to make up their minds for a new contest (281).

Into this war enters one of the most interesting personalities of that period, the tried soldier King Pyrrhus of Epirus, whose lofty imagination pictured to him Alexander the Great as a model and the establishment of a second Hellenistic world-empire in the West as a goal. After the manner of the later Italian *condottieri*, Pyrrhus put himself at the service of the Tarentines, and appeared with 25,000 men and 20 war-elephants on Italian soil (280). In his first conflict with the Romans at Heraclea, near the Lucanian coast, he won a great victory, thanks to his elephants, which were entirely strange to the Westerns. The Romans had indeed to withdraw their garrisons from Lucania; but in the

next year they resumed the contest, and although once again they were defeated in the severe battle near the Apulian Asculum,¹ they still maintained themselves in Apulia, and Pyrrhus' successes were valueless (279). This induced the restless man, weary of the fruitless war in Italy, to comply with a call to Sicily to aid his father-in-law Agathocles of Syracuse, who was hard pressed by the Carthaginians; and here he spent several years.

Meanwhile the Romans had struggled on with varying luck in Southern Italy and were pressing most heavily on the Samnites, when Pyrrhus after the total failure of his Sicilian projects was able to resume the Italian war (275). Near the capital of Samnium, Beneventum, was fought a third great battle, in which the Romans were completely victorious. Pyrrhus now gave up his Italian schemes as well, and having left a garrison in Tarentum returned to his adventurous operations in Greece. When during one of these he lost his life (272), his general Milo evacuated Tarentum also and left it to the Romans, who had long had a party of sympathisers in the city. Thus the conquest of Southern Italy is completed.

§ 13. THE CONTESTS WITH THE ETRUSCANS AND GAULS

The military importance of Rome, so brilliantly demonstrated in the obstinate wars with the Samnites and the South Italian coalition, appears in a still brighter light when we consider that throughout this period a portion, often indeed a half, of her fighting strength had to be employed against the northern peoples. The Gauls from time to time renewed the attempt to penetrate into Central Italy, and in particular found in certain cities of the Etruscans ever ready allies against Rome. Thus the Romans were frequently compelled to campaigns into these regions, as regards the course of which we have on the whole but uncertain accounts

¹ 'Another such victory, and I am lost,' was Pyrrhus' reputed saying; hence the phrase 'Pyrrhic victory.'

preserved to us. In any case they succeeded in maintaining the colonies of Sutrium and Nepete, which had been imperilled during the first Samnite war, and were a thorn in the side of the Etruscans. These northern opponents became more dangerous when in the second Samnite war they united with the Samnites and the Italic races dwelling between Etruria and Samnium also joined them. At Sentinum (295) the Romans would probably have failed to withstand the united power of the allies, among whom the Gauls were the most formidable, had not the Etruscans during the fight withdrawn from the field. This victory allowed the Romans to breathe for a time on the northern seat of war, and made it indeed possible for them to found the strong fortress of Hatria¹ in the district of the Piceni, near the coast of the Adriatic Sea.

Ten years later (285) the disturbances began again to assume a dangerous form; for now the Senones annihilated a Roman army at Arretium (Arezzo). Punishment however did not delay, and was sternly executed; the Romans pressed with strengthened forces into the territory of the Senones, and crushed the whole race with such pitiless severity that henceforth its name disappears from the roll of Italic peoples. Their chief town Sena Gallica (Sinigaglia) was made into a maritime colony of Rome. The treatment of the Senones fired the Gauls and Etruscans again to a common struggle for independence, the issue of which was once more favourable to the Romans. After several battles the coalition broke up, and by the occupation of Ariminum (Rimini) on the Adriatic Sea the Romans extended their sphere of dominion considerably further northwards.

Thus at the conclusion of this period the Roman power stretches from Ariminum down to Tarentum; in other words, Italy with the exception of Gaul is subjected to the Romans.

¹ This Hatria is not to be confused with the port of Adria (Hatria) between the mouths of the Po and Adige, which has given its name to the Adriatic Sea.

SECTION II

FROM THE SUBJECTION OF ITALY UNTIL THE
FALL OF THE REPUBLIC, 266-29 B.C. (FOUND-
ATION OF THE WORLD-EMPIRE)

CHAPTER VI

*Establishment of Supremacy in the Countries
of the Mediterranean (266-133 B.C.)*

Sources.—With this period the sources begin to be more abundant and reliable. First mention now belongs to the famous contemporary and friend of Scipio Africanus Minor, the Greek Polybius, who wrote about 140 B.C. his forty books of 'Histories,' of which the first five are preserved (264-221 B.C.). Among other sources, he drew upon the Annals of Q. Fabius Pictor, the oldest Roman historian (though he wrote too in Greek), who composed his work shortly after the Second Punic War. For the period 218-167 Livius (Books 21-45) is preserved to us; he probably made more use of Polybius than can be now proved. Third, and equally influenced by Polybius, is the Greek Appian, living in the age of the Emperor Antoninus Pius, who gives us connected narratives; of his surviving books may be mentioned here the Iberian (vi.), Hannibalic (vii.), Libyan (viii.), Macedonian (ix.), the partly preserved Illyrian (x.), and the Syrian (xi.)

Important isolated pieces of information are found in the Biographies of Cornelius Nepos (a contemporary of Cicero), and of Plutarch. Furthermore the surviving epitomes (*periochæ*) of almost all the 142 books of Livius are not without value, and much useful matter is supplied by the excerpts and fragments from the great works of Diodorus and Cassius Dio.

Social Changes.—Rome had now become a Great Power, and took her place on terms of equality with the other civilised States of the Mediterranean; by means of the Romanised trade-emporium of the Etruscans and above all of the South-Italian Greeks, the State of farmer-burgers grew into the Commercial State. New life, generally touched with Greek influence, appears now in all domains. So Rome in this age creates for the first time a coinage which can gain currency in the traffic of the world, converting into coin the lumps of copper it had formerly dealt out by weight and beginning to stamp silver money after the Attic standard. The extension of the sphere of power calls for an increase of the official staff and the establishment of new offices; military roads, like the magnificent Via Appia, cross the new acquisitions, connect the fortresses and colonies founded to secure them, and

convey Roman life and Roman speech in all directions through Italy. On the other hand, the influences of foreign culture also enter now with potency into the land; Greek, Greco-Campanian, and Etrurian art-products find a sale among the Romans and arouse an industry of their own; and even in intellectual life the superiority of the Greek genius gradually overcomes the rudeness of the stubborn Roman character. It must be confessed that the beginnings of Roman art and poetry, which fall in this period, are still distinctly clumsy and merely imitative.

§ 14. THE FIRST PUNIC WAR, 264-241 B.C.

Rome and Carthage until their Collision.—Itself originally tributary to Libyan races, the African commercial republic of Carthage had in the fifth century made itself independent and rapidly subjugated the region behind it; but it was especially through its possessions outside Africa, in Sicily, Sardinia, Corsica, and Spain, that it had obtained its great wealth and become a sea-power of the first rank. As by factories it ruled also the commerce of the western coast of Italy, it was certain to come into connexion with the Romans at latest when the latter by founding Ostia, the port of the Tiber, reached the coast. In view of the vast superiority of the Carthaginians, this first meeting can only have been a friendly one; and the compacts concluded between the two powers, of which tradition assigns the older to the first year of the Republic, must imply the predominance of the Phœnician Commercial State so long as the Romans did not and could not raise any claim to rank as a sea-power. This relation changed when Rome by subduing Italy brought under its sovereignty important sea-towns in all quarters, and was thereby summoned to play a part in the maritime trade of the Mediterranean and thus in the commerce of the world.

The War.—After the death of Agathocles of Syracuse a band of mercenaries summoned by him into the land, the so-called *Mamertini*, had occupied Messina (Messina), but were vigorously assailed by the new ruler of Syracuse, Hiero. They turned for help towards Rome, which deemed itself bound to grant protection to the 'Italici' (265). Hiero

sought the mediation of the Carthaginians, who actually succeeded in bringing about a union of the conflicting parties. When the Romans heard this, they occupied by an audacious stroke Rhegium and Messina, upon which the Carthaginians declared war on them (264 B.C.).

The Romans in the first two years of the war maintained themselves in Messina and gained a brilliant victory under M. Valerius Messalla (an honorific name derived from *Messana*). Hiero now went over to them, and thus they became masters of the east coast. Soon the chief basis of Carthaginian power on the south coast, Agrigentum (the Greek *Akragas*, now *Giugenti*) fell into their hands, and the Carthaginians found themselves limited to their naval fortresses in the western part of the island, Panormus (Palermo) and Lilybaeum (Marsala), which were believed to defy capture (262).

On the other hand the Carthaginians with their excellent fleet inflicted the severest damage upon the Romans by continuous privateering and attacks upon the Italian coasts. At last the Romans determined to equip a fleet, making indeed heavy calls upon the sea-towns subject to them. This first Roman fleet owed a victory¹ gained near the Lipari Islands on the north-west coast of Sicily to a brilliant invention of their leader M. Duilius, who by movable boarding-bridges converted the sea-fight into a land-battle (260). The consequences of this were however insignificant. In the following years the struggle went on with varying success in Sicily, Corsica, and Sardinia. An expedition to Africa, rendered possible by the issue of the great sea-fight at the promontory of Ecnomus on the south coast (256), seemed to lead up to the crisis. But owing to the want of foresight of M. Atilius Regulus this undertaking failed,² and the war was

¹ The new Capitoline Museum preserves an ancient copy of the column raised in honour of this victory.

² The well-known story of the martyrdom of Regulus is ill attested; it is probably an invention of the sort usually promulgated by family chronicles.

shifted back to Sicily, where the Romans effected the valuable conquest of Panormus (254), but were hindered from further advances by the brilliant ability of the new Carthaginian general Hamilcar Barcas, the father of the great Hannibal. By his occupation of Mount Heircte (Monte Pellegrino near Palermo) he kept his foes for years in check (248-3). It was the most inglorious period of the war for Rome, and brought her near to exhaustion. Then wealthy private persons offered the State a new fleet of 200 ships, with which the consul L. Lutatius Catulus gained a victory near the Aegatian islands on the west coast of Sicily, which compelled the Carthaginians to abandon to the Romans their last bases, Lilybaeum and Drepanum (241). With this the war was at an end; the Carthaginians paid an indemnity and surrendered to the Romans the island of Sicily as far as it was in their possession. Hamilcar Barcas obtained permission to withdraw with his army.

Sicily, the first Roman 'Province.'—With the occupation of the island of Sicily, which with the exception of the kingdom of Hiero of Syracuse fell to the Romans, a new chapter begins not only in the history of Roman administration but in the tendency of Roman policy in general. It is not the result of chance that just at the time when the First Punic War ended the last of the Roman burgher-tribes was established, and their number, now amounting to thirty-five, was never exceeded. Therewith was completed the task of the national union of Italy under the banner of Rome. In this firm civic structure a transmarine possession could no longer find a place, and thus by the acquisition of Sicily Rome was diverted into a new path; from a national Great Power it became an international World-Power.

The administration of the new possession could no longer be fitted into the framework of the tribal constitution, and thus arose a new administrative department, which received the name *provincia*. The first place in it was taken by a praetor, who represented above everything the supreme jurisdiction; by his side stood the quaestors, who managed the

business of taxation and the treasury. The position of the 'provincials' was at first not unfavourable, if we compare it with that of the allies of the mainland. They are not bound to military service, they preserve their real estate and their own municipal administration; but in return they have to hand over as tribute from the fields a tithe of the harvest and from the ports five per cent. on imported and exported merchandise.

Further results of the First Punic War.—Directly after the conclusion of peace a rebellion of her mercenaries and subject peoples involved Carthage in a war of several years' length; and it was only with the utmost difficulty and solely through the ability of Hamilcar Barcas that it ended to the advantage of the Carthaginians (239). In its course the island of Sardinia also revolted and offered itself to the Romans, who occupied it at the moment when the Carthaginians were preparing to chastise it, and kept it in their hands by threatening the remonstrating Carthaginians with a new war. Corsica too was soon afterwards successfully attacked. On both islands however Roman domination was limited to the coasts which the Carthaginians had held before them. Thus in a few years after the conquest of Sicily Corsica and Sardinia likewise are Roman provinces.

§ 15. THE GALLIC AND ILLYRIAN WARS, 239-219 B.C.

War with the Gauls.—As fresh swarms of Kelts pressed in, the North-Italian Kelts in the year 238 began again to move southwards, and while the Romans were still busy in Corsica and Sardinia a strong Gaulish host appeared before Ariminum, the most northerly forepost of Roman power. It broke up in consequence of an internal dissension. When however the Romans a few years later (232) began to allot the territory of Picenum, next to the Gauls, to Roman burghers, the Gauls rose anew, burst with a force of 50,000 men into the Roman domain, and by their forays

caused severe damage. At last in the year 225 two Roman armies, of which one was just returning from Sardinia, united; and thus it was found possible to surround the Gauls in Etruria and inflict upon them a severe defeat near the coast-town of Telamor.

The Romans now turned their advantage to good account, determining to continue the war until they had definitively incorporated the whole of Gaulish Upper Italy. In this they quickly and finally succeeded, as the result of a second decisive victory near Clastidium (now Casteggio, to the west of Piacenza) and the consequent capture of Mediolanum (Milan), the capital of the Insubres (222). Conquest was followed closely by strategic occupation; the great road from Rome to Ariminum, the Via Flaminia, was built out and extended from Ariminum in the direction of Mediolanum. Here arose the fortresses of Mutina (Modena), Placentia, (Piacenza), and Cremona.

The Illyrian Wars.—Maritime interests in the Adriatic Sea caused the Romans to present a remonstrance against the continued privateering of the bold pirate-race of the Illyrians on the coasts of the modern Dalmatia before their queen Teuta. Not only were they refused any satisfactory answer, but one of the envoys was actually assassinated on the return journey. On this the Romans despatched a fleet of 200 ships against the kingdom of Teuta, destroyed her robbers' nests, and made a portion of the Illyrians their tributaries. Still more important was the fact that in gratitude for their liberation from the troublesome sea-rovers the Greek cities on the Adriatic coast, Apollonia and Epidamnus, as well as the island of Corcyra (Corfu), entered the Roman alliance. Such was the first Illyrian war, 229 B.C.

By thus gaining a footing on Greek soil—an act of deep significance for the future—the Romans were from the first brought into sharp opposition to the leading power of contemporary Greece, Macedon; and hence arose later pregnant complications. But soon afterwards the advance of the Macedonian cause in consequence of the battle of

Sellasia¹ led the Romans, though only indirectly, to a new Illyrian war, as their former protégé the Illyrian prince Demetrius of Pharos (the modern Lesina) abandoned them for Macedon and endeavoured to extend his sovereignty over the whole of Illyria. The rising was soon repressed, the kingdom of Demetrius absorbed, and the utmost possible support given everywhere to the anti-Macedonian party in Illyria. This was the second Illyrian war, 220-219 B.C.

§ 16. THE SECOND PUNIC (HANNIBALIC) WAR, 218-201 B.C.

The Barcidae in Spain.—As leader of a national party which regarded preparation for a second conflict with the Romans as a duty of self-defence, Hamilcar Barcas had obtained an appointment as general without the announcement of any definite mission. To create for himself a new army that should not be dependent on payment from Carthage, he went to Spain and there made great conquests. As to their course we have no detailed information; at any rate he had such brilliant success that he was able to establish on foreign soil as it were a second Carthaginian empire.

After his death, which occurred in 229, the affairs of the Carthaginians under the command of Hamilcar's son-in-law Hasdrubal continued still further to prosper. By founding New Carthage (*Carthago Nova*, the modern Cartagena) in Tarraconian Spain, where the silver mines produced a rich output, and by conquering the particularly fertile eastern coast up to the mouth of the Ebro, he not only opened up to his native city magnificent new sources of strength, but also secured for himself through his constant struggles with the Iberians and Kelts a trained army.

In the year 226 the Romans, who regarded with distrust the strengthening of the Carthaginian power, interfered in Spanish affairs by taking under their protection the originally Greek coast-cities of the east, Saguntum (Greek *Zakynthos*, north of Valencia) and Emporiae (north of Gerona), and calling upon the Carthaginians not to cross the Ebro. The request was granted.

When Hasdrubal in the year 221 had fallen by an assassin's hand, Hannibal, the son of Hamilcar Barcas, took the lead in the Spanish operations. The brilliantly gifted young man had been trained for command under the eye of his great father and had already approved

¹ [Antigonus Doson of Macedon had been summoned by the Achaean League to aid them against Sparta, which under Cleomenes was pressing them hard. He did so, and thus was gained the victory of Sellasia, by which Sparta was crushed, 222 B.C.]

himself under his brother-in-law Hasdrubal; filled with the deepest hatred of Rome, he wished to begin the war at once, but received contrary orders from his native city, where the peace party favourable to Rome still had the upper hand.

The Outward Cause of War.—Hannibal could not rest under the decision of the Senate at home. He had recognised that now the hour had come for striking out, and no regard for his position as an official of the State restrained him from following the call of destiny. Under the pretext that the Saguntines had interfered with Carthaginian subjects he attacked their city, standing as it did under the protection of Rome, and after a siege of eight months captured it (219). Upon this success the Carthaginians, certainly not unmoved by the rich booty sent to them by Hannibal, decided to give a refusal to the Romans' demand that the general should be surrendered to them and the friendly State compensated. On this war was declared (218 B.C.).

The Course of the War.—For the war excellent provision had been made by the activity of the Barcidæ in Spain. Hannibal had further drafted a plan of campaign which promised almost inevitable success if all the factors concerned came into effective operation at the right time. From Carthage a squadron was to threaten Sicily and disturb by assaults the Italian coasts; he himself intended to unite in Upper Italy with the Gauls, who were already won over to revolt, and then in Central Italy to hold out a hand to Philip V. of Macedon, who since the second Illyrian war (§ 17) had been a decided opponent of Rome.

The Romans ordered one Consul, Publius Cornelius Scipio, to Spain and the other, Tiberius Sempronius Longus, to Sicilian waters. But they did not succeed in reaching Hannibal in Spain and pinning him there; for Scipio allowed himself to be kept too long in the region of the Po by the already revolted Gauls, and when at last he arrived at Massilia (Marseilles) Hannibal had left the Pyrenees behind him and could not even be checked from crossing the Rhone. Scipio now sent the greater part of his army under

his brother Gnaeus to Spain, while he himself returned to Upper Italy to confront Hannibal there. The latter had executed his world-famous march across the Alps¹ with fearful loss—of about 60,000 men something like 35,000 had fallen—and after subduing the Taurini² had advanced up the Po valley, when Scipio met him near the Ticinus (Tessin) but was defeated. On this Hannibal crossed the Po, and by a tributary of its right bank came again into collision with the Roman army, which in the meantime had been reinforced by the troops of the second Consul Sempronius, now recalled from Sicily. By a stratagem Hannibal allured the Romans out of their unassailable position and inflicted on them so heavy a defeat that the campaign was ended for this year. For it was no part of Hannibal's scheme to storm the fortresses of Placentia and Cremona, whither the remnants of the defeated army had retreated; he longed above everything to reach Central Italy with speed, so as to bring about a revolt of the allies. The Consuls of the next year (217) therefore garrisoned the two military roads leading southwards, Gaius Flaminius the Tuscan at Arretium and Gnaeus Servilius the Adriatic at Ariminum; but Hannibal crossed the Apennines, in the region of the modern Florence, while Flaminius on account of the heavy spring rains was not yet expecting him, and marched past the unwitting Roman army, which now pursued him along the road between Arretium and Perugia, thus falling into the snare laid by their wily enemy. In the defile between Cortona and the Trasumene Lake (Lago di Perugia), which Hannibal had completely surrounded, the army of Flaminius was almost wholly annihilated. A few days later the reinforcement of 4,000 horsemen sent in advance by the other Consul also fell before the Carthaginians. Rome was seemingly in the utmost jeopardy.

But Hannibal, probably knowing that he could not crush Rome at a blow, refused the cheap glory of terrifying the

¹ In all probability over the Little St. Bernard.

² From these Turin gets its name.

city by a siege of prospective futility, and marched through the district of Picenum, which he devastated, to Samnium and Campania, where he had especial hopes of immediately winning the wealthy Capua for his cause. For the moment indeed he found himself disappointed in this hope, and the year passed in insignificant operations against the prudent Roman Dictator Quintus Fabius Cunctator ('the man of delay'), by whose side the dissatisfied Roman people set for a short time his junior in command, M. Minucius, as second Dictator—a case that stands unique in Roman history. For the winter Hannibal established himself in prosperous and fruitful Apulia, and in the leisure it brought him he carried through a military reform of the utmost importance, organising his army on the Roman model. The countless weapons taken as spoil were here of service to him.

Thus he was excellently prepared to meet the decisive blow planned by the Romans for the next year (216). They had carried on conscriptions on the largest scale and were able to bring eight legions into the field, so that some 50,000 Carthaginians were now confronted by about 86,000 Romans. One of the Consuls, L. Aemilius Paullus, had approved himself in the Illyrian war; the second however, C. Terentius Varro, was certainly from a military point of view insignificant, and on this account he alone was subsequently made responsible for the ensuing disaster. For near the little Apulian town of Cannae, on the lower course of the Aufidus (Ofanto), was fought the most terrible battle of the whole war; 70,000 Romans, among them the Consul Aemilius, are said to have strewn the field, which Hannibal maintained, thanks to his admirable African cavalry. Hannibal apparently had approached near to his goal; the South Italian confederates, notably the wealthy Capua, now came over to him, Philip of Macedon concluded an offensive alliance with him, and Syracuse, where in the meantime Hiero, the friend of Rome, had died, joined the Carthaginians. He passed the winter in Capua.

But in the next year (215) the war came to a standstill.

His untrustworthy new allies brought to Hannibal little or no increase of his fighting power, while the Romans, who under the leadership of M. Claudius Marcellus and the young Publius Scipio had quickly rallied themselves for the utmost exertions, laboured with success, particularly in Apulia, to reconquer their confederates' territory. Abroad too the Carthaginian cause did not attain the results hoped for; indeed the Romans gradually gained the upper hand everywhere.

The Struggles in Sicily.—Ever since the year 218, when Tib. Sempronius had perforce been summoned from Lilybaeum to support Scipio, Sicily had practically been denuded of Roman troops; and when likewise Syracuse, the most powerful city of the island, revolted from Rome the Carthaginians might with very little effort have recovered Sicily. But in Carthage a peddling spirit prevailed over national duties; they deemed it sufficient to allow Hannibal to go his own way, and supported their own cause so feebly that they did not even check the landing of the Romans in Sicily. The same Marcellus who had imposed the first check on the advance of Hannibal after the battle of Cannae landed in 214 before Syracuse and began to beleaguer the city. Supremely favoured by art and nature in its fortification, it made a heroic resistance¹ before it was captured (212). The consequence of this was the reconquest of the whole island, which may be regarded as completely pacified by 210.

The Struggles in Greece.—Philip of Macedon could not collect himself for any vigorous action; he operated on the Adriatic coast, but did not venture to cross over to Italy, as the two ports to be considered, Brundisium (Brindisi) and Tarentum, were in Roman hands. When however Tarentum in 212 was captured by Hannibal, the Roman general M. Valerius Laevinus at once crossed over from Brundisium to Greece in order to transfer the war into the enemy's own

¹ At this time lived in Syracuse the famous mathematician Archimedes, who put his science at the service of his native city by inventing defensive machines.

land. He joined here the Aetolian League, and for six years shared in the shameful war by which the Greeks since many years had been tearing out one another's vitals. In the year 206 a peace was brought about between Philip on one side and Rome and the Aetolian League on the other, in which the Romans procured the confirmation of the conquests made by them in the Illyrian wars (§ 17). This is the first Macedonian war.

The Struggles in Spain.—As the sources of strength which permitted the Carthaginians to rise so rapidly and unexpectedly after the first war lay in Spain, it was a thoroughly sound principle of Roman policy to choke them up for their opponent, and to combat him in that peninsula. Hence when his term of consular office had elapsed P. Scipio was sent in the year 217 after his younger brother Gnaeus to Spain, and the two brothers in the next six years displayed brilliant generalship. After turning the city of Tarraco (now Tarragona) into a Roman naval fortress and making it the chief basis of Roman power in Spain, they advanced over the Ebro southwards and extended their conquests as far as Andalusia, in which they were aided by the disfavour which most of the native races felt towards the Carthaginians. At last the Carthaginians recognised the great importance of Spain, decided to give stronger support to their general there, Hasdrubal, a brother of Hannibal, and induced the Numidian king Massinissa to repay them in Spain for the assistance they recently had lent him against his neighbour and rival Syphax. The Scipios succumbed to this united force, and both met their death in desperate battles (211).

A peculiar chance brought it about that a third Scipio, the young P. Cornelius Scipio, who had saved his father's life at the Ticinus and had begun under Marcellus to attest his genius for command, was summoned to avenge the cause of his family and restore to credit Rome's position in Spain. The favourite of the Roman people, he volunteered for the perilous post of general in Spain and obtained the command, although lacking the legal age for that rank (210). His

operations were attended with success; in 209 he captured the enemy's most important fortress, New Carthage (Carthago), and the glory won by him as he advanced from conquest to conquest would have been without limitation if he had also succeeded in preventing Hasdrubal from crossing the Pyrenees and hastening to aid his brother Hannibal. After two more years Scipio had so far broken Carthaginian domination in Spain that Mago, the third son of the great Hamilcar Barca, was commissioned by his native city to take ship with the remnant of the Spanish troops for Italy. Through this Gades, the last basis of the Carthaginians, fell into Scipio's hands, and he was able to return in triumph to Rome (206 B.C.).

The Italian Seat of War from 215 to 205.—The bold hopes which Hannibal was justified in building on the victory of Cannae had not been fulfilled; the accession that he hoped for and needed came to him in no quarter. It remains all the more remarkable that in the following years, the course of which is on the whole imperfectly known to us, he not only maintained himself against the ever increasing successes of the now rallying Romans, but actually made other important conquests. Thus in 212 Tarentum, and in the sequel several other Greek maritime colonies, fell into his hands; and besides this he had previously inflicted on the Romans many severe blows in the open field. But the war took a more favourable turn for the Romans through their success in recapturing disloyal Capua in 211. By the famous march on Rome, which he approached to within $4\frac{1}{2}$ miles,¹ Hannibal had indeed attempted to draw off the beleaguering army from Capua, but in vain; Capua was forced to surrender, visited by the utmost horrors of vengeance, and deprived of municipal existence. Hannibal now withdrew to Apulia.

Two years of indecisive struggles followed; but the first success of any importance was again on the side of the

¹ Hence the phrase *Hannibal ad portas*.

Romans, who in 209 recaptured Tarentum. Nevertheless their cause once more fell on evil days. In the year 208 the Latin communities, which hitherto had persisted in an unswerving loyalty, were forced by their complete exhaustion both to stop payment and to refuse conscription; and above all Hasdrubal appeared in the following year in Upper Italy. This occasion was Hannibal's last hope; if he succeeded in uniting with his brother he could resume the war with the fairest prospects. But a fatal accident ruined his design; the Consul Gaius Claudius Nero, who was confronting Hannibal in Apulia while his colleague M. Livius was leading the northern army, intercepted the message of Hasdrubal which was to summon his brother to Umbria. Deceiving Hannibal, who was waiting without suspicion for news, by leaving behind him his camp with a small garrison, he marched to the aid of his colleague with the flower of his army. At Sena Gallica on the Adriatic Sea the Consuls in union defeated the Carthaginian army of reinforcement, whose general fell (207). It was not until his brother's head was thrown into his camp that Hannibal learnt of the catastrophe, which caused him to withdraw into Bruttium. By this battle the war in Italy was really decided; Hannibal had no longer sufficient forces to face the Romans in a pitched battle, and confined himself to holding his ground in Bruttium, while the Romans continued with success the reconquest of the revolted districts.

The War in Africa, and the Peace.—The war first took a new turn when Scipio in the year 206 returned from Spain, was elected Consul for the next year, and during his consulship brought about a transference of the war into Africa. He caused himself to be appointed general-in-chief, and in 204 crossed over to Africa, where he landed unchecked at Utica, northwards of Carthage, though he failed to capture the town. In 203 he defeated in a pitched battle the Carthaginians and their ally, the formerly friendly Numidian prince Syphax, who had just deprived his rival Massinissa of his country. The Carthaginians then recalled Hannibal

and his youngest brother Mago, who had indeed landed in Upper Italy but failed to make any progress. At the same time they entered upon negotiations for peace with the Romans. These however were broken off owing to Hannibal's immediate resumption of hostilities; Mago had succumbed to his wounds during the journey home. Upon this Scipio determined on a decisive battle. Near Zama, a place whose site cannot be accurately fixed, the Romans gained so great a victory that the Carthaginians were forced to resign themselves unconditionally to peace (202). This was concluded in the year 201, with the following stipulations: Carthage was to surrender Spain and the islands of the Mediterranean, give up all but twenty of its ships of war, pay for fifty years a war-tax, confirm Massinissa in the possession of his kingdom which Syphax had disputed, and bind itself to wage external wars under no conditions and African wars only with the permission of the Romans. More crushing conditions for a great State could not be conceived.

§ 17. THE DIRECT CONSEQUENCES OF THE HANNIBALIC WAR

Italy.—For European history the conclusion of the great struggle between Rome and Carthage meant the victory of the Indo-Germanic stock over the Semitic; for Italy it brought with it final confirmation of the dominion of the Latin element. The latter now expanded boldly in all directions. New portions of the territory of revolted allies came into the hands of Roman veterans or State tenants; great colonies like Puteoli (Pozzuoli on the Gulf of Naples), Salernum (Salerno), &c., extended Roman power. In this period was laid the basis of that system of *latifundia* (gigantic estates) which became so fateful for the social development of Italy, as it led especially to a well-nigh complete destruction of husbandry and country life, which had already suffered terribly from the long war, in which about 400 villages are said to have been ruined.

Gauls and Ligurians.—The Gauls of Upper Italy, who had been the first to revolt to Hannibal, now sought to forestall Roman vengeance by a universal rebellion, which began with the destruction of the fortress of Cremona on the Po. But their internal dissensions came to the aid of the Romans, permitting them not only to maintain their supremacy but also to strengthen it by new fortresses, such as Bononia

WARS WITH MACEDON AND SYRIA 45

(Bologna), and by the extension of the network of roads (the *177* *Aemilia*, hence the name of the modern Emilia). By the junction of Bononia with Arretium in Etruria through a military road, the Apennines ceased to be even outwardly the boundary between Italy and Gaul. Aquileia, in the Gulf of Trieste, was intended to give security against the inroads of northern barbarians and also against a possible attempt at landing by Philip of Macedon, while the colony of Luna on the Etrurian border, connected with Rome by the *178* *Aurelia*, was to guard against the restless and still far from pacified hill-folk of the Ligurians (200-196 B.C.).

Africa.—Carthage was sorely imperilled by the Numidian prince Massinissa and in consequence presented remonstrances at Rome, though in vain. A change in its constitution was carried through by Hannibal which once more brought the patriotic party into power (195). This caused the Romans to claim the surrender of Hannibal, a demand which he only avoided by hurried flight.

Spain was divided into two provinces. The warlike spirit of its freedom-loving population rendered it a troublesome child among Rome's foreign possessions; yet she was forced to keep it at all cost lest its abundant resources might again be exploited by enterprising heroes like the *Barcidae*. In this period one of the commanders here was M. Porcius Cato, who from his old-fashioned severity, especially *Censor*, and as a writer has the credit of having composed the first Roman history in prose.

§ 18. THE WARS WITH MACEDON AND SYRIA

The Second Macedonian War.—Of the Great Powers that arose on the dissolution of Alexander the Great's world-monarchy, the most important were Egypt, Syria, and Macedon. In the year 205 a child mounted the throne of Egypt; and Antiochus of Syria and Philip of Macedon profited by this circumstance to divide between themselves the possessions of Egypt outside Africa. In consequence the Egyptian government entrusted the Roman Senate with the guardianship of the royal child. The Romans, still incensed against Philip for his interference in the Hannibalic war, and summoned moreover by the friendly free State of Rhodes to its aid, took at first the course of commanding Philip by embassies to desist; but when he actually threatened Athens they officially declared war, 200 B.C.

The first years of the war passed without either of the

opponents being able to register any success worth mention. But with Titus Quinctius Flaminius, who assumed supreme command in 198, began a more vigorous management of the war on the side of the Romans, which culminated in the following year in the brilliant victory of Cynoscephalae, a chain of hills in Thessaly. The Roman legion here dissipated the world-wide glory of the Macedonian phalanx. Philip was confined to Macedon, and forced to surrender his fleet of war and pay a heavy indemnity. To the Greek cities however, which had long been vegetating in hopeless disunion, Flaminius at the Isthmian Games of 196 proclaimed liberty. It required indeed enforcement at the point of the sword (against for instance the tyrant Nabis of Sparta), and the politically rotten Greek race could no longer make anything out of it. When in 194 the Roman conqueror left Greece, glances were already cast about in the Aetolian League for a new master; and Antiochus of Syria seemed to present himself in this light.

The War with Antiochus of Syria.—During the Macedonian war, in which Antiochus of Syria shamefully left his ally in the lurch, the faithless Seleucid had extended his conquests over the whole coast of Asia Minor and even gained a firm footing on European soil at Lysimachia on the Thracian Chersonnese (196). Disregarding Rome's remonstrance, he continued unchecked his work of conquest, in which he was well served by Hannibal, who had fled to him. True, the latter's brilliant plan, which aimed at crushing Roman power at a blow by risings in Macedon and Greece, an attack on Italy itself, a new Punic war, and at the same time an insurrection in Spain, was not carried out, mainly in consequence of the feebleness of Antiochus and the irresolution of the rest; but when in 192 the King of Syria occupied the island of Euboea and entered into relations with the Aetolian League, the Romans found themselves compelled to order a stop to his farther advance.

The Roman general Acilius Glabrio, who in 191 appeared in Greece, had only to deal with one opponent, for the Greeks did

not dare to strike. In the battle at the famous defile of Thermopylae he gained such a decisive victory over Antiochus that the latter at once abandoned the war in Europe (190). In Asia too the feeble Syrian suffered defeat after defeat; a fleet of Roman and Rhodian ships prevented Hannibal as he advanced with a fleet from the south from uniting with Antiochus, and the king himself, despite his far greater strength, was completely defeated at Magnesia (north-east of Smyrna) by the Roman land-army commanded by Lucius Scipio and his brother Publius, the victor of Zama. He called for peace at any price, lost all his conquests in Asia Minor, paid a heavy war indemnity, and had to limit his fleet to ten ships. Syria, the kingdom of the Seleucidae, was thereby struck off the roll of Great Powers (189 B.C.).

The arrangement of Eastern affairs took up several years more. In Asia Minor an increased number of independent States were established and the loyal confederates, Eumenes of Pergamon and the Rhodian State, rewarded by an increment of power. In Greece, where the feuds between the Achaean and Aetolian Leagues continued, the Romans were forced once again to take up arms. The Consul of the year 189, Fulvius Nobilior, forced the Aetolians by the conquest of Ambracia into quiet, though only for a time.

Soon after (183) the Romans lost their most dreaded foe, Hannibal. After the failure of the plan which he designed to execute with the help of Antiochus, he had withdrawn to the court of a prince of Asia Minor, Prusias of Bithynia, whom he tried fruitlessly to stir up against the Romans, and in the first instance against Eumenes of Pergamon. When he felt himself no longer secure with him he destroyed himself. In the same year also died his great opponent Scipio—like Hannibal, in banishment; he had been compelled to bow before the republican bigotry of his fellow-citizens, who could indeed tolerate great deeds, but not great men.

The Third Macedonian War.—In consequence of the continued injuries inflicted upon them with the undoubted connivance of the Romans by their *protégé* Eumenes of Pergamon, Philip and his son Perseus, who succeeded to his throne in 179, found themselves compelled to use their

country's still rich resources for quiet preparations. In these they were strengthened by a reviving Panhellenic current in Greece. On the continued pressure of Eumenes the Romans in 172 declared war under a flimsy pretext, and in the following year advanced into Greece. Perseus now showed such incapacity and want of spirit that the Greeks did not dare to take up arms. The war however was conducted by the Romans also without particular vigour until L. Aemilius Paulus, son of the Consul who fell at Cannae, took command (168). At Pydna in Macedonia was fought the decisive battle, by which the Romans gained a complete victory, shortly afterwards capturing the king himself with all his treasure.

The results of the war were ruinous to Macedonia. It was split up into four leagues, which were forbidden all mutual combination and had to pay a part of their revenues as tribute to Rome. The treatment of the Greeks was also severe. The States with Macedonian sympathies had already been conquered in the course of the war; fugitives were pursued with the utmost cruelty, and 1000 Achaeans were forced to submit to being removed as hostages to Italy.¹ A regular war of annihilation was conducted against the Epirote race of the Molossians, who had sided with Perseus; 150,000 are said to have been sold into slavery.

With the battle of Pydna the last great stand of the inhabitants of the Eastern Mediterranean against Rome's domination was broken; henceforth all these States are to be regarded merely as client-States of Rome, whose behaviour was ruled and directed by the word of the Senate. Rome had succeeded to the heritage of Alexander the Great.

§ 19. COMPLETION OF THE ROMAN SUPREMACY IN THE MEDITERRANEAN (149-133 B.C.)

The Third Punic War.—Owing to the activity and commercial ability of its inhabitants, Carthage had from a mercantile point of view risen anew to its former level, and thereby excited in a high degree the jealousy of Rome, where the demand for the destruction of the competitor was raised more and more loudly. The representative of this

¹ Among them was the historian Polybius, to whom we mainly owe our knowledge of this period.

war party in the Senate was old M. Porcius Cato.¹ In the want of scruple with which Rome was now wont to carry on its foreign policy, a pretext for war was easily found. The Carthaginians, irritated to the utmost by Massinissa's appropriation of Emporiae, their most fertile district (151), and again dismissed with their plaint by the Romans, took up arms against the Numidian king. The Romans regarded this as a direct declaration of war against themselves; for by the peace of 201 it had been forbidden to the Carthaginians to wage war against allies of Rome. The Carthaginians nevertheless wished to avoid war, and sent 300 hostages to Rome; when in spite of this a Roman army appeared in Africa (149), they even obeyed the harsh command to surrender the whole of their materials of war down to their last sword. But when the further demand was made that they should demolish Carthage and found a new city away from the sea, the struggle of despair for their beloved native soil broke out, and with the stubbornness peculiar to the Semitic race they prolonged it over two years. At last the son of the victor of Pydna, young Scipio Aemilianus, adopted by the family of the Scipios and appointed to the chief command in 147, succeeded in cutting off all access to the beleaguered by blocking up their last port—Carthage had several of them—and thus finally forcing them into surrender. Carthage was levelled to the ground, the surviving inhabitants transported to a spot far from the coast, and the district of Carthage made into the Province of Africa, with Utica as its capital (146). The chief profit from this perfidious war fell to the great merchants of Rome, whose party had brought it on; the trade of her powerful rival mainly passed over to Rome.

The Province of Macedonia.—A pretender to the throne, the 'false Philip' (*Pseudophilippus*), who claimed to be the son of Perseus, caused Macedon once again to embroil itself in a struggle with Rome, which was quickly settled in favour

¹ From him comes the well-known phrase, *ceterum censeo Carthaginem esse delendam*, the burden of his speeches in the Senate.

of Rome by the Praetor C. Caecilius Metellus (148). Rome now deprived Macedon of the last remnant of independence, and turned it into a Roman province in connexion with Epirus and Thessaly (146). By the road from Dyrrhachium (Durazzo) to Thessalonica (Saloniki) a junction was effected between the western and eastern coasts of the Balkan peninsula.

The Province of Achaia.—The restless Greek nation could not keep the peace. The Achaean League, guided by Critolaus and Diaeus, sought again to subjugate the cities set free by the Romans and thus caused the latter to interfere anew in the welter of Greek politics. After the failure of Metellus's efforts to repress the rising peaceably from Macedonia, the Consul L. Mummius appeared in 146 in Greece, captured Corinth,¹ the leading state of the Achaean League, after a victory at the isthmus, and quickly restored quiet. Greece was subordinated, under the title of 'Province of Achaia,' to the administrator of Macedon.

Spain and the Numantine War.—In Spain Roman dominion had the greatest difficulty in gaining a footing (§ 19). The valiant race of the Lusitani in particular compelled the Romans to repeated contests,² and during the third Punic war it had found a most skilful leader in Viriathus. But even after his murder (139) the struggle continued, and in particular the perfidious and shameful way in which the Romans conducted the war inspired the valiant Spaniards with ever fresh powers of resistance. It was not until the conqueror of Africa, Scipio, was despatched in 134 as Consul to Spain that fortune turned towards the Romans. After a siege of fifteen months Numantia on the upper course of the Duro, the chief town of the rebels, was reduced and thereby peace restored for a considerable time (133).

¹ Through the sack of Corinth countless treasures of art came to Rome and Italy.

² On the occasion of these wars, in the year 153, the Romans altered the date of the accession to the consulship from March 15 to January 1, in order to be able to despatch their Consul more speedily.

COMPLETION OF ROMAN SUPREMACY 51

The Province of Asia.—In the year 133 the last Attalid, Attalus III., died at Pergamon. Having lived continually at strife with his subjects, he bequeathed his kingdom to the Romans. As however an illegitimate son of Eumenes II. contested its possession with them for years, they were unable to enter upon their Pergamene legacy until the year 129, in which it was incorporated in the Roman empire as the 'Province of Asia.'

CHAPTER VII

From the Completion of the Supremacy in the Countries of the Mediterranean until the Fall of the Republic (Revolutionary Period)

133–29 B.C.

Sources.—Of the great historical works of Livius and Diodorus only fragments and excerpts remain for this age. Connected narratives are furnished by Appian's five books of the 'Civil Wars,' Sallust's 'Catiline Conspiracy' and 'Jugurthine War,' Caesar's 'Commentaries of the Gallic War' and 'Civil War,' with the continuations by his partisans on the African, Alexandrine, and Spanish wars. From the year 68 onwards Dio Cassius is completely preserved (Book 36 ff.). His description of this age is most valuably supplemented by the writings of Cicero, whose political speeches and correspondence furnish an inestimable and not yet completely exploited material for the period. Then reference should be made to the biographies of Plutarch (the two Gracchi, Marius, Sulla, Pompeius, Caesar, &c.), who drew upon lost but good sources. Some slight gain is to be derived from the little work of Velleius Paterculus, who in the reign of Tiberius related the whole history of Rome up to the year 30 B.C. in a brief outline filling only two books, with not uninteresting details on culture and literary history. The compilation of Trogus Pompeius (age of Augustus) entitled 'Philippic Histories,' which comprises forty-four books, but excludes specifically Roman history, contains valuable information as to the events in the East; it is preserved in Justin's summary. Finally, a source which furnishes us with the best and most important testimony from ancient history begins from this time onwards to flow more abundantly; this is the inscriptions, both of private and of official origin, the number of which, owing to fortunate finds, is still increasing daily, and the study of which has called forth the independent and fruitful science of epigraphy. They are collected in the *Corpus Inscriptionum Latinarum*.

Home Politics.—The stirring period from the first war with Carthage until the acquisition of Asia brings before us an almost unbroken series of wars, which mainly aimed at conquest and ended in conquest. The foreign wars in the next age, without entirely disappearing, nevertheless retire decidedly into the background, while internal political questions are being fought out, questions which have to find more and more pressing through the previous development of affairs and in advance to a violent solution. A new struggle of burghers and patricians arises, like that once waged by the plebeians against the patricians, but more dangerous, as it is no longer fought on the level of legality, and more deadly, as it is no longer the burghers of a city, but those of a whole State who are concerned. The republic however had no longer stability enough to resist permanently the pressure of new political demands and conceptions. It gave way. The domination of one man, the Monarchy, first restores a condition of order.

§ 20. INNER DEVELOPMENT FROM THE CONCLUSION OF THE CONTEST OF THE ORDERS UNTIL THE APPEARANCE OF THE GRACCHI

Officials, Nobility.—When the contest between the patricians and plebeians had disappeared as the struggle between the orders ended, a new grouping of parties soon came about. Formerly the patricians had arrogated to themselves almost all the citizens' rights to public distinction and thereby kept in their hands the administration of the State; now the important and wealthy families of both orders attempt to appropriate them, claiming for their members the exclusive privilege of filling official posts, especially in the Senate. The official nobility thus growing up, the *nobilitas*, may be regarded as the continuation of the old patriciate.

The significance of the high offices of State, of which the most important were the three *curule* offices, i.e. that of the curule aedile, the praetorship, and the consulship, grew proportionately as the State expanded in power. The administration of the provinces in particular brought about a complete revolution in the position of the higher officials. What was hitherto a distinction and a distinction now became an occasion for growing wealth. The old Roman morality, which the censor C. Porcius Cato wished to revive by word and writing was no proof against the temptations entailed by the possession and government of so great a number of prosperous countries. Even C. Scipio could not escape the suspicion of having soiled his hands by fraud. The *novus homo*, which overcame the caste-bound nobility extended likewise the jurisdiction lying in their hands and to the Senate, which was now vested almost exclusively, in spite of the law, with the administration of the State. Thus the advantages of the gigantic extension of the Roman Empire were really felt by only one class of men; amidst the *luxuria* and dissatisfaction and an earnest wish for democratic changes the constitution grew strong.

Land-System.—The welfare of the State depended on the prosperity of the agricultural population, and to a still more eminent degree in ancient times, when the mass of the population was composed of free peasants. Ignorance or heedlessness of this fact on the part of those who guided Roman policy was not the least of the causes of the downfall of the empire; and it was not until the period now to be discussed that the doom of Roman agriculture was sealed.

From the provinces, and particularly from Sicily, the granary of Rome, huge quantities of corn came to the Roman market, partly at the instance of wealthy persons who sought to enrich themselves over the people. This was sold at nominal prices; often the surplus was distributed to the people gratuitously. Such largesses of corn gradually came to be a part of the regular means of agitation used by those who wished to play a part in the politics; and thus native agriculture, unable to face any longer the depression of prices, was injured to the same extent as the condition of the peasants was thereby corrupted. The consequence was a steady decline in the cultivation of grain and in the position of the agricultural population. To this was added a further circumstance. The possession of landed property, which was no longer profitable for the peasant working with small means, fell into the hands of large owners, all the more as trade was forbidden to senators and men of senatorial rank, who in consequence found themselves compelled to invest their capital in real estate. But these owners of the *latifundia*, who could scarcely measure their estates, abandoned the more toilsome and expensive cultivation of grain for the more convenient cattle-breeding, which inevitably debased the culture of the land and substituted for a numerous and vigorous peasantry a feebler and incapable class of herdsmen. The foundation of the troubles which still afflict Italy was laid then.

Trade.—With the acquisition of the Mediterranean provinces Rome had entered into the commerce of the world; and the result of this was a complete revolution of social conditions. The world-dominion of Rome as it expanded and diverted to itself all the products and art of the East called into existence in this period a new order, that of the great traders (*negotiatores*), who had indeed their centre in Rome, but spread over all the provinces, partly to pursue trade on a great scale, partly to seek large revenues as government tax-farmers (*publicani*). To follow more unscrupulously this order, following the tendency of the age, carried on its business, the greater became the opposition between capital and the proletariat; and in the splendour and wealth which now inundated Italy lay already the germ of the terrible convulsions which awaited the republic.

The Slave System.—The welfare of the commons had suffered heavily through the ceaseless wars, especially through that with Hannibal, which desolated Italy itself; and later it had had no support either from a rise of agriculture or from the methods of commerce. Now it received a still deeper injury from the enormously increasing slave-system. The successful wars had thrown on the slave-market countless thousands of human beings, so that both the possessors of *latifundia* and the great traders could supply themselves with labour at ridiculously

low prices. Thus on the one hand native labour lost its value as the free peasant in the country and the small artisan in the town were ousted; and on the other hand these gigantic crowds of slaves concealed in themselves a grave danger. The first warning in regard to this came to the Romans through the Slave War in Sicily, where the system of *latifundia* was most extensive and had caused especially acute disorders (140-132). Under a brave leader Eunus, calling himself King Antiochus, the Sicilian slaves offered for several years a successful resistance to the Romans; it was broken in 132 by the capture of their strong towns Enna and Tauromenium (now Taormina). Signs of similar slave-rebellions showed themselves at the same time in Rome, in Attica, and above all in the island of Delos, which in this period rose to be the chief slave-market of the Mediterranean regions.

The Allies (Italici). The value of the right of Roman citizenship constantly rose as Rome took rank as a World-Power; and the allies felt their exclusion from this privilege as a more and more rankling injustice. They were all the more sensible of it from having had to bear on their own shoulders the main burden of the wars that had raised Rome to her present height, which only their loyalty had made attainable at all. Thus ill-feeling grew among the Italici too to such a degree that it actually led to an open revolt, for which of course the Romans inflicted swift and severe punishment.

§ 21. THE ATTEMPTS AT REFORM OF THE GRACCHI (BEGINNING OF THE REVOLUTION), 133-122 B.C.

The level reached by the corruption of the aristocratic official world is indicated by the fact that the permanent Criminal Courts introduced in the year 149 (the so-called *quaestiones perpetuae*) had assigned to them as their first province by the *lex Calpurnia repetundarum* the trial of offences of embezzlement. Even in the circles of the *Optimates*, as the party of the nobility were called in opposition to the democratic *Populares*, the recognition gained ground that the just wishes of the commons must be met. Thus the Consul for the year 140, C. Laelius, the well-known friend of Scipio, brought forward a bill for the distribution of the occupied but not legally alienated domain-land; but it was in vain. In the same circle of the Scipios, aristocratic but not averse to liberal views, there had grown up under the guidance of two eminent Greeks a youth who entered the lists for the cause of the oppressed with all the fire of youthful enthusiasm.

Tiberius Sempronius Gracchus (133), whose father had commanded not without distinction in Spain and whose mother was the famous Cornelia, the daughter of the elder Scipio Africanus, turned back to the much contested and scarcely ever executed Agrarian Law of Licinius, and as Tribune of the Commons brought forward the following proposal. No one should possess more than 500 *iugera* of the State's lands (*ager publicus*); for grown-up sons an extra 250 *iugera* apiece might be claimed, though more than 1000 *iugera* were not allowed to come into the hands of one family; of the land recovered by this measure, lots of 30 *iugera* each should be given to burghers and allies on an inalienable tenure.

The opposition arising against the bill, which certainly fell with great severity upon the nobility, was led by the Tribune C. Octavius, on whose veto the plan of Gracchus necessarily collapsed. Then Gracchus took the first step on the road of revolution. He carried through the unconstitutional proposal that a Tribune who acted contrary to the interests of the people should be deposed. Thus Octavius was removed from office. The bill of Gracchus was then accepted and expanded by the added clause that the legacy of Attalus should be applied to cover the expenses, viz., compensation of dispossessed parties and equipment of new colonists. A commission of three men, the *tresviri agris iudicandis adsignandis*, who at the same time represented the highest jurisdiction for all legal questions arising, were entrusted with the immediate execution of the law. The first members were Tiberius Gracchus himself, his father-in-law Appius Claudius, and his younger brother Gaius.

For the continuance of his work it was now all-important for Tiberius to hold the tribunate for the next year as well. But when he endeavoured to encompass this illegal re-election the excited interposition of the Optimates led to a riot in which Gracchus with 300 of his adherents lost their lives. The revolution, with its lawlessness and Bloody Assizes, had begun.

Nevertheless no one as yet dared after the removal of the

bold democrat to suspend his work of reform. At last however the complaints of the allies themselves at too forcible dispossession led to a measure, proposed by Scipio Aemilianus, a man not opposed to reform in itself, by which jurisdiction was removed from the commission and transferred to the Consuls (129). The board thus lost with its most weighty function so much of its importance that the discontent of the *Populares* sought another solution. The proposal was made to bestow on the allies the long-claimed right of Roman citizenship. But this proposition did not meet even with the approval of the plebs, which, in jealous pride of its privileged position, was not minded to share it with any one. This dissatisfaction among the allies grew strong, and found indeed a tangible expression in the revolt of Fregellae, the chief of the Latin colonies (125), which however soon yielded to Roman superiority and atoned for its conduct by the loss of its walls and its right of civic existence.

At this time (124) the younger Gracchus, whose earliest political activity had been closely bound up with that of his brother, returned to Rome from his quaestorship in Sardinia and was elected Tribune for the next year by the commons, who built great hopes upon him (123).

Gaius Sempronius Gracchus, a true revolutionary, gifted with inspiring fervour and passionate eloquence, advanced with clearer purpose than his brother towards a complete change of the constitution. In the incomplete state of tradition we are in doubt as to many weighty details of his legislation, but its main features may be recognised in the following regulations. In the first place he raised the importance of the Tribunate of the Commons by legalising the possibility of re-election for another year, which had been a stumbling-block to his brother. Then he took up again his brother's agrarian law, which he extended by founding new colonies of burghers in the districts of Capua, Tarentum, and even of Carthage. The population of the capital was by his Corn Law to have its grain permanently provided at a minimum price, and by a new arrangement of votes the lower classes were to be

removed farther from the influence of the nobility in the Centuriate Comitia. A great and permanent importance accrued to his *lex iudiciaria*, which took away the right of composing juries from the Senators and transferred it to the order of knights. The *ordo equester*, consisting of eighteen *centuriae* of knights, had come to be the representative of the class of great traders, as a result of the regulation that every one must leave it who entered the Senatorial order; and it stood in a certain opposition to the nobility of office. This opposition was now intensified as the provincial administration of the nobility too came before the juries of knights; and thus the law of Gracchus created as it were a new order midway between the mass of the people and the nobility.

This legislation, to which were added a number of other innovations—bestowal of citizenship upon the allies, alleviation of military duties, disciplinary regulations for deposed officials—evoked the most violent opposition from the hitherto ruling party. During the absence of Gracchus in 122 while he conducted in person the establishment of the new burgess-colony of Junonia (Carthage), their intriguing policy succeeded in undermining his position with the commons, who were already dissatisfied with the transmarine colony. A colleague of Gracchus in the tribunate, Livius Drusus, profited by this feeling of the people to detach them from him by a proposal outbidding the Gracchan plans—in Italy itself twelve colonies of burghers were to be founded, with 30,000 lots apiece. The proposal was an empty one, simply for the reason that in Italy there was no longer any disposable soil for such a colonial scheme. But the people fell into the trap laid for them, and when Gracchus after his return sought the tribunate for the third time he not only failed to poll the needful number of votes but was even forced to see a bill proposed for the suspension of the African colony. This led to an open conflict, and the younger Gracchus like his brother came to a violent end. Thousands of his adherents fell, partly in civil war, partly

as victims of the impeachments directed against the party.

Despite this victory of the party of the Optimates, which they owed to the wretched vacillation of the commons, the most essential points in Gracchus' work of reform—the new arrangement of the Law Courts and the distributions of land—remained in operation; as to the latter indeed the following years brought some further extensions of it in the removal firstly of the inalienability of the apportioned land, then of the rent, and finally of the State's whole right of possession.

§ 22. EXTERNAL EVENTS UNTIL THE SOCIAL WAR, 121–101 B.C.

The Province of Gallia Narbonensis.—After Spanish affairs, thanks to Scipio's vigorous interference, had assumed a peaceful aspect, it was necessarily of importance to the Romans to bring about a communication by land between this province and Upper Italy. For this the way had been paved by long petty wars against the Keltic races dwelling west of the Alps, first the Allobroges in the valley of the Isara (Isère), and then their neighbours, the powerful Arverni. After a brilliant victory over the latter in the year 121 the Romans could venture to establish themselves in the territory between the Pyrenees and Alps, which was commercially under the rule of the friendly city of Massilia (Marseilles), by founding Aquae Sextiae (Aix in Provence) and colonising the old Keltic city of Narbo (Narbonne). The two places east and west of the Rhone were to protect the great military road from Spain to Italy. From the colony of Narbo the transalpine province received the name *Gallia Narbonensis*.

The Jugurthine War (112–105).—While the course of events on Gallic soil, so far as we can judge from the scanty tradition, was by no means inglorious, we find elsewhere in this period whithersoever we look the same depravity in the management

of external politics that reveals itself so glaringly in internal administration throughout this age. The corruption of the ruling class appeared in the most revolting light in the African complications which led to the so-called Jugurthine war.

Micipsa, son of Massinissa of Numidia, had died in the year 118, and had bequeathed his kingdom to his two insignificant sons and an illegitimate nephew Jugurtha. The latter, a man of equal ability and unscrupulousness, sought to bring the government entirely into his own hands. He first caused one cousin to be put out of the way by assassination soon after his father's death, and hoped to be quickly rid of the second, Adherbal. The latter however put himself under the protection of the Senate, as a client-prince of Rome. Jugurtha, who had fought under the Roman standards in the Numantine war and had learnt the views prevalent among the nobility, effected through bribery a division of the kingdom between himself and his cousin. Then, disregarding the feeble remonstrance of the Senate, he captured the hostile capital Cirta, in which perished not only Adherbal with countless Numidians but likewise all Italici resident there (112).

Now the Roman Senate, though still hesitating, found itself forced to open war. But the general who was despatched thither proved willing to conclude at once, without striking a blow, a treaty which left the cunning African in possession of his kingdom (111). At last men in Rome saw through the whole intrigue; the peace was cancelled and it was demanded that Jugurtha should defend himself in person before the Senate. He actually ventured to present himself in Rome, relying of course on the means hitherto employed with such success; and once again he would have gained a victory for his interests if he had not carried his depravity so far as to encompass during his stay the murder of a rival claimant to the Numidian throne, a descendant of Massinissa (110). The war was now renewed, but again conducted on the Roman side with carelessness, until in the year 109 the Consul Q. Cæcilius Metellus, a sturdy aristocrat of the old

type, brought about a change. After restoring discipline in the army he defeated Jugurtha at the river Muthul (108), and finally forced him to seek refuge and help from his father-in-law, King Bocchus of Mauretania. Even the skilful Metellus however could not prevent the war, in consequence of the peculiarity of the scene of war and of its inhabitants, from degenerating at times into bootless desert raids; and of this circumstance the junior general, Gaius Marius—a man of most insignificant origin, who had earned for himself brilliant laurels at the river Muthul, but had since quarrelled with his aristocratic general—made use, in order to advance his own claims for the consulship and supreme command in the next year by belittling and calumniating his superior (106). But Marius too could only continue the guerilla warfare in the desert; and in this he once fell into such straits that the Roman army was only saved by the prudent resolution of his commandant of cavalry, young C. Cornelius Sulla. In the next year however (105) Sulla succeeded by negotiations in persuading King Bocchus to surrender Jugurtha to him. The war was thus ended, and Marius as chief in command was able on the 1st of January 104 to display the haughty Numidian prince in his triumphal procession in Rome, and then had him put out of the way in his dungeon. Affairs in Africa were settled by one part of Numidia coming into the Roman province, a second to Bocchus of Mauretania, while the rest remained to the last descendant of Massinissa.

The Cimbri and Teutones.—The struggles which the Romans were forced almost without interruption to wage in defence of their northern and eastern frontiers against the Alpine tribes, especially the Illyrian races, assumed another and more perilous appearance when for the first time in the year 113 that nation knocked at the doors of the Roman empire which was destined one day to entirely overthrow it. Germanic hordes called Cimbri had pressed from their northern home into the district of the Middle Danube, then inhabited by Kelts, and in the Eastern Alps defeated the Roman Consul who first confronted them. They did not how-

ever follow up their victory by an irruption. Four years later (109) they appeared on the frontier of Roman Gaul, where they again inflicted a defeat on a Consul. But it was not until four years afterwards (105) that they seem to have sought to penetrate into Roman territory, at first on Gallic soil. At Arausio on the left bank of the Rhone (now Orange) was fought a terrible battle, which owing to the disagreement of the two generals proved so unfortunate for the Romans that 80,000 men are said to have fallen. A second Cannae seemed to have fallen upon Rome; but, like Hannibal formerly, the Germans did not now undertake the dreaded advance. To ward off this 'Gallic Terror'—for the Cimbri were looked upon as Kelts—no one seemed more fitted than Marius, who had just ended the African war. To him the people, against the law, assigned a second consulate for the year 104 and the management of the Gallic war.

When Marius reached Transalpine Gaul, he at first failed to find the enemy; for the Cimbri in their random wanderings had turned to Spain. But he wisely employed the repose allowed him in disciplining his army by service in the trenches and other useful operations, and in preparing by small battles for the great one. Meantime the Cimbri had returned from Spain, in whose warrior population they had found too stubborn an opponent, and marched northwards through the whole of Gaul, on their journey lighting in the district of the Sequana (Seine) upon another Germanic race, the Teutones. The latter were in the same position as the Cimbri and joined them in their further progress, of which Roman territory was now to be the object. For unknown reasons the gigantic horde of Germans divided itself into two masses. One of them, mostly consisting of Teutones, took the road along the Rhone into Transalpine Gaul, while the other marched towards the Northern Alps.

At the mouth of the Isère Marius, who despite the law was elected Consul year after year from 104 till 100, was met by the Teutones in the year 102. After an indecisive battle he marched after them and did not bring matters to a

crisis until he was on favourable ground in the neighbourhood of Aquae Sextiae. Here the lubberly sons of the North succumbed as much to the heat of the southern sun as to Roman legionary tactics. The king Teutobod was captured, his army almost wholly wiped out.

Meanwhile the Cimbri had pressed on over the Brenner into the valley of the Adige, driven before them the Roman army which confronted them, and taken up their quarters for the winter of 102-101 in the Po valley. In the following year (101) they marched up the river, and at Vercelli in the Raudian Plains met Marius as he was returning from Gaul. The superiority still possessed by the Roman arms under a capable general again won the day, and the race of the Cimbri was annihilated like their kindred in the preceding year at Aquae Sextiae. All that did not fall a prey to the sword came upon the slave-market in Rome.

§ 23. MARIUS AND THE PARTY OF REVOLUTION

Gaius Marius, the son of a peasant from the hamlet of Arpinum, was naturally driven to the party of the democracy by the disfavour of his aristocratic comrades, who regarded all offices, both political and military, as the preserves of the nobility and sought to thrust aside the brilliantly successful upstart (*homo novus*). It was to this party alone that he owed his first consulate with the chief command in the Jugurthine war and the series of his unconstitutional consulates from 104 to 100. His significance lies wholly in the military department, into which he introduced changes that were of the greatest importance for a later age. Marius' reform of the army was based on the recognition that the citizen body was no longer sufficient to recruit the legions from; he therefore took up into the army all elements, freedmen and proletariat, so that it changed from a citizen-militia into an army of mercenaries which became a pliant instrument in the hand of the general of the day, looking to him alone for gain and distinction. On democratic principles

he also abolished all differences based on property, altered the division and arrangement of the army, and by a new system of exercise based on the arts of the fencing-school increased the army's efficiency to such a degree that we are able to understand his extraordinary successes after the miserable defeats of other generals.

Marius too, like every other really important man of this age, was now dragged into the mounting waves of internal politics; but here the man of the sword was tried and found wanting.

The Democracy; Saturninus and Glaucia.—Since the fall of the younger Gracchus the popular party had been driven into the background, but was stirred into fresh activity particularly through the impeachments connected with the Jugurthine war, in which the depravity of the nobility was unmasked. In Marius it deemed it had found its proper champion. He was joined by its previous representatives, L. Appuleius Saturninus and C. Servilius Glaucia, both politicians of no importance, but desperate and reckless demagogues. These three men divided between themselves the supreme power for the year 100, Marius receiving the consulate, Saturninus for the second time the tribunate, and Glaucia the praetorship. The ultra-democratic tendency of these popular leaders appears in their proposals; by a Corn Law that almost lowered to zero the price of the corn to be officially sold to the people, and by a Colonial Law which aimed in the especial interest of the Marian veterans at foreign colonisation on the grandest scale, they showed their intention of regarding exclusively the claims of the lowest masses. Thus the Equestrian Order, in which C. Gracchus thought he had created a buttress of democracy, fell into the arms of the Optimates, and to their alliance the rule of the masses succumbed. Marius as Consul was even compelled to personally defend public order against his two associates when they proceeded at the elections for the next year to murder and violence. Both met their death in a regular street-battle. Their laws were at once cancelled, and impeachments

removed a number of their adherents. Marius however, who had aimlessly wavered between the two parties, sank into universal contempt, and was forced on the expiration of his consulship to withdraw sullenly into the obscurity of private life.

§ 24. LIVIUS DRUSUS AND THE SOCIAL WAR,
91-88 B.C.

The Laws of Marcus Livius Drusus.—The Tribune M. Livius Drusus (91), himself a member of the nobility, but like the Gracchi inspired with a lofty enthusiasm, came to the conviction that the Equestrian Order had by no means proved itself worthy of the trust which the Gracchan legislation had placed in it by transferring to it the juries, and that its verdicts were inspired by a policy of self-interest which endangered the State. By ousting this order he hoped to gain for his popular measures the support of the Optimates, who hitherto had opposed every reform; and he actually succeeded in carrying through the following plans—(1) restoration of the juries to the Senate, which was to be increased by 300 members; (2) additional largesses of corn; (3) conversion of the still existing domain-land into citizen-colonies. But this law was never carried out. The knights at first raised a protest on account of a mistake of form in the voting; but chance presented them with a much more effectual means of agitation for their ends. It had become known that Drusus was in close connexion with the Italian allies and wished to secure for them the Roman citizenship. This claim was still equally odious to the nobility and to the commons. It aroused such universal anger against the honourable Tribune that not only was a proposal to cancel his law accepted but Drusus himself, despite his quiet behaviour, was removed by assassination. But the blindness which Roman policy displayed in this point was soon to be terribly chastised.

The Marsian or Social War (91-88).—The ferment which had long been noticeable among the allies (*Italici*) came to a

head when the man by whose championship they hoped to attain their goal had fallen a victim to their opponents. How far the reproach made against Drusus of having formed a secret league with the Italici was justified need not be considered; certainly the organisation with which we see the allies entering upon the war suggests methodical preparation. The revolt broke out in the little Picentine town of Asculum (now Ascoli on the Tronto); the occasion was a threatening speech of the Roman Praetor, to which the people responded by murdering him and many Roman citizens. Among the first to revolt at this sign were the sturdy mountain-folk of the Marsi, whence this war is also called the 'Marsian.' After the rebels, joined by the greater part of Central and Lower Italy, had vainly demanded to be granted the citizenship of Rome, they proceeded to found an independent State; the town of Corfinium, on the river Pescara, was made its capital, under the name *Italica*. This new 'Anti-Rome' gave its citizenship to all revolted Italici, and received a constitution modelled on that of its former mistress (a Senate of 500, Consuls, Praetors, and coinage).

The war that now flamed up (90) was waged by both sides with the exertion of their uttermost powers and with passionate bitterness. Despite some successes of Marius the Romans at the end of the first year of the war found themselves forced to make the concession of granting citizenship to the allies who had not yet revolted (*lex Iulia*). A second law, *lex Plautia Papiria*, soon followed (89), which extended this right to all allies south of the Po, though with the restriction that the votes of the new burghers should not be distributed over all the thirty-five tribes but should remain limited to eight (or ten). As the war was thereby deprived of its proper ground, more and more allies withdrew from it; and when too the new Anti-Rome, Corfinium, had fallen in the year 88, Sulla ended the war by repeated victories over the stubborn Samnites and Campanians. But while he was busied in beleaguering Nola, around which the last resistance gathered,

a catastrophe burst upon Rome which shook the State to its foundations and forced Sulla into interference all the more as he himself was a fellow-sufferer.

§ 25. THE SULLAN DISORDERS AND THE (FIRST) MITHRADATIC WAR, 89-84 B.C.

In judging this period of revolution it must not be forgotten that the point at issue was not merely a question of power between aristocracy and democracy; it was the economic distress of the humble classes that had aroused that cry for help from the State which had now been ringing for half a century in the assemblies and streets of Rome. The middle and lower orders of burghers had been brought close to ruin firstly by the costly wars of the third and second century, and then still more by their most disastrous result—the monstrously increasing slave-system; and thus had been created a proletariat which necessarily formed the fittest soil for revolution. This distress was intensified by the bloody war which now for the first time since the struggle with Hannibal devastated the fatherland itself, and drove even the Italici, whose position hitherto had been economically more favourable, into the camp of the desperate. At this moment occurred an event which had been threatening for a considerable time, and which made the present dangerous position of Rome one of the most awful gravity. The province of Asia, the richest of the Roman Empire, had been seized by the Pontic prince Mithradates and the Romans there resident destroyed. By this so large a number of the richest families were hurled into bankruptcy that a general insolvency arose in Rome. This moment of deepest distress seemed very suitable for the resumption of the work of reform interrupted by the death of Livius Drusus.

P. Sulpicius Rufus, a Tribune of the year 88, and like Drusus a member of the nobility, was devoted to the cause of the Commons, whom he had captivated by his brilliant eloquence. His first demands—distribution of the new citizens over all the thirty-five tribes and bestowal of citizenship upon the freedmen—were intended to completely end the still fermenting rebellion of the Italici and give their rights to the freedmen who since Marius' reform of the army had been called upon for service in war. He succeeded indeed, though not without violent and bloody collisions with the Optimates, in carrying through for the moment these and some other popular proposals; but his power lasted only a short time. Among his opponents one of the most vehement

was L. Sulla, one of the Consuls for the year, who at the time of voting had come to Rome and there only with difficulty escaped death. In order now to render this dangerous antagonist harmless Sulpicius brought forward the proposal that the chief command in the imminent Asiatic war, which had already been committed to Sulla, should be resigned to Marius. Sulla marched with his army from Nola to Rome. In a fierce street-battle he won the mastery, and drove out the revolutionaries, on whose heads a ban was set. Sulpicius himself lost his life, while old Marius succeeded in escaping. After weary wanderings concealment in Africa.¹

L. Cornelius Sulla, who had already in the Jugurthine war proved himself equally capable as an officer and skilful as a diplomatist, and had just succeeded in stifling the Social War, now held in Rome unlimited power with the help of the army, which he had been the first to lead against his own fellow-citizens. Military rule, that most fatal result of the Marian reform of the army, succeeded to the rule of the masses. With the weapon created by democracy Sulla, the rigid aristocrat, showed to the decaying republic the road to monarchy. After some temporary regulations aiming at a change of constitution in the aristocratic interest, Sulla found himself compelled to depart with his army to Asia, where Mithradates had made vigorous advances. He had however to leave Rome in a very uncertain state, especially as one of the two Consuls for the year 87, L. Cornelius Cinna, openly belonged to the democratic party.

*Asia and the (first) Mithradatic War (89-84).—*The time in which internal convulsions forced the Roman government to turn its attention away from the observation of the provinces had been used by an Asiatic prince, King Mithradates of Paphlagonia (the south coast of the Black Sea), in order to make conquests in alliance with his son-in-law Tigranes of Armenia. Mithradates' 'Kingdom of the Bosphorus' soon extended beyond the northern shore of the Black Sea, where

¹ Hence the proverbial 'Marius in the ruins of Carthage.'

it succeeded to the inheritance of the once prosperous Greek colonies, now destroyed by the nomads. A war with Rome, which Mithradates does not seem to have designed, first came about through the Roman governor of the province of Asia, Manius Aquillius, instigating in 90 the Bithynian King Nicomedes, Mithradates' western neighbour, to assail the Bosporan kingdom, and thus compelling Mithradates to take up arms against the Roman allies (89).

But the Roman administrator had conjured up war too lightly. After splendid preparations of a thoroughly Asiatic sort, Mithradates stood in the heart of the Roman province (88). Its inhabitants, exhausted by a conscienceless system of taxation and by most brutal slave-hunts, not only revolted from Rome, but also carried out with the utmost diligence the terrible sentence of death which Mithradates had issued from Ephesus on all bearing the Roman name. Eighty thousand, according indeed to some accounts 150,000, Romans of every age and sex are said then to have perished. This massacre, to which Mithradates was led at once by the Oriental thirst of blood and by greed (for he confiscated half of the whole property of the victims), was the signal for a great rising of the East against the West, which was at once joined by the easily inflamed nation of the Greeks. Mithradates was accounted the saviour from the Roman yoke.

At last Sulla appeared with his army in Greece (87). Without meeting with serious resistance he advanced as far as Attica. Here Athens, in the remembrance of former greatness and under an unfortunate inspiration of patriotism, had undertaken the duty of acting as the centre of the revolt. The Athenians indeed succeeded in holding out against Sulla for some months; but in the spring of the next year (86) they yielded to hunger, and only the harbour of Piræus was able to continue the resistance. Sulla's position however was now for a moment serious. The siege of the well-fortified and provisioned port made no progress; he lacked a fleet in order to assail his chief opponent in Asia; and moreover an order to resign office came to him from Rome, where now the

democratic party under Cinna was once again in power. It was now Mithradates himself who saved his antagonist by calling off the garrison of Piræus to Boeotia, where he wished to stand for a fight. Sulla most thoroughly destroyed Piræus,¹ and then defeated the enemy in Boeotia near Chaeronea. Never again after this did fortune fail Sulla's banners.² When in Thessaly he came upon L. Flaccus, who had been appointed his successor, the troops of the latter passed over in such numbers to Sulla that Flaccus found it more advisable to betake himself at once to Asia, in order to gather there laurels of his own.

In the following year (85) Mithradates landed once more an army in Greece; but again it succumbed to Roman tactics near the Boeotian Orchomenus. Sulla then cleared the rest of Greece of the rebellious party, and in Thessaly, where he held his winter-quarters, built ships for the Asiatic campaign.

Meanwhile the Roman army in Asia had killed Flaccus and chosen as its general a certain Fimbria, who though a demagogue of the worst sort was yet more capable as a soldier, and by the conquest of Pergamon inflicted great injury on Mithradates. The position of Mithradates moreover had materially altered; through the misgovernment of Oriental despotism he had wholly lost the sympathies of the Asiatic provincials, and when now after several successes Lucullus, the general under Sulla, united the fleet he had brought up in Cilician and Rhodian waters with that of Sulla, the Asiatic, little capable of resistance, gave up the war and sued for peace (84). This was concluded by Sulla himself after his crossing into Asia. Apart from the usual indemnity, Mithradates was restricted to the kingdom which he had possessed before the war. The full vengeance of the Romans however fell upon the revolted province. Sulla took over the troops of Fimbria, which deserted their leader and thus drove him to

¹ From this event we may date the fall of Athens as the commercial metropolis of the East.

² He calls himself by preference *Felix*, the 'fortunate one,' the son of Fortune.

suicide, and transferred them to Licinius Murena, the new administrator of Asia; and then he imposed on the utterly exhausted province the enormous indemnity of 20,000 talents, commissioning his subordinate Lucullus to enforce the collection without mercy. Thus the once flourishing province was again given over to the whole host of Roman vampires, a blow from which it was never able to recover.

Cinna and Rome during the Mithradatic War.—We have seen that Sulla after repressing the Sulpician revolution had been unable to prevent a man of democratic tendencies from obtaining the consulate for 87. This was Cornelius Cinna, of whose personality little more is known than that he was an able officer in the Social War. The craving to play a political part in these agitated times seems to have driven him into the camp of the Marians, who induced him to take up again the Sulpician laws—bestowal of complete citizenship on the allies and freedmen. This led to a new collision of the parties, which ended in the victory of the Optimates and the banning of Cinna and his adherents. But the democrats found support from the allies, and at the same moment old Marius too landed in Etruria. From all sides Italici, discontented freedmen, even slaves crowded round him. Rome found itself assailed from two quarters, and had to capitulate to the deposed Consul. Marius, returning with Cinna to Rome, now gratified in a terrible form his fanatical hatred of the Optimates who had so often thrust him back. For five days and nights raged the butchery to which he condemned his old opponents, a slaughter in comparison with which the awful deed of Mithradates may seem excusable. The old man, drunk with vengeance, did not however long survive the triumph of living to gain that seventh consulate which had been prophesied in his youth; he died on the 13th day of the new year (86) amid the merited curses of the nation which he had twice saved from ruin. On the death of Marius the revolutionary party itself was so disgusted with the rule of blood that Sertorius, one of the most eminent among the new heads of the party, could venture to have 4000 of Marius'

ruffians cut to pieces. Cinna now began an unconstitutional government which started by overthrowing again the Sullan laws and by renewing and extending those of Sulpicius. Sulla was also removed from his chief command; but when Cinna himself set out for Greece in order to free himself of his rival his soldiers slew him in a meeting at Ariminum (in the beginning of 84). In Rome men waited in nervous anxiety for the return of Sulla, which despite his conciliatory letters to the Senate threatened to bring with it a new reaction and a new rule of terror. So the Consuls of the year 84 found it their chief task to hold in readiness a strong army in Italy, and on the return of Sulla no fewer than 100,000 men are said to have been in arms against him.

§ 26. SULLA'S RETURN, ALTERATION OF THE CONSTITUTION, AND DEATH, 83-78 B.C.

Sulla at War with Rome (83-79).—The incapable Consuls of the year 83 had made their preparations so unskillfully that Sulla with his four devoted legions could advance unchecked through the western country to Campania, where a victory at Mount Tifata near Capua made him master of the consular armies. Many members of the Optimate party at once began to turn to his cause; among them was young Pompeius, who had hitherto belonged to Cinna's party, but in consequence of enmities now threw himself entirely into the arms of Sulla and placed at his disposal his own very considerable resources.

The enemy however was still not to be despised (82). Supported by the still unsettled Italici, especially the freedom-loving Samnites, the Marians, whose chief leader was now the young Consul Marius, had kindled the torch of war from Campania and Samnium as far as the line of the Po. The decisive blow was struck before the gates of Rome itself, where on the 1st of November Sulla after a fierce struggle destroyed the enemy's army, consisting mainly of Samnite irregulars, and thereby forced an entrance. A few days afterwards he caused 4000 of the captives to be butchered

under the eyes of the Senate, a clear proof that his basis of settlement was the annihilation of the enemy. Everywhere the same savagery was shown. There was a terrible slaughter after the capture of Praeneste, the chief bulwark of the Marians; Samnium was then converted into the wilderness which for the most part it has remained to this day. The last throes of the struggle still continued for a long time, for it extended into the provinces of Spain (under Sertorius), Sicily, and Africa, all of which were held by revolutionary governors. But everywhere the cause of Sulla was victorious. His son-in-law Pompeius then won his first warlike laurels and the title of 'The Great.'

Sulla's Dictatorship and Change of the Constitution.—The unlimited power which Sulla actually possessed after the capture of Rome found outward expression in the appointment which raised him to the long forgotten supreme republican office of Dictator with the utmost conceivable powers; his official title was *dictator legibus scribundis et rei publicae constituendae*. The restoration of internal order was not attended with the moderation which Sulla had promised when in Greece; on the contrary he made a terrible clearance of his opponents by the notorious 'proscriptions.' About 4000 men fell victims to them in Rome and Italy together, and their execution, in the absence of any control, led to a revolting confusion of all legal and moral ideas.

Supported by a bodyguard of 10,000 freedmen, the 'Cornelians,' the Dictator began his legislation (*leges Corneliae*), which on all points revealed the rigid aristocrat. In the first instance he sought to reduce to deepest insignificance the Equestrian Order, the creation of the Gracchan revolution; he transferred the juries back to the Senate and stopped up the chief source of income for the rich trading classes by converting taxes into fixed payments. He had already after the fall of Sulpicius materially lowered the powers of the Tribune of the Commons, which in the revolutionary period had grown to be the most influential of State offices, by ordaining that Tribunes should introduce

only proposals previously approved by the Senate; he now caused past Tribunes to be excluded from the rest of the official career, a measure which aimed at stifling the ambition for this office in all able men. At the same time it was further deprived of its essential significance by the fact that the right of intercession no longer remained unrestricted, but every act of intercession might become the object of a judicial scrutiny to examine into its justification. The right of forming the juries, which Sulla transferred again to the Senators, was removed farther and farther from the commons by the establishment of a number of new standing courts. The Senate also, the number of whose members Sulla raised to 600, underwent a complete reorganisation; it was no longer to receive its necessary augmentation, as it had done hitherto, from the Censors, but was to be made up of past holders of 'curule offices.' To the latter was now joined as fourth the quaestorship, the number of whose members was raised to twenty. Thus the hitherto immensely influential office of the censorship was also done away with; for its second duty too, the formation of the tax-lists, had become meaningless owing to the abolition of the tax for Italy and the change from a system of citizen-militia to a mercenary organisation.

Despite the thoroughly aristocratic tendency of his legislation, Sulla was compelled nevertheless to keep two very important institutions of the revolution, the new system of citizenship and the colonial policy. As regards the former he was wise enough to leave alone the citizenship of the Itali and so not to interfere with the result gained by the great Italian war; only the concessions to freedmen were revoked. In the foundation of new colonies however he far surpassed his predecessors, in order to satisfy his veterans; he is said to have disposed of 120,000 allotments in Italy.

By further laws relating to the official career (order of succession, re-election), administration of provinces by past Consuls and Praetors, and municipal constitution, Sulla extended his reforming activity over almost all departments of the State's life, and much was created by him that was

permanent. In the main however his constitution, like himself a child of a wild age, was soon swept away by the swelling storms of the revolution.

Sulla's Retirement and Death.—Though Sulla clung to the supreme power entrusted to him until the completion of his legislation, he had nevertheless allowed the regular official administration to enter into operation by its side, and in the year 80 had himself filled the consulship. On the new elections for the year 79 he surrendered it. And now the unexpected happened. He voluntarily resigned his dictatorial power, and withdrew as a simple private man from business of State. He lived to enjoy for a year the most agreeable repose on the lovely Gulf of Puteoli (now Puzzuoli), until a sudden sickness swiftly carried him (78).

§ 27. THE DISTURBANCES FROM THE DEATH OF SULLA UNTIL THE FALL OF THE SULLAN OLIGARCHY (78–70 B.C.)

Sulla's restoration of order, energetically as it was carried out, yet bore in itself the germ of death. On the one hand it had brought back into power the party against which the revolution had already for fifty years been directed; on the other hand it was based on pure military force, which might be made by its possessor into an instrument for any new upheaval. The knights, the 'financiers' who had been deprived of their privilege and in part of their sources of revenue—the freedmen whose citizenship was declared forfeit—the masses of the capital, from whom Sulla had withdrawn the largesses of corn—above all, the numberless beggared pro-cripts and the Italiæi dispossessed by the land-allotments—all formed a group of malcontents from whose midst an assault upon the present constitution might every moment be expected. Against the ruling party, the *oligarchy*, lacked after Sulla's death a man capable of entering into his inheritance. Pompeius, the Dictator's son-in-law and most honoured general, was not at heart devoted to the aristocracy, to which indeed as a former Cinnan he was an object of suspicion; and Marcus Licinius Crassus, the wealthiest man of the age, did not deem the hour to have come in which he designed to make use of his influence.

The Revolution of Lepidus (78).—M. Aemilius Lepidus, one of the Consuls of the year 78, made himself the representative of those who were raising in ever louder tones the democratic

demands—re-establishment of the tribunician power, restoration of the banished and dispossessed to their old rights, and renewal of the corn largesses. While this contest was still going on in Rome open rebellion broke out in Etruria, the ejected landholders of Faesulae (Fiesole near Florence) recovering their property by armed force and with the slaughter of Roman colonists. The Senate had now to act, and it sent both Consuls to Etruria to enrol an army there and punish the rising. Lepidus however waited in inaction until his year of office (77) had run out. Then he marched against Rome, to force the Senate into acceptance of the democratic demands. He was however defeated on the Campus Martius by his colleague of the past year, Catulus, while his second in command, whom Pompeius captured at Mutina (Modena), suffered the penalty of death. Soon afterwards Lepidus too died in Sardinia, to which he sought to transplant the revolt, and the remnant of his army under Perperna crossed over to Spain.

Sertorius in Spain.—The Mario-Cinnan governor of Spain, Sertorius, one of the most eminent leaders of his party and perhaps the ablest man of this whole period, was still engaged in a struggle with the Sullan administrator Caecilius Metellus. Supported by the sympathies of native tribes, especially of the valiant Lusitani, Sertorius came forward as a regular Roman official; and for a time his power was so strong that his diplomatic connexions extended over Italy as far as Asia, where he ventured to negotiate with Mithradates in the name of Rome.

The settlement of the wearisome and costly Spanish war, which despite his ability Metellus was unable to decide, became an ever more pressing question; and so it was not difficult for Pompeius, who had risen still higher in popularity through the overthrow of Lepidus, to cause the chief command in Spain to be assigned to himself, in defiance of the legal regulations (77). For a long time the generalship of Sertorius succeeded in preventing the junction of Pompeius and Metellus; and even after this had been effected (75)

the bold partisan kept his opponents for two years more in check, until he fell a victim to a mutiny stirred up by Perperna (72). The native tribes now withdrew or surrendered; the rest of the insurgents were defeated with little trouble. Perperna and many other subordinate generals came to their death by the executioner's axe. In 71 Pompeius returned to Italy.

The Slave-War (73-71).—A troop of slaves, led by the bold Thracian Spartacus, had burst out of a gladiators' school in Capua. After setting free considerable masses of slaves they had taken up so strong a position on Vesuvius that two Roman brigades had been forced to retreat with heavy loss. The rising quickly spread over the whole of Italy, and the bitterness on both sides expressed itself in a merciless warfare which most horribly desolated the land. Even the able M. Licinius Crassus, who was entrusted in the hour of supreme need with the chief command, would not have succeeded so swiftly in repressing the rising, which Spartacus conducted with extreme skill, if a division of the slave-hordes had not been brought about by an inner rift, arising from the opposition of the Kelto-Germanic and the Hellenosyrian elements. Once sundered, the slaves yielded to the better disciplined soldiers. Spartacus died a hero's death in Apulia. Other troops were gradually wiped out; a last band, that sought to fight its way to the Alps, fell into the hands of Pompeius as he returned from Spain (71). He cut it to pieces, and for this credited himself with the suppression of the slave-rising.

Fall of the Sullan Oligarchy.—It is one of fate's peculiar ironies that Sulla, son-in-law and most eminent favourite and the man who owed his immeasurable wealth to the Sullan disturbances lent their hands to cancelling Sulla's constitution. Pompeius and Crassus, both of them returning from victorious campaigns, leagued themselves with the democracy, which procured for them the consulate for the year 70; and they restored the Gracchan constitution. The Tribunate recovered its former extent of power; the

Censorship revived : the juries of knights were re-established ; and in the interest of the equestrian order the administration of provincial taxation was recast into the old system of contract. The Gracchan corn-law had already come again into force some years previously.

§ 28. EVENTS IN THE EAST AND POMPEIUS, 74-64 B.

To the east of the great Mediterranean region, where the power of the Romans was not yet firmly established, it had been long endangered by three enemies in particular. The enterprising spirit of Mithradates of Pontus had been by no means depressed with his defeat by Sulla ; directly after Sulla's withdrawal warlike complications began anew owing to frontier disputes, and took so unfavourable a course for the Romans that the Senate thought it well to settle them by a not very creditable peace. This was the second Mithradatic War (83-81). About the same time a new enemy rose up against Rome in Tigranes of Armenia, the son-in-law of Mithradates, with whom the Pontic prince designed to share the dominion of Asia, and who had already extended his conquests over a great part of the Parthian (Persian) Mesopotamia and Syria up to the frontier of Egypt. The foundation of this Grand Sultanate was all the more unwelcome to the Romans as it directly collided with the sphere of their power ; for since the death of the last legitimate Ptolemæus in 81 Egypt had belonged to the Roman people on the ground of a supposed will, although it had been left for the time in the hands of two illegitimate princes.

But a still greater danger to the Roman power in the East lay in the Pirates. Starting from their nests, Cilicia and Crete, they not only harried the coasts of Asia and Greece, but extended their audacious buccaneering as far as Sicily and even the Italian coasts, and threatened to cripple the commerce of the whole Mediterranean.

*The (third) Mithradatic and Armenian Wars until the appearance of Pompeius (74-67).—*When the acquisition of Bithynia, which came to them by legacy, had made the Romans neighbours of the Pontic kingdom, Mithradates deemed the moment for the renewal of hostilities had arrived. His connexion with Sertorius, who had even sent him officers to improve the organisation of his army, an alliance with the pirates, and the favourable Anti-Roman feeling in the province of Asia as well as in Bithynia, seemingly gave him an advantage. At first too fortune was on his side ; but during the siege of Cyzicus the Roman general L. Li-

cinus Lucullus completely surrounded him, and inflicted on him heavy losses throughout a whole winter (74-73); and it was but a small part of his army that he brought back out of the Roman grip to his Pontic kingdom. In the next year (72) he was defeated at Cabira. Deprived of all his power, he fled to his son-in-law Tigranes. After the often stubborn resistance of the great commercial cities of Greek origin had been crushed, Pontus was constituted by Lucullus a Roman province (72-70). Lucullus tried too to arrange the affairs of the sorely tried province of Asia with gentleness, and thereby drew upon himself the hatred of the Roman capitalist party.

Tigranes, to whom his father-in-law's presence was very inconvenient, nevertheless refused to surrender him. In consequence he found himself suddenly attacked by Lucullus (69) and forced to take flight into the heart of his kingdom. Soon however he appeared with an army of tenfold superiority before Tigranocerta, which he had founded as capital of the new Grand Sultanate, and which was now beleaguered by the Roman army; but in one of the most important battles of Roman military history he was completely defeated by the brilliant tactics of Lucullus. Instigated however by the desperate Mithradates, whose life was now at stake, Tigranes would not consent to peace, but forced Lucullus to follow him into the mountains of Armenia up to his old capital, Artaxata on Ararat (68). In the toilsome mountain-campaign the soldiers, who for some time had been stirred up by Lucullus' enemies, the capitalist party, refused obedience; and when in the next year (67) the news of the deposition of their general arrived at the same time as his successor, who out of jealousy reversed his operations, the brilliant successes of Lucullus came to nothing. Mithradates meanwhile had once more gained possession of his kingdom, where he was again able to enkindle the hatred of the Orientals towards Roman dominion, and Tigranes re-entered undisturbed into the complete possession of his empire.


The Pirates and the Cretan War (68-67).—A special expedition had been despatched in the year 68 against the pirates, and under the leadership of Cæcilius Metellus, called *Creticus*, the island of Crete, one of the robbers' chief nests, had been cleared in spite of a valiant resistance; but withal the plague of piracy which had spread over the whole Mediterranean was so far from being repressed that in the year 67 a famine threatened to break out in Rome through the failure of the transmarine corn supplies. The Senate now decided, on the proposal of the Tribune Gabinus, to create a command such as had never yet been placed in one hand; a supreme general was to be nominated for three years against the buccaneers, with the power of disposing of all State treasures, of raising levies everywhere, and of appointing his own subordinate generals, as many as twenty-five in number. This *lex Gabinia* signified the legal surrender of the republic to military monarchy. The new command was entrusted to Pompeius, who most brilliantly discharged the task imposed on him, clearing the whole Mediterranean of the pirates in barely three months, destroying their dens and robber-castles, and endeavouring in lieu of the cruel mode of punishment hitherto practised to make them into useful members of the State by giving them fixed settlements. The consequence of this magnificent success was that Pompeius was also entrusted by the *lex Manilia*, which was zealously supported by Cicero, with the continuance of the now halting Asiatic war.

Pompeius in Asia: End of the Mithradatic and Armenian Wars (66-62).—On Asiatic soil too Pompeius was not deserted by his luck. Mithradates fled after losing a battle into his Bosporan kingdom north of the Black Sea; Tigranes surrendered at the first assault, and had his possession confirmed by the Roman victor. Although the war was not ended so long as Mithradates lived, the great difficulties with which a passage of the Caucasus threatened the Roman army led Pompeius to decline to follow his obstinate antagonist into his Bosporan kingdom. He devoted the next years (65-63)



MICROCOPY RESOLUTION TEST CHART

(ANSI and ISO TEST CHART No. 2)



APPLIED IMAGE Inc

1653 East Main Street
Rochester, New York 14609 USA
(716) 482 - 0300 - Phone
(716) 288 - 5989 - Fax

to the settlement of Asiatic affairs. Meanwhile the destiny of the aged Mithradates was fulfilled without the interference of Pompeius. After striving in vain to collect once more all the resources of his northern kingdom for a campaign of vengeance against the Romans, he fell a victim to the family feuds so common in these Oriental despotisms, and killed himself at Panticapneum in the Crimea when successfully attacked by his son Pharnaces (63). Such was the end of the man who for thirty years had kept the Roman empire in suspense, not so much through his remarkable abilities as through the almost inexhaustible resources of his dominions, and who appeared to his contemporaries as quite a second Hannibal, although in reality he was as far below the latter as the republic against which he struggled was below that which the great Carthaginian had to confront.

After the last resistance in the west of Asia Minor had been broken (64), Pompeius turned to Syria, where under the weak rule of several Seleucid princes Beduin sheikhs and bold adventurers had founded kingships of their own. Pompeius set to work vigorously. He deposed the incapable Seleucids, and incorporated Syria in the Roman empire as a province. He found himself also compelled to interfere in Jewish affairs, and settled the feud between the Maccabaeen brothers Aristobulus and Hyrcanus by restoring the old priestly rule of the Pharisee and joining Judaea to the province of Asia.

A frontier dispute that had broken out between Tigranes of Armenia and the Parthian king was decided by Pompeius in favour of the former, according to the principles familiar to Roman policy, or humbling the obedient ally the moment he was no longer needed. The way was thus paved for the long wars with the Parthians which the Romans had later to bear. In other respects however Pompeius' method of arranging Oriental affairs was shrewd and prudent. He was concerned for the revival of the countries which had long groaned under the burden of the war. Countless cities were either settled anew or founded for the first time by him, and out of these

'Pompeius-towns' (*Pompeiopoleis*) numerous Roman veterans colonised and romanised the Orient.

From the reorganisation of the East arose the five provinces of Asia, Bithynia and Pontus, Cilicia, Syria, and Creta.

§ 29. ITALIAN EVENTS UNTIL THE TRIUMVIRATE, 70-60 B.C.

Parties in Rome; Gaius Julius Caesar.—In an age in which is prepared and matured a change from one form of government to its opposite—in this case from the republican to the monarchical—political parties usually lose their former aspect and make way for new divisions. The aristocracy exalted once more by Sulla ('nobility' or Optimate party) still indeed lived on; but its decrepit condition is proved by the very fact that its most eminent representative was a man like M. Porcius Cato, an honest but narrow republican aristocrat who copied the rigid morality and punctiliousness of his forefather in the time of the third Punic war, and like him became a political caricature. A party that clung to past ideals was no longer capable of life in the rough present of revolutionary times; and so we have already seen that Pompeius, accounted the heir of the Sullan Reaction, had only attained his extraordinary position of power by approaching the democracy (the *Populares*). He and his associate Crassus, who likewise owed his existence to Sulla, were looked on as the heads of the popular party. But it was no longer these two parties that were the chief factors of political life; it was the several activities of individuals or of smaller circles, pressing as they will in such times of ferment into the foreground. These found their expression in more or less secret societies, comparable to the Greek *betaireiai*, which began to rule public life. These clubs voiced their interests either by gaining over able orators of the Bar and by every kind of corruption, or still more often by their well-organised armed gangs. It was the class of demagogues.

Among those who were seeking to win a political station the man now came to the front who was fated to turn into a new course the destiny not only of his people but of the whole European world. Gaius Julius Caesar, a kinsman of Marius and son-in-law of Cinna, had used the time of the Sullan reaction, in which it was advisable for him to be quiet, for developing by study his brilliant gifts. Soon afterwards he had aroused the notice of the public both by his activity as an orator and by his bold opposition in the Marian interest, as well as by his extravagant living, which moreover was supported wholly by debts. His fixed purpose of playing a political part suggested to him the advisability of seeking to attach himself to M. Crassus, who was not only the leader of the democracy in Pompeius' absence, but through his enormous wealth might always be useful to the insolvent beginner. By games of prodigal magnificence which he brought out as aedile of the year 65 Caesar also gained ground among the mass of the people.

The Catilinarian Conspiracy and Marcus Tullius Cicero.—One necessary result of the demoralisation caused by the Sullan proscriptions, with their outrageous enrichment of broken-down characters, was the presence in Rome of a number of men who after squandering their shamefully acquired property longed to obtain new wealth in the same way. The higher the rank of these men was, the more lofty was the goal to which they aspired; and of the clubs which aimed at securing the highest offices in the State one of the most active was apparently that which had at its head two creatures of Sulla and members of the nobility, L. Sergius Catilina and Cn. Calpurnius Piso. They had once failed to secure the Consulate for two men of their party; now in the year 64, when the return of the victorious Pompeius was close at hand, they set to work with greater energy in order to effect the election of Catilina together with that of the insignificant and easily manageable C. Antonius. It is quite credible that Crassus and Caesar were not sorry to see the intrigues of a party which was working against the Optimates and could certainly never win for itself any permanent success. But the reproach raised against these men of having connived at or actually belonged to the Catilinarian conspiracy will appear all the more frivolous if we consider that this conspiracy was nothing but the effort of a political group to obtain power and influence; and if at the

same time arrangements were made to remove by force the leading opponents and to set up a military power, no constitutional change since Gracchus had been effected on other lines. However, the Catilinarians failed this year also to carry their two candidates; only C. Antonius was successful, and his colleague was the famous barrister Cicero, to whom the Optimate party had turned for help, although he did not belong to them by birth and his political sentiments were not clearly discernible.

Marcus Tullius Cicero sprang from an equestrian family in the district of Arpinum. He had trained his inborn gift for oratory by vigorous study at the best Greek schools of rhetoric with such success that he is to be regarded as the most brilliant orator of all times and, for the Romans, as founder of the lofty prose style. In this lies his undying merit. In politics however his abilities did not keep step with his ambition and vanity, and the dependence of his political position is indicated clearly enough by the fact that after having championed the Gabinian and Manilian laws, by which the democracy gave Pompeius supreme power in the State, he now was entrusted with the Consulate as the expected saviour of the Optimates.

Cicero now (63) saw that his chief task lay in keeping watch on the Catilinarian club, which was ceaselessly pursuing its designs and striving to gain a military power outside Rome. By means of a traitor the Consul was kept continually informed of all their plans; and so success attended neither the designed outbreak of the revolution on the day of the Consular elections for 62 nor an attempt on the life of Cicero, whom Catilina would gladly have put out of the way before his departure to the army in Etruria.¹ Nevertheless Cicero allowed the head of the party to withdraw unhindered and waited another month before proceeding to arrest the noblest members of the conspiracy remaining in Rome. Upon these he caused the death-penalty to be pronounced and immediately executed, contrary to the *lex de provocatione*. The degree of the Catilinarians' guilt we only know from Cicero's overdrawn speeches for the prosecution, in which

¹ On the occasion of this attempt Cicero delivered on the 8th November the first of his famous Catilinarian Orations, *quo usque tandem*

he loved to paint himself as the saviour of the commonwealth and as a second Romulus. In any case the energetic Consul by his prompt action had suppressed a party which aimed at appropriating power; Catilina himself was surrounded at Pistoria (Pistoja) as he sought to force his way over the Apennines into Upper Italy, and after a most valiant resistance slain with the greater part of his army.

Return of Pompeius.—Already in the autumn of 63 Pompeius had sent to Rome one of his subordinate generals, Metellus Nepos, who was to get himself elected Tribune for the next year and as such to pave the way for his master's plans. Metellus at once after taking office (62) proposed that Pompeius should receive the Consulate for 61 and be allowed to keep his army in order to end the Catilinarian war. Both propositions were rejected after stormy opposition from the Optimates, especially from their champion Cato; open envy and short-sighted republicanism would not put still greater powers into the hands of the glorified conqueror of Asia. Pompeius, who in the autumn had landed at Brundisium and there loyally disbanded his army, entered Rome in the beginning of 61. He was greeted on all sides with coolness; even the leaders of the Populares, Caesar and Crassus, had no interest in coming forward for him and giving serious support to his wishes. It seemed as though the part of Pompeius were played out.

§ 30. THE FIRST TRIUMVIRATE AND CÆSAR'S CONQUEST OF GAUL, 60-49 B.C.

The First Triumvirate and its Results.—In the course of the year 61 Pompeius made vain efforts to become himself popular by popular bills, for instance, abolition of taxes in Italy. Meanwhile (60) Caesar, after having held the Praetorship in 62, had been acting with great success as pro-praetor in Spain, and brought thence not only honourable laurels from a war with the Lusitani but also abundant wealth, which was absolutely necessary to him for his

designs. The hour however had not yet come for him to advance alone. He therefore concluded with Pompeius and Crassus an alliance calculated to distribute the whole power of the State between the three, the First Triumvirate. Caesar, the most important of them, received the Consulate for 59; an extraordinary rank was assured to the two other Triumvirs. As Consul Caesar caused Pompeius' arrangements in Asia to be ratified *en bloc*, and brought forward in the interest of the veterans an agrarian law by which the State was to divide the territory of Capua into lots for them and renounce all claim to rent; this however was only for the poor fathers of families, and thus a claim of the veterans for colonial settlement was not in principle recognised. After a violent resistance by the Optimates, which Caesar at last repressed by removing his incapable colleague Bibulus and the blustering Cato, the popular assembly agreed to the bill and appointed Pompeius and Crassus to preside over a commission of twenty who were to carry out the law. Thus his two fellows in the Triumvirate were busied for years to come and for the moment contented with a function provided with ample powers; Pompeius too connected himself particularly closely with Caesar by marriage with the latter's daughter Julia.

In order however to secure his own position for a longer time, Caesar caused a Tribune devoted to him to bring forward the proposal to assign to him the province of Gallia Cisalpina (Upper Italy) for five years, with the right of raising levies and nominating his own generals. By this he could not fail to become from a military point of view master of Italy. The popular assembly approved the bill; the Senate, in order to show its complaisance towards the man in power, added further the province of Gallia Narbonensis. The Triumvirate had cowed the Optimates who had so resolutely confronted Pompeius; even the last moral resistance offered by men like Cato and by Cicero, whom his Consulate had cast wholly into the arms of the nobility, was crushed by Cato being entrusted with the annexation of the kingdom of Cyprus, while Cicero was banished for

illegal execution of Roman citizens (the Catilinarians) in April 58. Caesar now left for Gaul.

Caesar in Gaul (58-49).—Caesar had a twofold object in view when he took over the governorship of Gaul—firstly the raising of a competent and reliable army, which he needed for the inevitable struggle for monarchy, and secondly the romanisation of the Keltic country between the Rhine and the Ocean, from which so long as it was unoccupied a peril always lowered upon the flourishing province of Narbo (La Provence) and the acquisition of which would necessarily solve with more success than any transmarine possessions that vital question of present Roman politics, colonial expansion.

Among the Keltic races of modern France, which were united only by the bond of the same religion and for the rest were mostly tearing one another to pieces in mutual feuds, there were three in particular with whom the Romans had come into closer relations, the Arverni north-west of the Cevennes, the Aedui between the Upper Loire (*Liger*) and the Saône (*Arar*), and the Sequani in the district of the Doubs (*Dubis*). The last-named in their struggle with the Aedui, who through the support of the Romans had gained the upper hand, had summoned from over the Rhine German allies who had settled under the war-king Ariovistus in Alsace and might any moment attract further German invasions. From Switzerland too came swarms of Keltic Helvetii, who owing to the overpopulation of their country sought to acquire a new home in Gaul.

When Caesar arrived in Gaul, his first resolution was to bar any further advance of foreign hordes into the territory which he sought to win for the Roman empire. He therefore set out at once with the united legions of Cisalpine and Narbonensian Gaul against the Helvetii, of whom from three to four hundred thousand souls had meanwhile broken into the land of the Sequani from the Lake of Geneva and were now moving eastwards. He found them in the territory of the Aedui, near whose capital Bibracte (Autun) he overpowered the desperate struggles of the Keltic hosts. Part of them were settled in the land of the Aedui; the bulk were forced back to Helvetia.

Caesar now turned against the German intruders in Alsace. He bade them withdraw from the left bank of the

Rhine. Ariovistus proudly rejected the demand and preferred a settlement by arms, which took place on the 'Oxen-Field' north-west of Mülhausen. It was with fear and trembling that the Romans marched against the Germans, whom they had dreaded ever since the invasion of the Cimbri and Teutones; nevertheless Caesar at last gained the victory, which was completed by the flight of Ariovistus over the Rhine. The Germans were allowed to remain in the land under Roman suzerainty, but had to pledge themselves to forcibly repel any further immigrations to the left bank of the Rhine.

In the next year (56) he was called upon to confront the coalition of the gallically warlike northern tribes of the Belgae, who had collected a dangerous force in the neighbourhood of Soissons. Caesar avoided unequal battle, and waited until the confederates disagreed and separated, a result on which, with an accurate knowledge of Keltic nature, he counted in advance. He then with little trouble subdued the tribes severally and at last conquered even the stubborn resistance of the Germanic Nervii, who dwelt in the region of the Scheldt. As in the same year Caesar's subordinate Publius Crassus, son of the Triumvir, subjugated also the country between the Loire and Seine (Aremorica), it seemed as though already at the end of the second year of the war the whole of Gaul between the Rhine, Jura, and Ocean had been incorporated in the Roman Empire.

Now came the time for securing his conquests by the repression of risings and repulse of inroads. Already in the winter of 57-56 Roman dominion was imperilled by the revolt of the maritime Kelts subdued by Crassus, under the guidance of the Veneti. It was only after building a fleet and making a twofold attack by sea and by land that Caesar mastered the rising (56). He took stern and exemplary vengeance for it, selling the whole tribe of the Veneti into slavery. With equal success the Romans in the next year (55) repelled an invasion set on foot by Germanic hordes, Usipetes and Tencteri by name, on the Lower Rhine.

This led to Caesar's first passage of the Rhine, between Andernach and Coolenz, which however was only of the nature of a demonstration and was not made with any offensive purpose. This was followed by the first Roman expedition against Britain, whose Keltic inhabitants were in fairly close connexion with their kin on the mainland. It was intended to intimidate them; but Caesar crossed the Channel with such feeble forces that he barely forced a landing and had to deem himself fortunate in regaining the Gallic coast before the entrance of the autumnal storms.

Better fortune attended a second expedition to Britain which he undertook in the following year (54) after magnificent naval preparations, and which carried him far beyond the Thames. The submission which the British king Cassivelaunus had perforce promised remained indeed for the present a purely nominal one; but at any rate it was the prelude to the later successful occupation of Britain.

While Caesar was thus busied in the west, the part of his army left behind amid the restless and warlike northern tribes was being hard pressed, and in the winter of 54-53 a large division was completely destroyed by the Eburones on the Meuse. The rising that followed this movement (53) was repressed, Caesar taking in part a terrible vengeance and acting with such decision that he deemed his presence in Gaul for the coming winter needless and designed to keep watch from Upper Italy on affairs in Rome, which were assuming a more and more grave form.

Once again (52) revolt broke out, stirred up and led by the chivalrous and heroic Arvernian Vercingetorix, who had as his war-cry the removal of the foreign yoke and the establishment at the same time of a national kingdom. But before the insurgents suspected it Caesar was already in his headquarters at Agedincum (Sens). After crossing the Loire without hindrance he advanced against Avaricum (Bourges), where lay the chief forces of Vercingetorix. After a toilsome siege the town fell into the Romans' hands; but the army of the insurgents escaped into the Arvernian

fortress of Gergovia (Clermont?), which Caesar did not succeed in capturing. When the Aedui too joined in the revolt he was compelled to withdraw to Agedincum, where he united with Labienus, who meanwhile had been fighting on the Seine. The rebels now concentrated all their forces in Alesia (Alise near Flavigny), which was then completely enclosed by Caesar. After many conflicts, of which the issue was generally favourable to the Romans, it surrendered on the advice of Vercingetorix himself, who presented himself to the Romans. With the capture of their leader the confederates fell asunder, and the main resistance was broken; Caesar and his subordinates crushed in detail the still rebellious tribes one after another, and in the following years (51-50) he devoted himself to the peaceful task of organising his conquests.

By the comparatively swift subjugation of so large a country and so valiant a population Caesar had proved himself a soldier of the first rank; and now in the arrangement of the internal affairs of the new province he showed himself a master of statecraft. By not only using the utmost possible consideration towards justifiable peculiarities (as local chieftainship and druidism), but likewise by judiciously employing and emphasising present distinctions, he was able to win over at once a great and influential part of the population, and by a humane arrangement of taxation to soften the harshness of the foreign yoke. Never was a country so quickly romanised and so easily kept in its allegiance. The Gallic conquest added to the aging body of the Roman State a limb which contributed largely to the renewal of its youth; for Caesar himself it laid the foundation of his monarchical power, and in the world's history it played a part of incomparable importance simply by the fact that the current of the Germanic inundation into the Roman Empire was thereby dammed at a time when the Germanic world could indeed have shattered Roman and with it classical civilisation, but could not have absorbed it.

§ 31. THE DOMINATION OF THE TRIUMVIRS TO CAESAR'S PASSAGE OF THE RUBICON, 60-49 B.C.

Pompeius to the Conference of Luca.—Caesar's position of superiority in the Triumvirate had revealed itself in his Consulship; and Pompeius hoped to shake it during the absence of his dreaded rival. For this however he lacked an attached

party. The nobility had sullenly withdrawn from politics, and the honest republicans hated Pompeius as the tyrant of the hour; the street-demagogues again, who in these times had almost the sole control of politics, were devoted to Caesar. Chief among them was Clodius, the Tribune of 58, who with his armed gang of retainers put every possible difficulty in the way of Pompeius, his personal foe. The latter in order to gain for himself an influential part of the citizen body now determined to recall Cicero from banishment (57). But although Cicero, whose return took the form of a triumphal progress of all anti-monarchic elements, complaisantly put his brilliant abilities at the service of the man in power, an obstinate resistance met the proposal of Pompeius that he should be made superintendent of the whole corn-supply in the Roman Empire, with permission to dispose of the army, the fleet, and all provincial treasuries. There was no inclination to again entrust Pompeius with a military *imperium* so extraordinary as that which had arisen by the Manilian and Gabinian Laws, and the office he desired, though created at last, had decided restrictions. Pompeius however, who in view of Caesar's rising importance was most concerned with the military side of the power in question, then caused the proposal to be brought forward that he should be entrusted with the restoration of the exiled Egyptian king; and here he met with a frank refusal.

It is obvious that both Crassus, who owing to his proverbial wealth had a great following, and above all Caesar, who never took his eyes off events in Rome, were not unconcerned in these failures of Pompeius. Nevertheless it was just at this time (56) that their compact of the year 60 was renewed. Caesar, foreseeing the necessity of prolonging his Gallic command beyond the year 55, needed once more the support of his colleagues in the Triumvirate, and therefore summoned them to a conference at Luca (Lucca, north of Pisa) which was to strengthen the now slackening bond. It was decided that Pompeius and Crassus should hold the Consulate in the year 55 and then receive for five years the

provinces of Spain or Syria; on the other hand Caesar was allowed to keep his provinces for another five years, and his legions, to the number of ten, were entered on the State treasury.

Crassus in Syria (54-53).—Crassus on his arrival in Syria found the war already in progress which Pompeius had aroused by his decision in the frontier disputes between the Parthians and Armenians. But nevertheless he allowed the first year of his administration to pass without action, and gave his sole attention to the enrichment of his treasury by a regular plundering of the province. In the year 53 he advanced with his army over the Euphrates into the Mesopotamian desert, where the nature of the soil and the climate caused the Romans terrible sufferings. When at last the Parthians drew up for battle near the city of Carrhae, it became patent that on this ground the light Parthian cavalry and the mounted archers were far superior to the Roman legionary tactics, and a crushing defeat brought the expedition of Crassus to a speedy end. The disgrace of Carrhae equalled the days of the Allia and of Cannae; 10,000 Romans were led away into Parthian captivity and settled as serfs in the east of the kingdom; Roman standards as the spoils of victory adorned the Parthian king's palace.¹ On the return, which Crassus began at once, he himself was assassinated in a conference with the Parthians, and it was only with great difficulty that his subordinate C. Cassius brought the remnant of the army back to Syria. The terrible ending of this campaign would almost have entailed the loss of the province of Syria, had not internal dissensions led the Parthian king Pacorus to conclude a peace, and indeed an alliance, with the Romans.

The Breach between Pompeius and Caesar.—The gulf between Caesar and Pompeius had been bridged over from

¹ It was Augustus who at last compelled these standards to be restored, to the enormous delight of the vain Roman people. There is a representation of this scene on the cuirass of the famous statue of Augustus from Primo Porta (now in the Vatican, *Bra cio Nuovo*).

mere motives of interest by the renewal of the Triumvirate at Luca; and after the death in 54 of the latter's wife, Caesar's daughter, and still more after the fall of Crassus it became more and more manifest. Through the intrigues of demagogic agitators in the pay of both rivals Rome became the scene of anarchical disturbances, such as the murder of Clodius by Milo, which at last led to a league between the Optimate party and Pompeius. The latter's influence reached its zenith when in the year 52 he received for some time dictatorial power as *consul sine collega*; and he employed it, among other objects, for several legislative proposals aimed against Caesar. The point at issue which led to the outbreak of the civil war was this. Caesar, whose governorship expired on the 1st March 49, needed the Consulate for the following year in order to obtain the ratification of the arrangements made by him in Gaul and to secure for his veterans their well-earned and promised land-allotments. It was precisely this that Pompeius and the senatorial party sought to prevent; and in order to be able to accuse Caesar as a private person and thereby to exclude him from election they demanded that he should disband his army and personally present himself in Rome for the election, a condition the fulfilment of which would have signified Caesar's political death. For a long time Caesar delayed the decision by means of the Tribunes who were devoted to him, and by conciliatory offers did everything to prevent the conflict from coming to a head. He even went so far in his loyalty as to surrender at the order of the Senate two of his legions for the imminent Parthian war; Pompeius retained them for himself in Italy. Towards the end of the year 50, when Gaul was pacified, Caesar betook himself into his Cisalpine province (Upper Italy) where from Ravenna he watched affairs in Rome. In January 49 a blunt refusal met his thoroughly justifiable demand that Pompeius too should surrender his governorship of Spain, which he had not entered at all in the five years of their compact, and should dismiss his army; and on the other hand a fixed date was appointed for the disbandment of his army. Hesi-

tation was now at an end, *iacta alea est*. Caesar with his army crossed the rivulet Rubicon which divided the Gallic province from Italy proper, and thereby opened the Civil War.

§ 32. CAESAR'S VICTORY, MONARCHY, AND DEATH,

49-44 - 3.

The Wars against Pompeius and the Pompeians.—The boldness of Caesar, who dared to advance against Rome with a single legion, so disarmed the hesitating Pompeius that he with most of the Senators abandoned the State Treasury, left the capital, and on the further news of Caesar's victorious progress even sailed across from Brundisium to Greece. From this base he hoped, after drawing to himself the legions of the East, to fight his opponent with better success. Caesar recognised that it was impossible in the total absence of a fleet for him too to cross over to Greece, and decided to attack first the chief base of the Pompeian power, Spain, with his army that still lay in Further Gaul. After a short stay in Rome, where he gained over many opponents by his extraordinary clemency and restored order, he took command himself of the Spanish war. It ended in forty days with the reduction of the six Pompeian legions. Soon followed the surrender of the important trading town of Massilia, which for several months had withstood Caesar's power. Meanwhile Pompeius had collected nine legions in Greece and greatly strengthened his Adriatic fleet. Caesar was threatened with a perilous contest. Once again he settled in Rome only the most pressing business; he resigned his allotted dictatorship after appointing himself Consul for 48, and then hastily made for Brundisium to join the army. From here he crossed into Greece with six legions under great difficulties (June 48). At Dyrrhachium (Durazzo), which Pompeius had occupied, the armies throughout the winter lay over against one another, and the superior position of his antagonist brought Caesar into great straits. At last by a bold move

eastwards he made it necessary for the other to follow him, and in the Thessalian plain near Pharsalus forced him to a pitched battle, which secured final victory for Caesar's cause. Pompeius fled to Egypt, whose king owed him a debt of gratitude; but at the command of the faithless Ptolemaeus, who hoped thus to win Caesar's favour, he was murdered at the moment of landing at Pelusium.

When Caesar arrived some time after in Egypt, he became mixed up in the feuds between the king Ptolemaeus and his sister Cleopatra; and as he had brought with him but few troops, he fell for a time into great peril until reinforcements enabled him to defeat in the Nile delta the Anti-Roman party, at whose head the young king had placed himself. With this the resistance of Alexandria, the royal capital, was broken. Cleopatra received the crown from the hands of the Roman imperator; living in close association with him, she arranged Egyptian affairs to suit the Roman pleasure. After a stay of nine months in Egypt Caesar found himself compelled to undertake in person the war which had been unsuccessfully conducted by one of his generals against Pharnaces, the son of Mithradates, in order to put an end to the bold conquests of the Bosporan prince on the soil of Asia Minor. A brilliant victory at Zela in the kingdom of Pontus (47) — *veni, vidi, vici* — placed the destinies of Asia in Caesar's hands. Now at last he could think of return to Rome, where his presence was urgently needed.

For in the West affairs were not too prosperous. The partisans of Pompeius still possessed resources enough to keep up the contest, which particularly in Dalmatia and Spain imperilled for some time Caesar's superiority. Then the main forces of the Pompeians, led by the sons of the murdered imperator and the sturdy republican M. Porcius Cato, concentrated in Africa, where the Numidian king Juba warmly supported them. In Rome itself, moreover, the serious financial crisis resulting from the Civil War had produced an intolerable state of affairs, to which the arbitrary and capricious M. Antonius, Caesar's *magister equitum*, did

not prove equal. To this was added the circumstance that the legions lying ready in Campania for the African war began to be troublesome, as they were still vainly waiting for the high rewards promised to them. On Caesar's arrival the condition of things speedily changed in his favour. By judicious measures he lightened indebtedness, restored the rule of law by holding the regular elections, and by his mere personality forced the mutinous legions back into the most joyful obedience. Thus at the end of this year he could venture to cross over to Africa, where Cato as chief in command had gathered round himself all Caesar's enemies. As Caesar appeared with but a small force in Africa, he at first fell into straits; but later he gained the victory in a bloody battle before Thapsus (April 46), while at the same time one of his generals crushed the power of the Numidian prince Juba. Several of the most distinguished leaders of the Pompeian party had fallen in the battle; Cato, unwilling to survive the end of the republic, destroyed himself in Utica, the gates of which he opened to Caesar; and only a small part of the hostile forces, among them the two sons of Pompeius, Gnaeus and Sextus, escaped into Spain. After making Numidia into a province and pacifying Africa, Caesar returned to Rome, where he celebrated with colossal splendour a fourfold triumph over Gaul, Egypt, Pontus, and Numidia.

Once again however he had to take the field against the Pompeians. Gnaeus and Sextus Pompeius in Spain had not only found a large following among the native peoples, inclined as they always were for revolt, but had actually gained over several Caesarian legions. Towards the end of the same year Caesar arrived in Southern Spain; but it was not until March 45 that the decisive conflict was fought at Munda (between Cordova and Malaga). Here the Caesarians after a desperate and all but lost battle gained at last the victory by turning to account an accident. Thirty-three thousand Pompeians are said to have fallen; Gnaeus Pompeius lost his life in the flight, while his brother Sextus succeeded in finding con-

cealment among friendly mountaineers. Caesar was now for the first time actual monarch in the Roman empire.

Caesar's Monarchy (46-44).—If the Roman monarchy is not usually dated from the year 46, this is, generally speaking, simply because Octavianus only won by arms the heritage of Caesar after the latter's death, and moreover gained it only with the aid of a Triumvirate, from which he again emerged as monarch. In reality Caesar is the first monarch of Rome; and with the clear-eyed resoluteness of his character he never sought to deny the fact. The title for the new kingship was in the first instance supplied by the dictatorship, which Caesar, after receiving it for several shorter periods, caused to be transferred to him for life; later however he seemingly preferred the name of *Imperator*, likewise bestowed on him as a standing title, as it particularly implied the notion of the highest official authority, that is, *imperium*. That he seriously thought of renewing the old title of *King* must be doubted, although his flatterers often suggested it to him.

Caesar began his infinitely difficult task of healing the terribly disorganised conditions of society by a reconciliation of parties, which he introduced by a sweeping amnesty. As a genuine democrat he wished to make all useful members of the State, without distinction of party colouring, serviceable in the construction of the new administrative organism, at the head of which the Imperator was to stand as voluntarily recognised representative of the nation. Thus he not only allowed all existing offices to stand, but even made considerable additions to some, in order to associate with the administration the greatest possible number of able men. The mode of election also remained as before, except that the right of proposing candidates was allowed to him, which certainly amounted in reality to nomination. In every way he strove to show respect to republican institutions, without however obscuring thereby his position of supremacy, which was directly patent in his outward presence, as well as in the stamping of his portrait upon coins.

The demands of democracy, never silenced since the

Gracchi, were taken up by Caesar in a princely fashion: colonisation extending over Italy and the provinces (e.g. of Carthage and Corinth), which especially benefited the veterans, a new arrangement of corn-distributions to the needy, regulations for the administration of the provinces, laws dealing with the desperately involved conditions of debt and tenancy, all aimed at the improvement of society in general both in Italy and the provinces. The regulation of indebtedness was to be subserved in particular by the improvement of the terribly disorganised calendar, an innovation which under the name of the 'Julian Calendar' has become important in the world's history. Besides this legislative activity the all-embracing creative genius of the Emperor extended also to the promotion of outward prosperity, which he sought to aid by foundations and constructions of many kinds. Finally Caesar deemed it his duty to pay his tribute to the military ambition of the Roman people, he decided on an expedition against the Parthians, as one of the most popular cries was to take vengeance on them for the defeat of Crassus and the loss of the Roman standards. But a few days before starting for Asia the Emperor was overtaken by his doom.

Caesar's Death.—Despite the wholesome government which Caesar throughout dispensed, he could not be without enemies. To these belonged in the first place all republicans by conviction, who quite openly kept up a kind of saint-worship around the figure of Cato; and in the main these were the best elements of the citizen-body. Less honourable on the other hand were those Pompeians who basked in the sunshine of the Emperor's grace and nevertheless did not cease to intrigue for the now Utopian ideal of the republic. But even among the real Caesarians there was no lack of men who from discontent or other personal reasons had a spite against the ruler and were inclined for conspiracies. Caesar was not without knowledge of this cross-current, which often manifested itself clearly in a vehement pamphlet-literature, and even in conspiracies against his life; but such was his

confidence and so unswerving his course of action that he disregarded them both. As indeed we can understand, it was particularly in the Senate that the opposition took firmer and firmer root; for the Senate had been hurt by its liberal admixture with democratic elements, partly of a lower class, and by the depression of its political influence, and from its bosom arose the conspiracy to which the Imperator fell a victim. Its heads were C. Cassius Longinus, who after the battle of Pharsalus had joined Caesar and now thought himself neglected, and Decimus Brutus Albinus, Caesar's able assistant in the conquest of Gaul; among some sixty senators whom they gained over for their purpose was also the nephew and son-in-law of Cato, M. Junius Brutus, who was living in close association of friendship and study with Cicero, and who, in spite of a morbid republicanism nurtured by family tradition and Stoic philosophy, had not spurned Caesar's forgiving love after the battle of Pharsalus. On the 15th of March 44 (the Ides) the designed murder was accomplished before the commencement of a meeting of the Senate in the theatre of Pompeius, by whose statue—a strange ordainment of chance!—Caesar gave up the ghost.

§ 33. THE STRUGGLES FOR CAESAR'S INHERITANCE (VICTORY OF OCTAVIANUS AND FALL OF THE REPUBLIC) 44-29 B.C.

Pretenders until the Formation of the (Second) Triumvirate (43).—Nothing illustrates better the complete misapprehension of actual conditions which was prevalent in the circles of these 'restorers of liberty' than the resolutions framed two days after the murder at the first meeting of the Senate, mainly at the instigation of Cicero, who now came forward again. By the resolution sanctioning the will of the deceased with all his other arrangements and translating him to heaven, while at the same time giving a complete amnesty to the murderers, the fatal opposition between Caesarians and Anti-Cesarians was officially ratified. At first a universal

helplessness and uncertainty prevailed, which was further increased by the wily intrigues of the Consul M. Antonius, the favourite and for many years the assistant of Caesar. But the commons after the publication of the will, by which they were generously endowed, began to side openly against the murderers, and their attitude soon caused the heads of the conspiracy to leave Rome, partly in order to go to the provinces already allotted by Caesar to them, partly in the exercise of specially devised commissions. Antonius, who had obtained for his protection a bodyguard of 6000 men, felt himself so thoroughly master of the situation that he determined to forcibly deprive Decimus Brutus of Hither Gaul, which the latter had already taken over. The importance of this particular province lay in the fact that from it Italy and Rome could be most easily held in check. At this moment Caesar's official heir, Gaius Octavius, appeared on Italian soil.

Gaius Octavius, the grandson of Caesar's sister Julia (born 22nd September 63) had been some years ago adopted by his great uncle and brought up manifestly to be his successor. With a not very powerful body, Octavius possessed remarkable powers of intelligence, which had been quickened by a careful education, and now qualified the youth of nineteen for a position which called for the shrewdest politician and diplomatist. None but such a creature of intelligence, endowed with an iron and dauntless pertinacity, was capable of rising up on the existing walls of the republican State a new structure which could stay the sinking Roman world for some centuries to come. In Greece, where he was living for purposes of study, young Octavius was met by the news of the death of his uncle and adoptive father. He betook himself without delay to Italy, where he designed to enter upon his heritage under the new name of C. Julius Cæsar Octavianus.

Antonius withheld the inheritance of Caesar from Octavianus, in whom he saw a dangerous antagonist; and the latter in his poverty found himself compelled to seek admission to the Senatorial party. The way into this was opened for him by Cicero, whom the calculating young man entirely won over. Octavianus placed himself with an army raised on credit from Caesarian veterans at the service of the Senate, which without regarding his lack of military experience

appointed him junior general to the Consuls now taking the field against Antonius, Hirtius and Pansa. The task of this army was to relieve Decimus Brutus, who was shut up by Antonius in Mutina (hence the name *bellum Mutinense*), and to disarm Antonius, who was now unmasked by Cicero's energetic agitation and famous 'Philippic' orations. After several successful contests, which indeed cost the lives of both Consuls, but compelled Antonius to flee to M. Aemilius Lepidus, the Caesarian governor of Gaul, Decimus Brutus was entrusted by the Senate with the further management of the war. And now Octavianus dropped the mask of submission, marched with his army to Rome, and extorted for himself the Consulship, and for Antonius and Lepidus, with whom he was acting in collusion, the repeal of the hostile resolutions framed against them. Now the officers and army of Brutus also passed over to Octavianus, and the Caesarians became decidedly preponderant in Italy. Their three leaders, Octavianus, Antonius, and Lepidus, founded on the occasion of a conference at Bononia (Bologna) the *Second Triumvirate* (43-36). Politically it aimed at a division of the powers of State between the three, elected for five years; on the military side it aimed at common operations against the murderers of Caesar, Brutus and Cassius, who had attained great power in the East. But for the realisation of their plans two things were needful, the removal of the most influential portion of their opponents and the control of great resources. Both of these ends were to be served by the proscriptions drawn up in Bologna, which have stamped this Second Triumvirate with an indelible brand of infamy. Two thousand knights and three hundred Senators are said to have then perished, among the latter Cicero, whose head Octavianus coolly surrendered to the vindictive Antonius. Thus Rome and Italy were 'pacified.'

Octavianus and Antonius now crossed over to Greece (42), in order to begin the struggle with Brutus and Cassius. In the two years following Caesar's murder these men had fought with great success throughout the East against the Caesarian

officials, and now they advanced with a considerable force to the decisive struggle, which took place near the Thracian village of Philippi. Within a few weeks were fought two great battles. In the first Antonius defeated Cassius, who took his own life, while Octavianus was conquered by Brutus; in the second however Brutus succumbed to his united opponents and followed the example of his comrade. The army and fleet for the most part joined the Triumvirs. Antonius and Octavianus now parted, the former to rearrange Asiatic affairs in the interest of the victors, the latter to attend to the payment of the veterans, which necessitated land-allotments on a grand scale.

The forcible ejections which Octavianus had perforce decreed aroused a furious bitterness, which was still further increased by the danger of imports being cut off from the country by the fleet of S. Pompeius, who after Caesar's death had ventured out of his Spanish hiding-place and had raised during the general disturbances a not inconsiderable seapower. In collusion with M. Antonius, his ambitious wife Fulvia and his brother Lucius, the Consul of the year 41, sought to exploit this peculiarly difficult position of Octavianus against him. A regular war broke out between him and the Antonians (41-40), which ended with the capture of Perusia, into which Lucius Antonius had thrown himself (hence the name 'Perusine War'). No intelligent man indeed could expect candid dealings between the two rulers—Lepidus played always a subordinate part—and Antonius now would have been all the less inclined to give way to his youthful colleague as he deemed himself justified in the utmost claims by his extraordinary position of power in the East. For the moment however a breach was avoided; indeed an apparently complete reconciliation was effected at a conference at Brundisium, and sealed by the marriage of Antonius with Octavianus' step-sister Octavia (40). In this peace S. Pompeius was also included, from reasons of prudence. But already in the next year (39) hostilities began anew between the aspiring and restless son of Pompeius and

the Triumvirs; it was only after a two years' war (38-36), which was fought out in and around Sicily and in which Octavianus' general M. Vipsanius Agrippa¹ won well-earned laurels, that the last Pompeian was rendered harmless. In connexion with this war Octavianus threw overboard Lepidus, long a burden to him, who claimed Sicily for himself as reward for his assistance; he compelled him to withdraw from the Triumvirate and live out his life in self-chosen exile. With this the Triumvirate was in reality dissolved and the fate of the Roman empire exposed anew to the rivalry of two pretenders.


*Octavianus and Antonius at War for Supremacy (36-30).—*The opposition between the two rivals for the inheritance of Caesar was naturally such a one that any attempt to bridge it over was hopeless and indeed was never essayed in seriousness by the two parties. Nevertheless the strong character and noble spirit of Octavia was able for several years longer to prevent an open outbreak of hostilities. But after an unsuccessful campaign against the Parthians, which cost him his reputation as a general, Antonius for the second time threw himself into Cleopatra's arms, and indeed officially wedded her. The last bond between the potentates was now broken. Urgent campaigns in the Eastern Alps and Illyria (35-33) prevented Octavianus at first from beginning as yet the struggle with Antonius, but supplied him with a mettled army for it and gave him a valuable knowledge of generalship. In the year 33 however expired the second period of five years for which the Triumvirs had mutually guaranteed their power; and the two rivals appeared with countercharges before the Senate. Antonius however had alienated all sympathy in Rome by the unbounded capriciousness with which he squandered Roman provinces and dependent states on Cleopatra and her children no less than by his objectionable relations with her in general. Octavianus had no difficulty in causing the position of Antonius to be declared forfeit and

¹ The founder of Cologne (*Colonia Agrippina*) and builder of the Pantheon in Rome.

war to be voted against Cleopatra (32). It was no trifling contest that confronted Octavianus. Antonius had at his disposal the whole resources of the East, and he waited on the west coast of Greece with an army of about 100,000 men and a strong fleet for his opponent's attack (31). Octavianus avoided battle as long as he could, and thus brought Antonius into a difficult position. At length the latter made up his mind to decide matters by a sea fight. On the 2nd of September 31 B.C. was fought at Actium on the Ambracian Gulf (Gulf of Volo) the notable battle of that name. Moved by the flight of Cleopatra, Antonius most disgracefully and unreasonably gave up his cause for lost. Both fled to Alexandria, whither Octavianus followed them in the next year (30). The destiny of Antonius was speedily consummated. Army and navy deserted to his opponent; and then, nerved by a false report of Cleopatra's death, he took his life. Cleopatra also followed the same course when she perceived the impossibility of winning any influence over Octavianus.

Egypt thereby fell into the hands of the conqueror. After putting out of the way two sons of Cleopatra by Caesar and Antonius who had already been nominated kings, he took possession of it as his private property. The enormous wealth which he found in the royal treasury enabled him to meet all his obligations towards both the veterans and the persons injured by ejections; but the golden rain of Egypt did not in the least rouse to new life the moribund body of the Roman State. After Octavianus had passed the winter of 30-29 in Asia, where relations with the Parthians particularly needed regulation, he returned in the summer of 29 to Rome, where the celebration of victory and peace was held from the 13th to the 15th of August amidst the boundless but justifiable delight of the people. Thus had the monarchy founded by Caesar passed after fifteen years of civil war to his heir.

THE JULIAN HOUSE¹



¹ Names in thick type are those of the Emperors of the Julian House.

SECTION III

THE IMPERIAL AGE UNTIL DIOCLETIAN (29 B.C.—
285 A.D.)

Sources.—It is only for the first century of the Imperial Age that the sources are abundant enough for us to gain a relatively clear picture of it. The biographies of the Emperors by C. Suetonius Tranquillus, which contain their careers from Caesar until Domitian, supply an abundance of most interesting matter in spite of deficient arrangement, manifest errors, and grave distortions. Of the two great works of Cornelius Tacitus, stateliest of all Roman historians—the ‘Annals,’ describing the period from Augustus to Nero (68), and the ‘Histories,’ which reach from the year 69 until Domitian’s death—important pieces are lost; he is however the most trustworthy witness of that great age, although he has by no means attained his ideal of writing without prejudice. In regard to contents these two histories stand far above the so-called ‘Historians of the Imperial Age’ (*Scriptores Historiae Augustae*), a collection of biographies extending from Hadrian to Numerianus and composed by various authors, which owe their position in the foreground of our study of the second and third centuries solely to the wretched condition of our sources for that age. Deliberate falsehood for political reasons and misrepresentation from love of sensation appear beside the authors’ obvious lack of historical or critical intelligence; and the opinion that we must form of their lost main source, the biographies of Marius Maximus (from Nero to Elagabalus), is necessarily unfavourable. Of the work of Livius, which extended to 9 B.C., only scanty summaries for the age of Augustus survive. The last part of the short sketch of Velleius Paterculus becomes somewhat fuller for this period. Of the Roman History of Cassius Dio few remnants for the Imperial Age have been handed down to us. Of Plutarch’s *Lives* those of Otho and Galba are preserved. Of the Roman historians writing in Greek mention has yet to be made of Herodianus, whose history from the end of Marcus Aurelius until Gordianus III. is in spite of great failings valuable enough. In the employment of all these historians it is more or less needful to observe that the discrepancy between the Senatorial and Imperial colouring of the narratives has led to great distortions of the truth, which has moreover suffered severely from the overgrowth of the rhetorical style, a cancer of the historiography of these ages.

But outside history proper we have also to reckon among our sources a large number of literary productions which reflect or directly treat events of the day, such as the works of many poets (Horace, Martial, Persius, &c.), collections of letters such as that of the younger Plinius, occasional writings like the *Panegyricus* by the same author upon Trajan, or the so-called ‘Germania’ of Tacitus. Most important too

is the testimony which coins and inscriptions have bequeathed to us; among these the most prominent place is occupied by the so-called *Monumentum Ancyranum*, Augustus' grave-inscription, which was destined for his mausoleum and contains a summary of his deeds.

CHAPTER VIII

The Emperors of the Julian and Flavian Houses,

29 B.C.—96 A.D.

§ 34. AUGUSTUS AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE MONARCHY

The Nature of the Augustan Monarchy.—If we observe how hesitatingly Augustus—a title of honour which was presented to Octavianus by the Senate in the year 27—proceeded to assume those rights which are characteristic of the monarch, and how he strove to mask his singular position by leaning as far as possible upon republican institutions, we cannot marvel that up to the present day opinions vary as to what name is to be applied to this creation of his. Even a contemporary writer could describe the history of that age as far as the reign of Tiberius in such a way that the transition from one form of government to the other finds not a word of mention. From our present standpoint we must designate the supremacy of Augustus as a *monarchy*, a sequel to Caesar's creation; Augustus understood his position as that of *princeps* or 'First' (*i.e.* of the Senate and people), and hence arose the name of 'princiate.'

In reality Augustus did not take the last logical step to which the regeneration of the State necessarily led him; despite all the limitations imposed by him on the Senate, the representative of the administrative organism of the Republic, he did not venture to reduce it to such an insignificance as excluded any doubt as to the true division of power. The opposition between Senate and Emperor became the most retarding factor in the further development of Roman state-

life; and when at last after three centuries it was removed by Diocletian's change of the constitution, the aging body of the State was so far advanced in decay that it could never again revive to new life.

Augustus showed clearly how he conceived his relation to the Senate when on the 13th of January 27 he resigned the extraordinary plenary power possessed by him in the fifteen years of his Triumviral office (43-28) into the hands of the Senate, which thereupon voted him as a token of gratitude the honorary title of *Augustus*. The Consulate, which the new ruler had held from 27-23, could not satisfy his claims simply because of the presence of colleagues implied in the office; the revolution which had been consummated in the last century wholly rested on military power, and this beyond a doubt would have to form the stay of the monarchy. So together with the most important border provinces (Syria, Gaul, Spain), in which a strong military force was permanently needed, Augustus procured for himself the *imperium proconsulare*,¹ which gave him unlimited powers outside Italy. Henceforth the division of the provinces into 'imperial' and 'senatorial' remained. For the police of the capital again Augustus, by a Sullan arrangement which had been already permitted officially to the Triumvirs, kept a guard which bore the title of *Praetoriani* and formed a band nine cohorts² strong, blindly devoted to the Emperor and in return highly privileged. In his supreme command over the whole army of the State, which included the right of filling up all officers' posts and military jurisdiction, the Emperor had arrived at that goal towards which the whole development of army organisation since Marius and Sulla had tended; possession of the army gave possession of the monarchy.

It was far more difficult to find suitable forms for the relation of the Principate towards the civil law. The starting-point

¹ The title *imperator* he had already borne regularly from the year 40, without its being regarded then as an official title of the Emperor. Tiberius did not bear it.

² The cohorts were of 1000 men each.

here was the 'Tribune's power' (*tribunicia potestas*), which Augustus caused to be assigned to him annually from the year 23 onwards. The rights connected with this office, such as the privilege of introducing laws and bringing forward or checking resolutions of the Senate, the religious sanctification which was associated with its inviolability (*sacrosanctitas*), were raised by Augustus to such an importance that in the subsequent bestowal of the *tribunicia potestas* on one of his ablest assistants, M. Vipsanius Agrippa, men could see an appointment to a share in the monarchy. Tacitus regards this office as the chief source of the Emperor's plenary powers, and indeed the Emperors themselves dated by it the years of their reign (e.g. on coins).

The tribunician power secured for the Emperor a strong influence over the Senate, which Augustus further extended by procuring for himself as *princeps senatus* the right of nominating a portion of the Senators (*nominatio*) and of proposing the officials to be elected by the Senate (*commendatio*). In legislation the old state of affairs apparently remained; but the Emperor's dispensations (*edicta*) were silently accepted as laws, and the Senate every year was sworn to them. In jurisdiction an important change came in; the Imperial Court took a place by the side of the previously existing courts of Senators and jurymen, all cases coming before its bar which related to officers, imperial procurators, members of the imperial family, or affairs of imperial provinces. As the Emperor was not able to pass judgment in person on all these matters, they called for the assistance of officials educated in the law, so that from this time the order of scientifically trained jurists began to develop, and from its most distinguished representatives the Emperor did not scorn to take professional advice. Finally Augustus added to the supreme military command and the highest judgeship (of which the latter indeed was only in a limited sense his) the supreme priesthood, causing himself to be appointed *pontifex maximus* for life after the death of Lepidus (12 B.C.). Thus he now united in his person the functions on which the old kingship had rested.

The creation of Augustus, though in many respects it was so brilliant, and though in fact the Roman world owed to it a partial recovery lasting some time, contained in itself a twofold contradiction, the consequences of which asserted themselves disastrously enough. The division of power between Emperor and Senate created in reality a kind of double rule or dyarchy, which worked contrary to the monarchic principle; and in the discrepancy between the rank of the Emperor in Rome, where he sought to be the first republican official, and in the provinces, where he was Imperator without restriction, a certain incompleteness was expressed which was the greatest weakness in Augustus' work.

§ 35. THE RULE OF AUGUSTUS, 29 B.C. TO 14 A.D.

Internal Administration.—The skill with which Augustus, although the division of administrative power was unfavourable to centralisation, yet contrived to interfere with a regulating and improving hand in nearly all branches of government and public life calls for our admiration. To his unwearied labours in this sphere the Empire, and above all the hitherto so enslaved provinces, owed that revival which was celebrated in something more than courtly flattery by many contemporaries as the dawn of a golden age.

Closely connected with the military organisation of Augustus was the financial administration. Payment of the veterans from the civil wars had swallowed up enormous sums, which for the most part had been defrayed from the spoils of Egypt; but the expenditure on the army kept on foot simply to guard the frontiers, which on the death of Augustus numbered twenty-five legions, and on the national fleet stationed at Misenum and Ravenna demanded every year an outlay beyond the means of the old treasury, the *Aerarium Saturni* administered by the Senate. Augustus therefore established a new military treasury, the *Aerarium militare*; but as the Emperor as supreme general had the greatest interest in the regular

collection of taxes, Augustus claimed a control over the whole system of taxation, so that even the Senatorial provinces and the dependent States had to receive imperial procurators. By a new scheme, in part based upon careful assessments, Augustus endeavoured to give a firm basis to the system of taxation, which hitherto had been open to the utmost caprice, and guarded it by severe laws against possible reprisals. The revenues moreover which accrued to the Emperor personally from his provinces and the Imperial territories like Egypt led to the foundation of an exclusively Imperial treasury, the *Fiscus*.

The inability of the State treasury to meet the ever increasing demands of such an Empire led Augustus to transfer to the Imperial treasury a large number of costly branches of administration, by which he naturally gained also a constant addition of power. Thus the Emperor defrayed and administered for Rome the corn-supply (*cura annonae*), the system of fire-police (*praefectura vigilum*) managed by the seven cohorts of *vigiles*, and the regulation of the Tiber with its tendency to disastrous inundations (*cura Tiberis*), for Italy the *cura viarum*, i.e. the construction of the great network of roads which spread over the land. In claiming the right of coinage Augustus proceeded with the same respect for tradition which marks his other measures; in the provinces the governors preserved the right of coining, and in Italy the Emperor shared with the Senate the coinage of gold and silver, while the small change, the copper, was wholly left to the Senate. Later indeed the name of the official on the senatorial coins gave way entirely to the simple stamp of the Senate (S.C.)

To his capital Augustus devoted the utmost interest, which was manifested especially in a vigorous course of building. By restoring fallen temples and raising new ones, by magnificent Courts of Law, theatres, libraries, and by laying down a new Forum (the old Forum Romanum had long been insufficient for the needs of the capital of the world), Augustus made his Rome that splendid city of brilliant marble whose

wonders still reveal themselves even in its wretched ruins to the eye of the skilled antiquarian. Judicious measures of police, to which we must add also the division of the city into fourteen quarters (*regiones*), held in order the internal life of this gigantic centre of traffic, which in Augustus' times is said to have reckoned two millions of inhabitants. Less successful were the efforts of the Emperor in another department of the public weal, to which nevertheless he directed his keenest care; they related to public morality, which ever since the development of the Roman State into a World-Power had been continually sinking, and in the times of Augustus had reached that level of depravity which, apart from abundant literary testimony, the legislation referring to it reveals to us. Slavery, whose most loathsome outgrowth was represented by the gladiatorial games, the Hellenistic frivolity dominating the stage, the collection of enormous wealth in the hands of single families, the luxury and the often highly offensive worships of the East—all these circumstances had led to a perilous corruption of the whole national life. Supported by the propaganda of literature, which was devoted to him (Horace, for instance), Augustus sought vigorously to combat these evils. Significant witnesses for this are the *lex Julia de adulteriis* against adultery and excesses, the *lex de maritandis ordinibus*, which aimed at making divorce more difficult and at placing the unwedded and childless under political and legal disadvantages, and the *lex Papia Poppaea*, which was to encourage by rewards the establishment of households. Laws too against luxury of every kind, against the immorality of the public shows, &c., were designed to raise public morality, while a revival of religion by the resuscitation of purely Roman worships or by the introduction of seasonable new ones, such as that of the *Divus Iulius* and of the *Genius Augusti*, was to supplant secret foreign rites. It must be confessed that in this department but little success crowned the efforts of Augustus, however much honour they did to the 'Father of the Fatherland,' as he was entitled from the year 2 B.C.

External Politics and Wars.—It was no part of Augustus' plan to seek by conquests a further extension of the great empire which he had come to rule; his policy aimed rather at spreading the blessings of peace over the whole Roman world. This is brilliantly attested by the administration of the provinces and subdued kingdoms, which Augustus with untiring energy strove to incorporate in the Roman State. He himself in the course of his reign visited in person nearly all the provinces, in order to settle difficulties that had arisen and to make certain of the way in which his ideas were being realised. We learn the provincial administration best from the history of Gaul, to which, owing to its great importance, Augustus directed his especial interest and which nobly paid its debt of gratitude to Rome by thoroughly absorbing and successfully developing Roman culture. Under Augustus Lugudunum (Lyons) became the centre of the three Gallic provinces (Aquitania, Lugudunensis, Belgica) and the second capital of the world-empire.

Not only Gaul but the whole northern frontier of the empire were constantly disturbed by the movements of the Germanic tribes, against whom, despite the peaceful tendency of his reign, Augustus was forced to decree vigorous military operations. The Germanic wars had two bases in particular, the lines of the Danube and the Rhine. In the sons of his third wife Livia, Tiberius Claudius Nero and Nero Claudius Drusus, Augustus found two capable generals.

After the lands south of the Upper Danube, Raetia, Noricum, and Pannonia, had been brought under the imperial administration, Tiberius in the years 12–9 B.C. secured the lower bed of the Danube against the people pressing in from the north, Getae and Bastarnae, and created the new province of Moesia out of the territory lying between the Danube on one side and the northern frontier of Illyria, Macedonia, and the dependent state of Thrace on the other. At the same time his brother Drusus, by the famous campaigns between the Rhine and Elbe to which among other places the fort of Aliso on the Lippe and the Saalburg in the Taunus owe

their origin, extended Roman supremacy as far as the Elbe ; and after his sudden death (9) Tiberius secured these conquests with the utmost skill, so that in this period the *Provincia Germania* implied a real possession of the empire. It was not until the governor P. Quinctilius Varus, who by his blundering administration had provoked the rising of the Germans under Arminius, had met with the crushing defeat of the Teutoburger Wald¹ (9 A.D.) that the frontier had to be drawn back to the line of the Rhine. The Rhine and Danube now marked the northern border of the empire, which a series of stately fortresses was to secure—*Castra Vetera* (Xanten), *Colonia Agrippina* (Cologne), *Moguntiacum* (Mainz), *Augusta Rauracorum* (Augsburg), *Augusta Vindelicorum* (Augsburg), *Castra Batavorum* (Passau), *Vindobona* (Vienna), &c.

In the Orient, which Augustus repeatedly visited, affairs permitted of a more peaceful arrangement. From the Parthians, who had been chastised for the defeat neither of Crassus nor of Antonius, Augustus obtained in 20 B.C. through diplomatic negotiations the restoration of the captured Roman standards, an event that was celebrated by the vain Roman people like a victory. He did not arrive at a real settlement of the difficult Eastern frontier questions, in which a great part was played by Armenia, the object of Parthian ambition ; but the credit of the Roman name was preserved amidst all the everlasting changes of tenancy in the Eastern territories, and commercial relations were able to extend as far as India. From Syria frequent interferences were made in the administration of Judaea, which at last was wholly incorporated in the Roman province ; and from Egypt the legions carried the fame of the Roman name as far as Arabia and Ethiopia.

Harder strife was needed to bring back to obedience the restless Spanish tribes of the Cantabri and Astures, which even threatened to interfere in Gaul. The skilful generalship

¹ With regard to the locality of the battle no certain conclusions can be drawn.

of Agrippa (20-19 B.C.) at length succeeded in establishing here complete peace and creating a field favourable to the spread of Roman culture.

The Assistants and Family of Augustus—The Succession.—Among the men who stood near to Augustus and supported his government with a complete sacrifice of their own personality, two particularly deserve mention. In domestic politics C. Cilnius Maecenas, a man of ancient Etruscan nobility, stood by the Emperor's side as a kind of diplomatic mediator in a position based solely on the bond of confidence. Aristocratic courtier and wisest protector of all the arts of peace, the great patron of Horace and Vergil, he may pass as the representative of the monarchical culture of the Augustan age. The military founder of the monarchy on the other hand was M. Vipsanius Agrippa, the victor of Actium, who has often been mentioned above. His thoroughly practical character approved itself not only in generalship but also in organising the national administration. His services were so brilliant and so indispensable that Augustus by the assignment of the *tribunicia potestas* made him his associate in the government and even married him to his only daughter Julia, intending that the issue of this union should be appointed to succeed him.

But it was not vouchsafed to Augustus to bequeath the rule of the world to a descendant of his blood. The hopes placed on the wedlock of Julia and Agrippa were indeed so far realised that two sons were born of it, Gaius and Lucius Caesar, whom their grandfather adopted at once; but both princes died before him. The Emperor then resolved to appoint as his associate in the government and successor his little-loved stepson Tiberius, whom after the death of Agrippa in the year 12 B.C. he had forced to break off his present happy married life and wed Julia, with the condition that he should pass over his own son Drusus and adopt Germanicus, the son of his deceased brother Drusus.

When Augustus died on the 14th August 14 A.D. at Nola in Campania, the position of things was so secure that Tiberius

could assume the supremacy without opposition. Augustus left behind no hostile political groups; the feeble attempts at revolt against his monarchy which had now and again been made he had always promptly and effectually suppressed. The durability of his great life's work was now attested by the unopposed bequeathment of the throne.

§ 36. TIBERIUS, 14-37 A.D.

Domestic Politics and Administration.—Tiberius Claudius Nero, the elder son of Livia by her first marriage, entitled himself as Emperor *Tiberius Caesar Augustus*. Endowed by nature with an unpliant character tending to eccentricity in all forms, and embittered by a long life of neglect—for on his accession to the throne he already counted 55 years—the second Emperor did not succeed in associating with his own personality that enthusiasm for the new form of the State which Augustus had contrived to awaken in the general masses of the people, and especially in the provinces. Withal his rule was no less meritorious than that of his great predecessor.

In the development of the monarchy Tiberius went a step further than Augustus by not causing his position, like the former, to be guaranteed anew from time to time by the Senate, but regarding it as an incontestable property, as indeed it had proved itself by its bequeathment. Otherwise Tiberius too showed himself most cautious and considerate in his dealings with the Senate, and even raised its importance by transferring to it all elections, which were taken away from the meetings of the people, and by depriving the latter in practice, though not in theory, of even the power of introducing laws. Emperor and Senate, the latter restricted by the Emperor's right of nomination and commendation, are now the only legislative factors. The sovereign will of the ruler showed itself equally in an innovation strongly opposed to republican feeling; the whole bodyguard, which hitherto had only been quartered to a very small extent in Rome, was

now concentrated in the capital,¹ and thus the position of the Prefect of the Guard (*praefectus praetorio*) became more and more influential at the expense of the Senate. This decision was due to the man then holding this office, Aelius Seianus, who was Tiberius' right hand. At the same time the Senate had to surrender to the Emperor the command over the 'city cohorts' intended for duties of police; the City-Prefect (*praefectus urbi*), as their commander was entitled, became after the Prefect of the Guard the most important Imperial officer.

The administration enjoyed continuous surveillance by Tiberius, which found expression among other ways in the numerous indictments of oppressive provincial officials (*rerum repetundarum*). Like Augustus, he sought to bring an improving and helpful influence to bear on all departments, and his rule in every respect increased that happy condition of the empire which his predecessor had founded. If nevertheless a strong opposition against him grew up in aristocratic circles, it was his reserved and imperious character that was to blame, no less than the unhappy influence of the ambitious Prefect Seianus, the sole possessor of the Emperor's confidence. The latter half of his reign swarmed with prosecutions and executions for misprision of treason (*maiestas*), a juristic idea that arose under Tiberius; and the outspoken feeling of the capital induced him in the year 26 to entirely leave Rome and to make his home partly in Campania and partly on the island of Capri.

Foreign Politics and Wars.—The legions on the Rhine and Danube had profited by the change of rulers to extort by revolts an improvement in their condition, viz. a shortening of the period of service from twenty-five to sixteen years and an increase of pay. It was only with difficulty that this dangerous rising was suppressed on the Danube by Seianus, on the Rhine by the Emperor's nephew and adopted son Germanicus. The latter, with his ambitious wife Agrippina,

¹ The enclosing walls of the *Castra Praetoriana* are still preserved in so far as they were included in the Aurelian city-wall; they encircle the Campo Militare between Porta Pia and Porta San Lorenzo.

the daughter of Julia and Agrippa, was in the habit of crossing the Emperor's plans; and now in entire opposition to Tiberius' purposes he deemed it advisable to assail the Germans anew. In the years 14 to 16 he undertook several campaigns against the Marsi, Chatti, and Cherusci, and gained some victories which stamped him in the eyes of the public as a great general, but which brought no gain to the Roman supremacy. Tiberius therefore, averse to any policy of conquest, recalled him from his post, and after allowing him to celebrate a brilliant triumph allotted him another mission, in Asia (17). The position of commander-in-chief in Germany was not filled up again; two legates shared the military and juridical administration of the province. The waiting policy of Tiberius with regard to the Germans was soon to prove its value. Their never ceasing internal quarrels led to a great war between the Suabian kingdom founded by Marbod, which Tiberius himself had combated from Pannonia with general success, and the Saxon tribes led by Arminius. The creation of Marbod was destroyed; he himself sought the protection of Rome and died in Ravenna. Arminius however, the 'liberator of Germany,' fell a victim to family discords (21).

In the East the affairs of Parthia and Armenia were again such as to make a display of Roman power seem desirable. The task that was here imposed on Germanicus was however not clear; and it was rendered much more difficult—as was assuredly intended—by the fact that the proud prince was to share the command with the governor of Syria, Cn. Calpurnius Piso, an ambitious man of the noblest origin. This led to endless disputes as to official rights, which were further envenomed by the wives of both men; and when Germanicus died in the year 19 Piso was accused of murder, and although his innocence was proved in the trial he took his own life in prison. The people however, who worshipped Germanicus and his family, actually cast the blame for the death of their darling on the Emperor, and from this time the hatred of Tiberius grew.

Family Relations and Succession.—Tiberius had from his first marriage a son Drusus, whom he had been forced by the command of Augustus to pass over in favour of his nephew Germanicus. No children had issued from his second marriage with Julia, who on account of her scandalous life had been banished by her own father. Thus Tiberius could hope after the death of Germanicus to secure the succession for the son of his body. Against this design was spun at the court a mesh of the most odious intrigue, which had a terrible effect on the Emperor, already inclined as he was by nature to suspicion. Three parties sought to win the first place. At the head of one stood the old Empress Livia, to whom Augustus had devised a share in the supremacy and who thought herself insufficiently regarded by her son; she died in 29. The second was represented by the ambitious Agrippina, who wished to procure the succession for her own and Germanicus' children. The third was formed by the Prefect of the Guard Seianus, the Emperor's trusted favourite, and the depraved wife of Drusus, Livilla; they removed Drusus by poison in 23 and aimed at supremacy for themselves. Seianus succeeded in entangling Agrippina and her sons in charges of treason and rendering them harmless; but when he himself in the year 31 proceeded to conspiracy for the speedier attainment of his purpose, Tiberius was warned at the last moment and was able to forestall and crush his disloyal confidant. In the whole imperial family there now survived only two princes who were to be considered for the succession—Gaius the youngest son of Germanicus, and Tiberius (Gemellus) a son of Drusus and Livilla, who was however weighted with the suspicion of illegitimacy owing to his mother's relations with Seia. Nevertheless Tiberius with his sense of justice seemed to have devised to him by his will an equal share with Gaius. Such was the settlement of the succession, the sad conclusion of a terrible domestic drama.

The old Emperor spent the last years of his life in his solitude on Capri in an ever increasing horror of society and

bitterness, as the result of which we must regard the countless impeachments for treason in that period. The people responded to the Emperor whom they had pitilessly driven away and hated with a *Chronique Scandaleuse* of his course of life; from its loathsome details, as given to us by the gossiping Suetonius, the reader turns away with disgust and unbelief. The present age at length is beginning to pass a more correct judgment on this ruler, who especially in his domestic policy is to be reckoned among the greatest of all Roman Emperors. He died at the age of 78 on Capri, probably by a natural death.

§ 37. THE EMPERORS GAIUS, CLAUDIUS, AND NERO,

37-41 A.D.

Gaius Caesar (nicknamed *Caligula*, 'army-boot'), a young man who had grown up in every enjoyment and vice, had escaped the suspicion of Tiberius during the trial of his mother Agrippina and his brothers only by his great skill in deception. With the aid of this he also contrived to win great popularity in the early part of his reign as long as he felt himself still unsafe. His cousin and adoptive brother Tiberius Gemellus he speedily caused to be put out of the way. By accurately defining the jurisdictions of Emperor and Senate in favour of the latter, by restoring the comitial elections suppressed by Tiberius, by abolishing unpopular taxes, tolerance of foreign worships and the like, he won over Commons and Senate; and even in the provinces he enjoyed the same credit because he was generous in bestowing the precious Roman citizenship. But when the great savings which the wise financial administration of Tiberius had stored up in the public treasury had been dissipated in most extravagant and often quite senseless undertakings, the true character of the prince revealed itself; he was heartless, capable of never a great thought, morally rotten. The recently abolished impeachments for treason were renewed, for they gave opportunities for great confiscations; heavy taxes, such as the income tax of 12½

per cent., were introduced; in every possible way money was to be wrung out of the people. At the same time the Emperor made his scandalous course of life more and more public, seeking to gain from the halo of his apotheosis¹ a justification for all conceivable deeds, which now earned the applause only of the rabble, which was stupefied by monstrous festive splendours.

An equally ridiculous and bootless expedition into Germany and against Britain (39-40) was designed to blind the soldiers to his unworthy sway of empire and procure for himself a cheap triumph. But the patience of the Romans lasted no longer; in January 41 he was murdered by a few high officers during the Palatine Games.

The reign of Gaius, in which it is customary to recognise the first type of 'Caesarian madness,' remained without the least influence on the later development of Imperial history. As a result of his murder a not uninteresting reaction in favour of former conditions was displayed, the Senate for a moment hoping to be able to restore the republic or at least to take into its own hands the decision as to the succession. But before the Senate proceeded to action the question as to the tenancy of the throne was already settled.

Tiberius Claudius Germanicus, usually entitled simply *Claudius*, brother of Germanicus and uncle of Gaius (41-54), was raised to the throne by the praetorians, who were as little desirous as the commons for a return to senatorial rule; the Senate perforce confirmed him. To no one can this appointment have been more surprising than to the Emperor himself. From youth he had been thrust into the background by his family owing to his sickliness; he had spent his years in learned dilettantism, without ever rising to the surface of political life. Nevertheless Claudius ruled with ability, plainly following the principles of Tiberius. To him belongs the credit, among other things, of incorporating Britain as a province in the empire (43); its posses-

¹ It was this Emperor who demanded the erection of his statue in the temple at Jerusalem, which was frustrated by a rising of the Jews.

sion ever since Caesar had seemed desirable to the Romans in view of the relations between the Kelts of the mainland and the islands. Thrace also became a province in his reign, and the prestige of the empire in the East (Syria, Palestine, Parthia) was vigorously maintained sword in hand.

Internal government too was careful, and brought some gratifying changes; in particular the Emperor directed his interest to the improvement of the legal administration, for which he displayed a real passion. Agriculture was aided most effectually by draining the Fucine Lake, and commerce, especially the corn trade, profited by a magnificent extension of the harbour of Ostia. The imperial attention was turned to the provinces as well, notably to Gaul, whose citizens received from Claudius the qualification to hold all Roman offices (the *ius honorum*) and therewith access to the Senate; it was one of the most important steps towards romanising the provinces.

How far the wise measures of Claudius are to be put to the account of his advisers, the freedmen Narcissus and Pallas, is beyond our knowledge; on the other hand we know that both exercised an often harmful influence on the Emperor, who displayed far too great a weakness in dealing with such cabals of favourites and still more with women. The revolting vices of a Julia and Livilla were revived in the ladies of the Claudian court; the Emperor's first wife, the infamous Valeria Messalina, whom Narcissus put out of the way in 48, was followed by the younger Agrippina, who had her mother's ambition and had ensnared the Emperor for the sole purpose of obtaining the succession for her son by an earlier marriage, L. Domitius Nero. With the aid of the devoted Pallas she succeeded in inducing the Emperor to pass over his own son Britannicus, adopt his stepson Nero, and even wed him to his daughter Octavia (53). When the Claudian party, headed by Narcissus, threatened to undermine Agrippina's influence, she caused her husband to be poisoned and attained her object; her son Nero could succeed without difficulty to the throne (54).

Claudius fell a victim to his excessive weakness for the female sex; but in view of his administration of the empire he did not deserve to figure in tradition as little better than the ridiculous clown as which Seneca, Nero's witty tutor, sought to brand him by the malicious satire parodying his 'deification.'¹ In the case of Claudius, as of Tiberius, later ages have admitted a juster estimate.

Nero Claudius Caesar (54-68) at first shared the government with his mother Agrippina, who indeed appears by his side on coins. The Senate, supported by the Prefect of the Guard Burrus and the Emperor's influential tutor Seneca, formed a counter-party; they succeeded in gradually ousting the ambitious Augusta and guiding the young prince for some years in the ways of wise moderation. As in the early years of Gaius, whom Nero greatly resembles, the empire in the first third of his reign enjoyed a happy condition which was only for a time imperilled in Britain (60-61). Here the governor Suetonius Paullinus sought to extend the hold of the empire and thereby brought on a revolt which was stirred up by the national druidism, and in the course of which the chief centres of Roman culture, Camalodunum (Colchester) and Londinium (London), fell before the fury of the Kelts. Suetonius however was at last victorious; after his recall, which was due to his bad administration, peace was again established (66-68). A determined rising of the Jews, which T. Flavius Vespasianus was charged to suppress, Nero did not live to see ended.

The dark sides of Nero's character, which the dissimulation of years had cloaked, revealed themselves just when he felt himself threatened in his position of supremacy. Seeking to avenge herself for being supplanted, Agrippina approached the ousted Britannicus, Claudius' own son, perhaps to play him as a trump card against Nero. Nero poisoned his adoptive brother and pursued his mother with a

¹ This so-called *Apocolocyntosis* ('pumpkinification,' perhaps more correctly *Apotiticosis*) *Caesaris* of Seneca is one of the most amusing if most biting pamphlets of antiquity.

hate that was only appeased when at his orders she was murdered (59). Henceforth no restraints existed for the Emperor. Spurning the formerly privileged Senate and his previous guides, he yielded himself entirely to his own caprices and desires. The woman's rule that had already so often brought disaster on the Julian house began anew, and one of the most notorious ladies of the knightly aristocracy, Poppaea Sabina, became the Imperial consort and Augusta, after Nero's first wife Octavia, the sister of Britannicus, had been repudiated and then murdered on one of the most abominable impeachments of the whole Imperial age (62). Owing to Nero's measureless extravagance a financial crisis soon arose, and was further intensified by a crushing calamity that befell the capital, the notorious fire of the year 64. This very reason excludes the possibility that the Emperor himself caused the fire, which consumed nearly half the city; but he felt himself called upon to take account of the gossip of the people which accused him of it, and he therefore directed suspicion upon one of the most despised religious sects that Rome of that day had to shew, the Christians, whose name on this occasion appears for the first time, and in bloody letters, in Roman tradition. Nero interested himself with gratifying zeal in the rebuilding of the city; but here too he could not restrain his morbid extravagance, as is proved by the construction of his magnificent palace, the *Domus Aurea* or 'Golden House' (66-67). The same want of moderation shewed itself in the journey to Greece, whither the vain Emperor was called by his dilettante interest in musical competitions, owing to which he declared the province free, recompensing the Senate for this loss by resigning the island of Sardinia. To remedy his financial straits Nero had recourse to one of the most disastrous measures of statesmanship, ordaining the first depreciation of the currency, which necessarily undermined all credit.

Under such circumstances discontent with the Neronian rule increased in all circles, and conspiracies followed by

cruel impeachments (Seneca was a victim) were the order of the day; even the Guard was no longer to be trusted, as the striking impeachment of Piso shewed. The decision however came this time from the legions on the frontier of the empire. The attempt of the Keltic governor of Gaul, C. Julius Vindex, to make himself Emperor had been frustrated from jealousy by the governor of Upper Germany; the Spanish legions now proclaimed as emperor their general, P. Sulpicius Galba, in answer to the ban set upon him by Nero. The Guard approved this step of the legions, and the Senate at once declared Nero under ban. The Emperor came to his end by his own hand in the villa of a freedman, to whom he had fled (June 68). With him the Julian House was extinguished.

§ 38. THE FLAVIANS, 69-96 A.D.

For a year it seemed as though the empire were now to fall under the doom of owing its ruler to the will of the legions and praetorians. Galba, appointed Emperor by the Spanish troops, could win no confidence in Rome, and was removed by M. Salvius Otho (Jan. 69), who however enjoyed the purple only for a quarter of a year; when the nominee of the German legions, A. Vitellius, gained a victory over him at Cremona he slew himself (Apr. 69). To Vitellius however the troops of the East opposed a claimant in their tried general Vespasianus, and after prolonged struggles, which reached their conclusion in Rome itself, Vitellius was slain and Vespasianus recognised by the capital (Dec. 69).

Flavius Vespasianus (69-79), already sixty years of age on his ascension to the throne, addressed himself with the utmost earnestness and skill to the difficult task of bringing order into the disorganised affairs of the empire. He was particularly mindful to restore the discipline of the legions and praetorians, now sapped by the events of the 'Year of the Three Emperors,' and to strengthen the empire's sorely enfeebled taxable powers. His thoroughly creditable frugality however did not prevent him from spending great sums on great ends; he built a famous temple to the Goddess of Peace (*Templum Pacis*) and the gigantic *Amphitheatrum Flavi-*

anum, the modern Colosseum. To the Senate he left a wide sphere of independence, though vigorously checking encroachments upon his rights by the aristocrats who would not pay due regard to a Princeps sprung of a mere knightly family, as *e.g.* in the impeachment of Helvidius Priscus. Connected with this is the ejection of the philosophers, of whom the representatives of the Stoic doctrine especially cultivated in their adherents a sentimental opposition to monarchy, based upon republican enthusiasm but withal senseless. To the practice of the law Vespasian devoted especial interest. By the so-called *lex regia Vespasiani* an advance was made in the development of monarchy, as henceforth the imperium for life was bestowed on the emperors on their ascension.

The troubles of the year 69 had led on various points of the wide frontier to military movements. Two wars are particularly associated with the name of Vespasian, although he personally ended neither. In 69 the Batavi, dwelling north of the Lower Rhine, had risen under the leadership of their countryman Julius Civilis against Vitellius and after his death had kept up the struggle against the new government also. The rising threatened to grow all the more perilous as the Gauls too became entangled in it and the Roman troops, consisting mainly of natives, joined in the movement. Numerous forts of the Romans on the line of the Rhine were destroyed before Petilius Cerialis after several victories overpowered the rising (70). A peace which left to the Batavi their position as *civili* of the Romans concluded this war of independence. Far more toilsome was the continuance of the Jewish war commenced by Vespasian, with which the Emperor's elder son, the Caesar Titus, was charged. After four months of siege (April-August 70), Jerusalem was completely destroyed and Judaea sundered as a distinct province from Syria. The conflicts with the Jewish people, who defended themselves with the valour of desperation, had been throughout bloody, and had claimed great sacrifices on either side; equally terrible was the

vengeance which the victor inflicted upon the conquered. The last struggles were prolonged into the year 72; but already in 71 Titus with his father celebrated a brilliant triumph over the Jews (represented on the famous Arch of Titus on the top of the Via Sacra). In June 79 Vespasian died after a beneficent reign. He was followed by his elder son

Titus (79-81), who already in the year 70 had received, together with his brother Domitianus, the rank of a Caesar. His brief reign figures in the senatorially coloured tradition as one of peculiar happiness, a proof that he must have displayed great forbearance towards the Senate. To this circumstance he also owes the honourable title *amor et deliciae generis humani*, 'darling and delight of the human race.' Under Titus began the campaigns of Agricola in Britain (see below). Two heavy calamities fell upon Italy during his reign. On the 24th August 79 the famous eruption of Vesuvius¹ buried the flourishing towns of Pompeii, Herculaneum, and Stabiae, and a few months later a fire caused great damage in Rome. In September 81 Titus suddenly died; he was followed by his brother

Domitianus (81-96), whom the Opposition of senate and aristocracy that had arisen already under his father drove at length into paths which gained for him the reputation of a second Nero. At first Domitian took up his task of empire with enthusiasm and personally interested himself in all branches of the administration and practice of the law, strictly regulating also the provincial officials. Arts and sciences enjoyed his favour. But the reproach of soldier-kingship clung to the house of the Flavii, and the proud Domitian scorned to meet it by flattery of the Senate and aristocracy, as Titus certainly did. For this he was pursued by them with a deadly hate, which found expression even in literature; and thus were aroused in the Emperor distrust and suspicion, particularly towards real merit. On

¹ Here perished the elder Plinius, the well-known author of the *Historia Naturalis*.

this account jealousy led him to recall in the year 84 the able commander Cn. Julius Agricola,¹ who since 77 had been extending the dominion of Rome with the utmost success, subduing the island of Mona (Anglesea) and Scotland up to the Firth of Tay. The Emperor himself fought with less good fortune in the territory of the Rhine and Lower Danube; he notably failed to finally conquer Decebalus, who threatened the province of Moesia, and actually bought peace by a yearly gift of money. He nevertheless celebrated triumphs in Rome and secured for himself the titles *Germanicus* and *Dacicus*—an indication of the degree to which his ambition was inflamed. In the last years of his reign a kind of mania for prosecution seems to have developed in Domitian, from which at last his nearest associates no longer felt safe. In September 96 he was murdered; the Senate pursued his memory with fury, striking it off from all public monuments, while historians like Tacitus and Suetonius and poets like Juvenal wrote in gall the description of the last Flavian which they have transmitted to posterity.

CHAPTER IX

The 'Golden Age' of the Roman Empire

(FROM NERVA UNTIL THE DEATH OF MARCUS AURELIUS,
96-180 A.D.)

The Senate who had made the life of the detested Domitian so hard to bear came forward at once after his death with a candidate acceptable to themselves, who promised to be a pliant tool in their hands and later transmitted the heritage of empire agreeably to their wishes. The next Emperors—Trajan, Hadrian, the Antonines—contrived to leave to that actually impotent but still conceited corporation the feeling of an imaginary importance, and in return the senatorially coloured tradition has surrounded their figures with the halo which makes this period even now seem the happiest of the Roman Empire.

¹ The father-in-law of Tacitus, to whom the famous historian has raised a permanent monument in a biography.

It did really produce able emperors; and yet in it those weaknesses already distinctly appear which were to undermine the proud structure of imperialism. The impoverishment of a population burdened with a monstrous load of taxation, the dislike to spend money in taking part in public administration, the inability to meet the expenditure on the army needed for the defence of the borders, and consequently the impossibility of sufficiently protecting the enormously long frontier lines—these symptoms of decay display themselves more and more often.

§ 39. NERVA AND TRAJAN.

M. Cocceius Nerva (96–98), the man after the Senate's own heart, was a senator sixty years of age of whom not much more could be said than that he had a reputation for remarkable juristic ability and very skilful political tactics in relation to the different reigns of the last ten years. His performances shew in many respects a reaction, due to his connexion with the Senate, against the previous development of monarchy. There was importance in the 'alimentations' originated by him, a charity-fund endowed by the imperial bounty which was to assist poor Roman citizens in acquiring land or bringing up their children.

The consciousness of his own weakness, which was most distinctly revealed in his behaviour towards the praetorians when they demanded punishment for the murderers of Domitian, led the Emperor to adopt the talented governor of Upper Germany, *M. Ulpius Traianus*. A few months later Nerva died.

Imperator Caesar Nerva Traianus, as the new Emperor officially styled himself (98–117), was sprung of an old Roman family, and born at Italica in Spain. By his father he had been trained to be a good officer. To this he owed also his appointment to the command on the Rhine, which on account of the continual danger from the Germans was reckoned one of great responsibility. Trajan is said to be the founder of the famous *limes*, or frontier fortification, which has of late been accurately traced, and which, running from the Taunus to Altmühl, was designed to defend against the irruptions of the Germans the district taken already in Domitian's

time from them to safeguard the Rhine frontier. It was only after the settlement of German affairs that the new Emperor returned to Rome (99). His virtues as a general, which recalled Caesar, gained him the enthusiastic admiration of the soldiers; and he succeeded also in winning over the Senate by respectful behaviour and the people by liberal largesses and games. He did not however stay long in the capital.

Next to the pacification of the Rhine frontier, it was necessarily one of the most important military tasks of a vigorous Emperor to chastise the Dacian king Decebalus, who ever since Domitian's far from creditable peace had assumed a more and more threatening attitude, and to put an end to the annoyances from him. After two wars, waged after most careful preparation with the utmost perseverance (101-102 and 105-107), Trajan succeeded in breaking the stubborn resistance of the Dacians and incorporating their land in the empire as a new province (Roumania). Decebalus took his own life, and his chief stronghold Sarmizegethusa (now Varhely) was converted into the colony of Ulpia Traiana. The Emperor received the title *Dacicus*.¹ Two other provinces, both of them however without importance for the future, were added in Trajan's reign to the Roman *imperium*. The governor of Syria conquered a part of Arabia, which from the city of Petra was called *Petraea* (114-117); and Trajan himself in the Parthian war, of which he did not live to see the conclusion, was able to absorb as a province the much contested Armenia, which however was surrendered again by his successor.

Of Trajan's domestic administration we know that it was carried on with admirable care, and numerous magnificent ruins within and without Rome still yield eloquent testimony to his public-spirited energy in building; such are the *Forum Traiani* in Rome with the Basilica of five naves,

¹ Events of these Dacian campaigns are figured on the famous 'Trajan's Column' in spirally rising high reliefs, in an apparently historic sequence of time and place.

two libraries, and 'Trajan's Column.' Arts and sciences flourished to a high degree; literature can show men like Tacitus, Juvenal, and the younger Plinius, with whom the Emperor himself kept up an active correspondence.

During his Parthian campaign, which had brought him down the Tigris as far as the Persian Gulf, Trajan died in Cilicia (August 117); he was followed—though probably not on the ground of a supposititious will—by his long proved and constantly favoured kinsman P. Aelius Hadrianus, the husband of a grand-daughter of Trajan's sister, and at the time commander of the Syrian legions.

§ 40. HADRIAN, 117–138 A.D.

Imperator Caesar Traianus Hadrianus learned in Antioch of the death of Trajan and was at once greeted by his army as Emperor, a proof that his right to the succession was open to no doubt. In him one of the greatest of rulers mounted the throne of the Caesars; he is one of the few representatives in antiquity of the modern principle that the prince is the first servant of the State. It is lamentable that we are not better informed as to this man's life; his contemporaries certainly did not know how to appreciate him.

External Politics.—Through his own eminent ability as a soldier Hadrian clearly recognised the impossibility of continuing or even maintaining Trajan's conquests. He therefore gave up all the provinces beyond the Euphrates as well as Armenia, and on this basis concluded peace with the Parthians. His entire efforts aimed at a strong defence of the frontiers; he is said to have completed the German *limes* begun by Trajan. He constructed a quite similar frontier fortification in Britain, where the conflicts with the valiant inhabitants of the Scottish Highlands continually entailed heavy losses; by the so-called 'Pictish Wall' running from the mouth of the Tyne to Solway Firth the sphere of Roman authority was delimited and secured against the inroads of the northern tribes. Under Hadrian too there arose on a third

endangered point of the imperial frontier, the Lower Danube, a line of fortifications which stretched to the Black Sea and were designed to keep back the restless hordes of the South Russian steppes. While thus Hadrian decidedly approved himself a prince of peace, he still recognised that a competent army is the only practical security against war, and therefore devoted to it particular interest; his military reformation, which aimed at improvement of the subaltern staff and more serviceable battle-tactics, long remained of great value.

Of the wars into which Hadrian found himself forced only one need be mentioned, the Jewish War (132-134), which certainly was due to the Emperor himself. In order to put an end to the restless nation's political hopes of a Messiah, still sturdily nourished by the rabbis, he founded in 132 a Roman soldier-colony, Aelia Capitolina, on the ruins of Jerusalem, in which a sanctuary of the Capitoline Jupiter arose on the site of the ancient temple of God. This foundation and the prohibition of circumcision aroused one of those outbreaks of passionate fury which we have often come upon in the history of this race. Under the guidance of a certain Bar-Kochba, who claimed to be the Messiah, the Jews revolted against the Roman supremacy; but after two bloody years of war, in which the Emperor himself appeared in Palestine, they were crushed almost out of existence. Judaea was practically stripped of population; from this time dates the complete dispersion of the Jews over the civilised world. The colony Aelia Capitolina was closed to them; a heavy tax pressed upon those who remained in the Roman empire. In view of Hadrian's great aversion to military operations, the war against the Jews can only be explained in the same way as the punishments inflicted upon Christians by the same Emperor and to a greater extent by others after him; the monarchical principle, as well as the Imperial sentiment, could hardly deal otherwise than violently with subjects who on the ground of peculiar religious views disregarded the laws of the State.

Internal Administration.—By his first measure of domestic politics, consisting in a tax-abatement of about £95,000,000 and in the establishment of a new period of assessment (every fifteen years), Hadrian showed that he here too recognised the point from which an improvement of affairs must begin. The finances of the municipalities were especially disordered; Hadrian therefore, continuing an idea of Trajan, sent to them imperial auditors to inspect their financial management. Although the self-administration of the municipalities was thereby gradually undermined, this measure on the other hand implies an advance towards that removal of the distinction between fatherland and provinces which was first completed by Caracalla. In his famous journeys through the empire, which lasted several years (121–126 and 129–134), Hadrian learned the needs of all the nations subject to him and sought throughout to do them justice on the broadest scale.

This Emperor also brought about an important change in the sphere of the higher administration by creating a special Civil Service staff to be chosen from the knightly order, with definite divisions of salary and rank; hitherto all the administrative officers had come out from the military service. In the department of law too Hadrian was zealously active; his *edictum perpetuum*, a collection of important decisions by praetors, became the groundwork of the later *Corpus Juris*.

Magnificent constructions throughout the empire (basilicas, theatres, baths, bridges, roads, aqueducts) testify to the public-spirited energy of the Emperor as a builder; in Rome the ruins of the mighty temple of Venus and Rome, the *Pons Aelius*, and the Castello di Sant' Angelo (*moles Hadriani*) recall his name to this day. He personally practised many arts and sciences, and led the literature of his age into peculiar new paths (an archaising tendency). Despite his brilliant gifts as a ruler he did not succeed in winning the confidence of the noble circles surrounding him; his capriciousness, which tolerated no contradiction, repelled

many from him. The Senate too did not think itself sufficiently regarded, and when the Emperor had died in July 138 of dropsy this meanly vindictive corporation would have gladly executed the *damnatio nem ritæ* upon the dead man if his successor had not prevented it.

§ 41. THE ANTONINES, 138-180 A.D.

T. Aelius Hadrianus Antoninus Pius, as Hadrian's adopted son *T. Aurelius Antoninus* named himself (138-161), had been led by his own childlessness to adopt already in Hadrian's lifetime *L. Verus* and his nephew *M. Annius Verus* (the later Emperor *Marcus Aurelius*). Thus the succession appeared secure for some time.

The government of *Antoninus Pius* moved generally on the lines laid down by his adoptive father. He only decided on military operations when they were urgently demanded by the defence of the frontier or disturbances among the subject peoples. Thus in his reign the wall laid down by Hadrian in Britain was pushed up further to the North, and now ran from the Clyde to the Firth of Forth. On the eastern frontier of the Empire the Parthians once more threatened to disturb the peace; but by a personal discussion with their king *Volagases III.* *Antoninus* was able to prevent an outbreak of hostilities. In his internal government also the Emperor continued the efforts of Hadrian, endowing public charities, promoting sciences and arts, and caring for a good administration of the law. He died in 161. The Senate honoured his memory by consecrating the temple by the Forum, which had been dedicated by him to his departed wife *Paustina*, to the *Divus Antoninus* as well; it is still partly preserved.

M. Aurelius Antoninus (161-180) and *L. Verus*, the adopted sons of *Antoninus Pius*, carried on the government in common until the death of *Verus* (161-169), although the foremost place was always taken by the stronger character of *Marcus Aurelius*, who had also become the son-in-

law of the deceased Emperor. Contrary to his peaceful sentiments, Marcus found himself driven into an almost uninterrupted series of campaigns which on the whole preserved indeed the credit of the Roman name, but withal revealed clearly the weakness of the defence of the frontiers. The Parthian war (162-166), in which L. Verus proved his own incapacity, was concluded in 166 with a triumph; but it brought terrible injury upon the Roman people, for a desolating pestilence followed in its train. Far more wearisome was the Marcomannian war (167-180), to which both Emperors set out after ending the Parthian campaign. Years ago the German tribes of Marcomanni and Quadi had begun to cross the Danube in forays which reached as far as Upper Italy and formed a serious danger for the empire. The struggles on the Danube, with an interruption of a few years (175-177), in which Marcus was called by the revolt of the Syrian governor to Asia, lasted on until the death of the Emperor, which occurred in March 180 at Vindobona (Vienna).

Marcus Aurelius, who from his practice of the Stoic philosophy received the title of 'The Philosopher,' was a man of the noblest spirit and simple kindly character.¹ As far as the wars waged against his own inclination permitted it, he devoted himself in the spirit of Hadrian and his predecessor to the duties of civic government, in which, it must be confessed, he often proved himself unpractical. His financial administration was bad; like Nero, he brought about a commercially most disastrous depreciation of the currency. In legislation on the other hand he applied the principle of humanity with success. To the Senate he was very acceptable. His Marcomannian war is glorified by the still preserved monument on the Piazza Colonna in Rome, an imperfect imitation of Trajan's column.

¹ This finds expression in his still preserved 'Addresses to Himself,' a book of high ethical value.

CHAPTER X

The Decline of the Empire under the Soldier-Emperors

(FROM COMMODUS TO DIOCLETIAN, 180-285 A.D.)

If Commodus is not to be reckoned among the Soldier-Emperors, inasmuch as he succeeded to the throne as legitimate heir and son of Marcus Aurelius, he nevertheless was the first after the Julii to concede again a disastrous influence to the Guard and its Prefects. Henceforth the decline of army discipline takes a rapid course; the constant struggles along almost the whole frontier of the gigantic empire give opportunity to bold usurpers with the aid of their troops to snatch at the diadem; every victorious, indeed every discontented legion deems itself justified in acclaiming its general as Emperor. Often several Emperors are ruling at the same time in different extremities of the empire. Wars of usurpation henceforth belong to the regular order of things.

Meanwhile the assault from without grows more and more menacing. In the East the old Parthian state under the able dynasty of the Sassanids develops into a vigorous New Persian Empire, which moves victoriously against the Roman sphere. The northern frontier on the Rhine and Danube is even more sorely pressed by the Germans, who as Goths, Franks, Saxons, and Alamanni become the terror of the neighbouring Roman provinces.

Within there appears under these circumstances an increase of the financial distress in particular, and of a general decay connected with it. The constant wars lead to sad depopulation, and attempts are often made to remedy this by settling German colonists on Roman soil. Thus a new factor comes into the foreground in the life of the Roman State—the *German* element.

§ 42. COMMODUS AND THE HOUSE OF SEPTIMIUS SEVERUS,
180-235 A.D.

M. Aurelius Commodus Antoninus (180-192), the degenerate son of the imperial philosopher, carried on with support of the praetorians, whose general was his confidant, a misrule which recalls the worst times of Caligula and Nero. After bringing the Marcomannian war bequeathed to him by his father to an end by a far from honourable peace, he abandoned himself in the capital to a discreditable life of

monstrous extravagance. The interests of the empire were in every respect neglected, and distress increased in all departments. He was murdered (31st December 192) in the night before 1st January 193, the day on which he was to enter on his consulate as a gladiator; for he was a passionate admirer of these men of muscle. On the resolution of the Senate his memory was dishonoured.

After the three months' reign of the honourable and well-meaning Senator P. Helvidius Pertinax, whose vigorous measures moved the praetorians to put him out of the way, pretenders were set up not only by the latter but also and at the same time by three different bodies of troops.

L. Septimius Severus (193-211), who commanded in Pannonia, first marched into Rome and by his energetic personality won over the Senate. In the first four years of his reign he had to struggle with his rivals for supremacy, which after 197 was his without competition. He waged a successful war of some length against the Parthians, who had supported one of his opponents; he restored the prestige of the empire for a time in the East, and even won for it a new province there, Mesopotamia. It was the last extension of the Imperium. In the last years of his reign he was forced to take the field against British tribes, but was prevented from concluding the war by death (at Eboracum, now York, February 211).

With the name of Septimius Severus, who was sprung of a knightly family resident in Africa, several remarkable innovations are associated. In order to establish a connexion between his and the preceding dynasty, he invented the fiction of declaring himself the legitimate heir of the Antonines by subsequent adoption, a measure which later found imitation. He did away with the peculiar position of the praetorians and founded a new Guard, which was not like the former made up of Italians but of the most trustworthy elements of the frontier legions. Supported by this body-guard of 50,000 men, the Emperor thrust the Senate decidedly into the background and bore the proconsular

imperium for the first time in Italy itself. Under him the famous jurist Papinianus held the office of Prefect of the Guard. There was great activity in building, especially on the Palatine.

M. Aurelius Antoninus Caracalla (211-217), who is said to have earlier aimed at his father's life, soon removed his brother and fellow-emperor Geta together with a great number of his adherents, among them Papinianus, and carried on a rule of cruelty and extravagance for which he procured means by plundering his own subjects. His monstrous magnificence as a builder is still eloquently attested by the colossal ruins of his famous *Thermae Antoninianae* or 'Baths of Caracalla' in Rome. His politically most important measure of administration, the bestowal of the Roman citizenship on all municipalities of the empire, arose merely from the need for filling the treasuries by the application of new taxes. Wars on the frontiers of the Rhine and Danube, as well as those against the Parthians, are marked by feeble and creditable management. In the Parthian campaign he was murdered by his Prefect of the Guard *Macrinus* (April 217), who wore the diadem himself for some months until the Syrian troops raised to the throne a distant relative of Severus' house, the fourteen-year old Varius Avitus Bassianus, as *M. Aurelius Antoninus* (*Elagabalus*). His bye-name Elagabalus he got from the Syrian sun-god of that name, whose high priest he was in Emesa, and whose worship he brought to Rome. As Caracalla had abandoned the cares of government to his mother Julia Domna, so he made her sister, his grandmother Julia Maesa, his associate in empire and Augusta. Brought up in oriental excess, the lad disgraced the imperial throne for wellnigh a year until the disgusted soldiers slew him with his mother Soaemias, because he had tried to put out of the way his cousin Alexander Severus, who at their wish had been nominated as Caesar.

M. Aurelius Severus Alexander (222-235) was still too young to carry on alone the government, which at first

remained in the hands of his grandmother Julia Maesa, and later was strongly influenced by his mother Mamaea. The young Emperor was inspired by the best will, but was too feeble of nature to help himself in such troublous times. The committee of the Senate which he drew to his side as Imperial Council did indeed number famous jurists, such as Ulpian and Paulus, but no great statesmen; and the undisciplined soldiers hated the civil officials who issued decrees from the chancellery, and indeed slew the particularly unpopular Ulpian before the Emperor's eyes.

The wars of Alexander Severus brought no honour to the Roman Empire. In Parthia there had grown up under the Sassanid Ardashir Babekan the New Persian Empire, the assaults of which upon Rome's Asiatic possessions were fruitlessly combated by Alexander. Not more successful was the course of his campaign against the Germans, which he undertook from Mainz; when in the meanwhile a distinguished general, Maximin³ Thrax, presented himself as rival Emperor (235), the soldiers deserted Alexander and slew him together with his mother.

§ 43. THE GREATEST EMPERORS FROM ALEXANDER SEVERUS TO DIOCLETIAN, 235-285 A.D.

After the death of the last of the Severi, the decline of the empire goes on apace. The imperial diadem becomes an apple of discord between more or less able commanders, among whom barbarians, like *Maximinus Thrax* (235-238), appear more and more frequently. Of measures of imperial administration we now hear but seldom; struggles of pretenders and wars against the ever more vigorous advances of neighbours on the frontier form the history of the empire in this period. Of the wellnigh countless number of Imperatores, many of whom bore this name for scarce a month, it may suffice to mention the most important or at least those who bore rule for a somewhat longer span of time.

Gordianus III. (238-244) was the victor among the

many rivals of Maximinus. He undertook a successful campaign against the Persians and forced them to give back Mesopotamia, but was slain before the conclusion of the war by his Prefect of the Guard Philippus, who had forced himself on him as associate in the government. The best known fact in the reign of *M. Julius Philippus* (244-249), entitled from his origin *Arabs*, is that in the year 248 the thousandth anniversary of the existence of the Roman empire was celebrated with great pomp. Otherwise his rule marks a continuous decline of Roman credit. Opposition was vainly offered to the German tribe-leagues, especially the Goths, who burst into the empire from the Black Sea. The Senator *Decius*, sent by him against the Goths, was proclaimed Emperor by his troops; he waged continual warfare against the dangerous invaders, who were already desolating Thrace and Moesia (§ 35), and fell in battle against them (249-251).

P. Licinius Valerianus (253-260) was unable to stay the ruin assailing the empire on all sides; in his reign the territory between the Limes and Rhine was lost. The Franks and Alamanni roved through Gaul; the Saxons plundered the coasts; the Goths pressed into Greece. Valerianus fell into the hands of the Persians, who had defeated him, and died in captivity. His son *Galienus* (260-268), a prince with good intentions but too little energy, maintained his heritage only in a very limited part of the empire, while countless rival Emperors (the 'Thirty Tyrants') rose up, especially in the imperilled border provinces. The general distress grew; the irruptions of the Germans brought the empire to the verge of ruin.

M. Aurelius Claudius II. (268-270) successfully encountered the Alamanni and Goths, hence his title *Gothicus*; but he died too early to be able to do real service to the State.

L. Domitius Aurelianus (270-275), a distinguished general, was not only like his predecessor successful in repelling the Alamanni and Goths, but even restored for a short time the unity of the empire (hence the title *restitutor orbis*), after destroying the Queen Zenobia's kingdom of Palmyra and

subduing a Gallic usurper. At home too he governed vigorously; his circumvallation of Rome, still for the most part preserved, is famous. While engaged in a campaign against the Persians he was murdered near Byzantium (275).

M. Aurelius Probus (276–282), commander of the Syrian troops and like Aurelianus of Illyrian descent, followed with brilliant success in the footsteps of his predecessor in driving back the Germans. He even restored the old frontier of the Limes, and forced many thousands of Germans to a fixed settlement on Roman soil, encouraging them in tillage and vine-growing (see below, § 44). He also took as many Germans as possible into the army, thinking thus to refresh and better it. The Senate he treated with consideration. But at last Probus too shared the fate of his predecessor, and was slain at Sirmium on the Save, the chief town of Pannonia, by his soldiers, who were disgusted by his strictness. From the struggles of the pretenders in the next following years the Illyrian C. Valerius Aurelius Diocletianus, an able soldier, emerged as victor (Nov. 284). With him begins a new period in the history of monarchy.

SECTION IV

FROM THE RE-ORGANISATION OF THE EMPIRE BY DIOCLETIAN AND CONSTANTINE TO THE FALL OF THE WESTERN THRONE (AGE OF ABSOLUTISM), 285–476 A.D.

Sources.—For this last period of the history of the Western Empire the sources are more abundant than for the preceding, though we are not on that account able to pass a more favourable verdict on their merits. History too shared in the general decay of science and literature. Of connected narratives only two, one written in Latin and one in Greek, are of eminent importance—that of Ammianus Marcellinus, who continued Tacitus (unhappily only Books xiv. to xxxi. survive, comprising the history of 353–378), and that of the Greek Zosimus, who drew upon the now lost writings of the rhetorician Eunapius and of Olympiodorus, and treated the period of 270–410. Very scanty are

Aurelius Victor's Imperial Biographies from Augustus to Constantine, beside which still exist an epitome carried on until Theodosius I. and the outline of Eutropius, which extends from the foundation of Rome until 364. All these authors are pagans. But on the victory of Christianity Christian writers also occupied themselves with writing history; and it must be confessed that historical truth has not been a gainer thereby. On the contrary, the hatred against the former oppressors found expression often in monstrous exaggerations and distortions. A speaking example of this is presented by the well-known little work of Lactantius on the persecutions of the Christians, *De Mortibus Persecutorum*. This same tendency led again to equally false panegyrics, such as those by which Bishop Eusebius of Caesarea has utterly garbled the narrative of Constantine the Great's life. Hence the now commencing church histories (of the above-mentioned Eusebius to 324, of Socrates 306-349, of his plagiarist Sozomenus 324-415, &c.) must be used with the utmost caution.

In this period appears a peculiar kind of historical tradition, the 'Chronicles,' which often begin with the creation of the world and for the most part offer only scanty material. The oldest is that of Eusebius, which the great church-father Jerome translated into Latin, and carried on from 324 to 378. Further continuations are those by Prosper Aquitanus to 455 and Marius of Aventicum to 581, the East Roman annals of Marcellinus Comes to 566, &c., &c.

Beside strictly historical works, we find valuable material for contemporary history in nearly all products of literature—for instance, the extensive writings and above all the letters of the great church-writers Ambrosius, Jerome, and Augustine, the collections of speeches and letters of the Greek rhetoricians Themistius and Libanius, who played a great rôle in the Eastern Empire, and the panegyrists and poets who celebrate contemporary princes, and among whom Claudius Claudianus, the court poet of Honorius, is the most important and copious.

Extremely valuable material not only for legal and constitutional but even for contemporary history is presented by the great collections of laws which arose under the Emperors Theodosius II. and Justinian (*Codex Theodosianus* and *Justinianus*). For the knowledge of the thorough reorganisation of the official orders under Diocletian and Constantine, we possess in the *Notitia Dignitatum* a contemporaneous official document of the highest historical interest.

CHAPTER XI

From Diocletian to the Death of Theodosius the Great, 285-395 A.D.

In this period, which comprises the fourth century, two powerful rulers strive to rally again the last vital powers of the dying Empire; but in the very reorganisation which they give to it are contained the

germs of death that helped to speed the dissolution of the world-monarchy. The division of the administration paved the way for the complete division of the empire.

The reconstruction of the empire was further influenced by two factors with which a compromise was made in this period—Christianity and Germanism. To both the principle of tolerance was applied after opposition had proved more and more ineffectual; Christianity and Germans were admitted in the body of the Roman State. That change in the world's history which was accomplished in the fourth century finds characteristic expression in a phenomenon which we observe at its conclusion—a Roman Emperor submits to ecclesiastical punishment by a Christian bishop, and rules with a Prime Minister of German origin.

§ 44. DIOCLETIAN AND HIS AGE, 285–305 A.D.

The Reorganisation of Administration.—Although Diocletian had attained to sole monarchy after the defeat and murder of Carinus (285), it was not his design to abide in it. He took as his associate in government his friend and countryman *M. Aurelius Valerius Maximianus*, creating him Caesar and soon afterwards Augustus also. But after some years, either because he deemed the burden of ruling over so gigantic an empire too great for even two supreme heads, or because he thought to secure internal quiet more effectually against usurpers' ambitions by a number of regents, Diocletian decided (303) that each of the two Imperatores should select a Caesar, to each of whom was promised, after a certain lapse of time, promotion to the rank of Emperor, and the right of selecting a new Caesar. He himself nominated as Caesar *C. Galerius Valerius Maximianus*; his fellow-emperor appointed *M. Flavius Valerius Constantius* (Chlorus).

The whole empire (including Italy, whose privileged position of freedom from the ground-tax henceforth was at an end) hereby underwent a new division, which split it up into 101 provinces; several of these together formed again a *dioecesis*, of which there were altogether twelve. Each of the four rulers, whom we may term the two 'Senior Emperors' and the two 'Junior Emperors,' received a part of the empire, with a certain imperial capital, to be independently administered. These were the following four sections

—1, the East with the capital Nicomedia (Diocletian); 2, Italy and Africa with the capital Milan (Maximianus); 3, Illyria and Greece with the capital Sirmium, now Mitrovitz, on the Save (Galerius); 4, Gaul, Spain, and Britain with the capitals Eboracum, now York, and Treves (Constantius Chlorus). The civil service was organised afresh and entirely sundered from the military; at the head of the administration in each section of the empire appeared a *præfectus prætorio*. The Senate had now no place in this official order; it indeed remained in existence, but lost its importance, as did Rome itself, which had to yield its rank as capital to the more favourably situated Milan.

Thus the powers of government, which officially had always hitherto been shared between Emperor and Senate, had passed wholly into the hands of the ruler, and Diocletian became by this reorganisation the founder of absolutism. This found external expression in the introduction of a court ceremony borrowed from oriental despotism, out of which have developed the monarchical forms of intercourse still in use. The Emperor is henceforth spoken of as *dominus* 'lord,' the subject is *servus* 'slave.'

Diocletian and Christianity.—The revival of the old State religion was all the more a necessary part of the restoration of Roman State life as the Emperor already in his lifetime claimed divinity. It was thus a quite natural result that the new State set its face against a religious community which trained its members to take no share in public life and to disregard the gods, and with them the Imperial divinity. Christianity had indeed been already exposed on these political grounds to occasional persecutions; ¹ but in the joyless times of the third century, when all bonds of order seemed to break, it had found with its doctrine of flight from the world an ever

¹ The persecutions of Christians have naturally been painted by Christian tradition in extremely exaggerated colours. It is now beyond a doubt that the number of victims butchered by Christian fanaticism in the dark ages of religious discord is far greater than the death-roll in the persecutions of Christians by heathens.

wider extension and had spread over the whole Roman Empire a net of communities with their bishops and fixed organisation. Diocletian hoped to completely crush by severe edicts this religious society confronting the State, and moved his three fellow-Emperors to like measures, which only Constantius sought to avoid (303). Their houses of assembly were closed to the Christians, their communal property taken from them, civil rights and honours denied them; many died a martyr's death. But the number of the adherents of Christianity was already far too great for these measures to have the desired effect, even when they were rigorously carried out. From persecution itself new power and support accrued to it, and ten years after Diocletian's edict it extorted for itself toleration.

The Rule of the Four Emperors to Diocletian's Resignation (303-305).—The hostile movements on the border of the huge empire never ceased. Already during their joint reign Diocletian and Maximianus had been embroiled almost without respite in frontier wars, which they shared later with the junior Emperors. Thus Constantius recovered Britain, which for several years had been in the hands of usurpers, and continued the struggles of Maximianus against the Germans while the latter was suppressing a rising in Africa. Diocletian and Galerius protected the Danube frontier, and in a successful war with the Persians won some new territories on the Tigris. Against the Germans, of whom especially the Alamanni, Burgundians, and Franks¹ became an ever increasing peril to Roman Gaul, Diocletian's government continued the policy practised by earlier Emperors of making them harmless by settlement on Roman soil. The same thing was done with different tribes threatening the line of the Lower Danube. These settlers, who were under the obligation of a poll-tax and military service, formed a peculiar and important element in the Roman population of the time, the so-called *colonatus*.

¹ It was in this age that the Franks gained a firm footing in Gaul.

In the beginning of the year 305 Diocletian, perhaps as a result of severe sickness, deemed the time to have come for enforcing the rule laid down by him for the change of government. On May 1 of this year he resigned the diadem in the capital of the East, Nicomedia, and made his fellow-emperor Maximianus do the same. *Galerius* and *Constantius* were promoted to the rank of Imperatores; Severus was appointed Caesar for the West, Maximinus Daia for the East. The two old Emperors (*seniores Augusti*) withdrew into private life; Diocletian took a villa near Salona in Dalmatia. The calm with which this change of government was effected testifies to the powerful influence which Diocletian exercised upon his associates, and indeed upon all his contemporaries. But the weakness of this artificial system of succession soon displayed itself; it was never again employed.

§ 45. CONSTANTINE THE GREAT AND HIS AGE, 306-337 A.D.

The Wars of the Emperors to the Monarchy of Constantine (306-323).—Diocletian's arrangement of the succession had in principle excluded inheritance by heirs of the body, because its creator saw in the latter no security for competent rulers, and according to his design only the best and strongest men were to be summoned to the throne. Thus in filling up anew the posts of supremacy in the year 305 the sons of Maximianus and Constantius Chlorus had been passed over. But when in the next year Constantius died in Britain, the army proclaimed his eldest son Constantinus as Caesar. Soon afterwards the Roman praetorians did the same with the son of Maximianus, Maxentius; and the restless Maximianus himself, who had been forced solely by Diocletian's superiority to withdraw, assumed again the purple. Thus there were six Emperors claiming to rule. The empire had thus become again an apple of discord for pretenders; internal wars began afresh. First fell Severus, who was abandoned by his troops and then put out of the

way by Maxentius; in his place the same Emperor Galerius nominated Licinianus Licinius as his associate. Maximianus in a conference with Diocletian was induced to retire; but when he nevertheless continued to place difficulties in the way of his son-in-law Constantine, he was slain by the latter in 310. In the following year Galerius died. Now Constantine and Licinius leagued themselves against the two other Emperors. The former defeated the armies of Maxentius in various battles, and won supremacy over the old capital and Italy by the conflict at the Mulvian Bridge before Rome, now the Ponte Molle (313), in which Maxentius perished. In the next year Licinius conquered Maximinus Daia at Adrianople, upon which the latter's share of the empire fell to him. In the same year Diocletian too died. For ten years then *Constantine* and *Licinius*, who married the former's sister Constantia, shared the supremacy with their sons, who were appointed Caesars. The peace however was often interrupted and always uncertain, probably because the ambitious Constantine saw in Licinius only a rival of whom he wished to rid himself. As a result of offensive interferences by Constantine in his fellow-emperor's sovereign rights a decisive battle was fought in 323, in which Licinius was defeated. He surrendered, and was seemingly pardoned; but in the following year he was strangled in Thessalonica. Constantine had now reached his goal; he had become sole monarch (323-337).

Constantine and Christianity.—While in his internal policy Constantine followed in the paths entered upon by Diocletian, his behaviour towards the Christian Church was the opposite of that of his predecessor. Already Galerius, whose whole life had been a stubborn persecutor of the Christians, had given up Diocletian's policy shortly before his death and had assented to Christianity free exercise of its doctrines. Constantine and Licinius now expanded this measure by the edicts of Milan and Nicomedia, which declared the principle of the equality of Christianity with the old State religion (313). When later Licinius inclined again to the pagan

party, Constantine for political reasons favoured Christianity all the more warmly. The strong influence of the compact organisation of Christian communities exercised upon the members offered to him a fine opportunity for winning over the clergy. He then fore-ordained the lightening of their civil burdens, and never afterwards he took a certain jurisdiction.

In the fierce contest as to the relation of Christ's person to God which broke out in the Church soon after its recognition Constantine took no part, in order to restore peace and order. We may judge how indifferent the question of dogma was to him from the fact that this very emperor, under whose policy and influence the Arian heresy flourished, presided at the Council of Nicaea (325). He wished Bishop Athanasius a few years later, and at last was moved by the Arian bishop Eusebius to accept Christianity in the Arian form. Christianity under Constantine was in no sense raised to be the State religion; it was never placed on equality with paganism. Constantine himself was hardly touched by the elevation of pure Christian doctrine; it is only Christian gratitude that has tried to turn his figure into that of a counterfeit saint.

Constantine's Reign as Sole Monarch (323-337).—The reconquest of the empire commenced by Diocletian was continued by Constantine in the same spirit. He established out of the former two prefectships, the holders of which were to administer justice, police, and finance under the name of *praefectus praetorio*, and formed a bond of union between the great and minutely organised host of officials and the emperor. The court posts in close touch with the emperor's person were arranged in strict gradation; fixed titles and terms of honour were introduced, as *illustris*, 'Most Noble,' *spectabilis*, 'Honourable.' In the military sphere too Constantine brought in important changes, entirely abolishing the institution of the Guard and dividing the army into two parts, troops in the field and garrisons.

The capital of the Empire was removed to the East. Byzantium on the Bosphorus, on the border of Europe and Asia, was selected for this purpose; and the new foundation, in establishing which magnificent splendour and oriental luxury were displayed, received the name *Constantinopolis*. This 'New Rome' the Emperor sought in every way, even by creating a second Senate, to raise to the level of the old, and it quickly developed into the centre of the Greek culture of the East.

Like Diocletian, Constantine in dealing with the Germans followed the principle of welding them into the Roman world by settlement on Roman soil and above all by employment in the army. Under him the Germans were specially favoured, and appear even in the higher military posts. If we regard his reign from the standpoint of that age we shall be unable to deny it admiration; the creation of Diocletian was maintained by his organising genius and further developed. But the path by which Constantine arose to his height ran red with blood. To reach his end he shrank from no deed of horror, even against his nearest kin; his father-in-law Maximianus, his brother-in-law Licinius, and the latter's young son, fell before him in the struggle for the monarchy, and then his own son by his first marriage, the excellent Caesar Crispus, became through his great popularity a victim to his father's jealousy. Measureless ambition and oriental despotism stimulated these bloody deeds, from which the praise of his Christian biographer Eusebius cannot wash Constantine's memory clean. He died (22nd May 337) during preparations for a Persian war in Nicomedia.

§ 46. FROM THE DEATH OF CONSTANTINE THE GREAT TO THE DEATH OF THEODOSIUS THE GREAT, 337-395 A.D.

The Sons of Constantine (337-361).—Already in his lifetime Constantine had put aside Diocletian's system of succession and appointed as Caesars his three sons by his second marriage; on his death the supremacy passed to them

in the following manner—*Constantinus II.* received the West, *Constantius* Asia with Egypt, *Constans* Italy and Africa. A ghastly slaughter of kinsmen ushered in the reign of these first Christian Emperors. The harmony of the brothers did not last long. Territorial disputes between *Constantinus* and *Constans* led to a war in which the former was defeated at *Aquileia* and perished (340). *Constans* thereby attained possession of the share of *Constantinus* and won predominance in the empire, which was further strengthened by not discreditable conflicts with the Germans. He made himself however so disliked by his arbitrary rule that one of his generals, *Magnus Magnentius*, a Frank by birth, was proclaimed Emperor by the Gallic troops (350). But *Magnentius* also did not wear the purple long; he was defeated in the next year (351) on the *Drave* by *Constantius*, who had stopped his Persian war, and being abandoned by all he slew himself shortly after.

Constantius was now sole monarch (353–360). He had already before leaving the East appointed his cousin *Gallus* as Caesar and charged him to represent him; but fearing a usurpation by him he forestalled it by murdering him (354). As however the presence of the Emperor in the East was urgently needed, and on the other hand the inroads of the Germans into Gaul called for a strong command in the West, *Constantius* sent as Caesar into Gaul the last surviving member of his house, his cousin *Julianus*, the brother of the murdered *Gallus*.

Julianus Apostata (Caesar 355–361, Augustus 361–363) could boast of brilliant successes against the Alamanni (a battle near *Strassburg*, 357) and Franks. For several years he kept the tide of German invasion from Gaul. As *Constantius'* struggles in the territory of the Danube against Germans and Sarmatians as well as against the Persians were less favoured by fortune, he grew jealous of *Julian* and demanded a part of the Gallic troops for a coming Persian war. The latter refused to leave *Julian* and proclaimed him Emperor in *Paris*. Before *Constantius* could bring about a

settlement by arms he died in Cilicia (361). Julian was the sole master in the empire.

The new Emperor began his reign with a restoration in favour of the declining paganism. Brought up himself against his will in Christianity, he had imbibed a deep contempt for the religion which he saw zealously paraded in the bloodstained house of Constantine, and whose furious quarrels over doctrines unintelligible to the laity seemed to the highly educated youth ridiculous. Distinguished pagan teachers, such as the Athenian orator Libanius, had gained great influence over him and brought him over to the Neoplatonic philosophy, which by borrowing considerably from fundamental Christian ideas sought to inspire paganism with a new content. Julian with his lofty culture of mind and heart was the last man to reopen the era of Christian persecutions; he hoped to carry out his ideal—an ennoblement of the old forms of religion so as to suit modern needs—by restrictions imposed on the Christians, especially as teachers, and by the support which he lent in every way to pagan worship. With his early death, which reached him on a successfully commenced Persian campaign (June 363), his efforts came to naught.

After the short reign of *Jovianus*, the nominee of the Persian army (363-364), who after a shameful peace with the Persians beat a retreat, but died as early as February 364, *Flavius Valentinianus* was elected Emperor, and at the wish of the army took his brother *Flavius Valens* to share his throne.

The Valentinian Dynasty and Theodosius the Great (364-395). The demand of the soldiers for a division of the government is significant of the change which had gradually been accomplished within the Roman empire. The Greek East and the Latin West had lost the sense of unity, and claimed their separate centres of administration in Constantinople and Milan. To this was added the religious opposition between the mainly Arian Orient and the Athanasian (orthodox) Occident. Valentinianus (364-375) took these cir-

cumstances into account in transferring the Eastern prefectship to his Arian brother Valens (364-378). Valentinianus fought not without success against the Alamanni and Sarmatae, while his general Theodosius, father of the later Emperor, held Britain and Africa for the empire. When Valentinianus died in 375 he was followed by his sons, *Gratianus* (375-383) and *Valentinianus II.* (375-392), the latter still a minor; the former of them, influenced by Ambrosius, the famous bishop of Milan, deprived the pagan worship of the State support hitherto left to it.

From about the year 375 notice was called to that gigantic movement of peoples in the East which we term the 'wanderings of the nations,' and which was conjured up by the irruption of the Mongolian tribe of the Huns into Europe. By the impact of these mighty Asiatic swarms the West Goths (Visigoths) dwelling north of the Lower Danube in the ancient Dacia had been pushed into Roman territory. Here under Valens they had found a home as colonists; but, imagining themselves to be treacherously treated by the officials, they rose against Roman supremacy, and inflicted on Valens in 378 a severe defeat near Adrianople. The Emperor himself perished in the battle. Gratianus, arriving too late for his aid, was nominated as Emperor of the East *Flavius Theodosius* (379-395), son of the able general of Valentinianus I., who succeeded by degrees in pushing the Goths out of Greece and Thrace and settling them in Moesia as allies pledged to service in war.

This danger ward off, Theodosius interfered in the affairs of the West (383-388), where a usurper *Magnus Clemens Maximus* had put Gratianus out of the way and had even found recognition as his successor by Valentinianus II. and Theodosius. When however Maximus attempted also to oust Valentinianus, Theodosius marched against him, defeated him in several battles, and put him to death at Aquileia (388). He then commissioned one of his ablest generals, the German Arbogast, to protect the empire of Valentinianus against the Franks and Alamanni. The Emperor however failed

to agree with Arbogast, and was killed by him in 392. Arbogast proclaimed as Emperor *Eugenius*, a noble Roman, who found some support, but was not recognised by Theodosius and in September 394 was defeated in the bloody battle by the Frigidus, near Aquileia. Both he and Arbogast put an end to their lives.

Thus did Theodosius once again unite the whole empire in one hand. But it was for a very short time; for he died in January 395 at Milan. In him the Western Empire lost its last great ruler. In ecclesiastical affairs he had taken a most zealous part and secured predominance in the East too for the Athanasian doctrine. But despite all his devotion to the Christian religion, which found expression in submission to the ecclesiastical penance imposed on him by Ambrosius for the butchery of Thessalonica and in severe measures against pagan worship, he never in his relations to the Church neglected policy; the efforts of the Bishop of Rome to gain supremacy over the East too always met with a rebuff from him. The title of 'The Great' was better deserved by Theodosius than by Constantine.

CHAPTER XII

From the Death of Theodosius the Great to the Fall of the Western Throne, 395-476 A.D.

§ 47. THE SEVERANCE OF THE REALM AND THE DECAY OF THE WESTERN EMPIRE

Severance of the Empire.—It is a common error to suppose that Theodosius the Great so divided the realm between his sons Arcadius and Honorius that it was henceforth to continue in two separate halves, as an East Roman and a West Roman Empire, and that he thus is to be regarded as having founded the division of the realm. Theodosius in reality did nothing but what so many of his predecessors had done;

he bequeathed the realm to his sons, who had already in his lifetime been nominated as Caesars, under the condition that the elder Arcadius should administer the East, the younger Honorius the West, both under ministers who possessed the departed Emperor's fullest confidence. We even find the unity of the imperial administration attested by the fact that the numerous laws and dispensations preserved to us from the age of the sons of Theodosius bear the subscriptions of both Emperors, and thus had validity for the whole empire.

In reality nevertheless that severance into two independent empires towards which the development of internal affairs had tended, especially after the reorganisation of Diocletian and Constantine, was accomplished under the sons of Theodosius. In the face of the profound difference between Orient and Occident in language, customs, and religion, the principle of unity could no longer be maintained, least of all by such weak emperors as those produced by the fifth century. Moreover the antagonism between the two real leaders of the halves of the empire after the death of Theodosius, the Vandal Stilico in Milan and the Gaul Rufinus in Constantinople, helped materially to accentuate the opposition between East and West. That too the consciousness of the completed division made itself felt very soon after the death of Theodosius in the several sections of the realm is proved by the fact that a usurper appearing in Africa believed himself able to mask his defection by passing over from the Western to the Eastern Empire. Thus at the turn of the fourth and fifth centuries was consummated the severance of the Romans' world-dominion into an East Roman or Greek and a West Roman Empire.

Decay of the Western Empire ; the Germans.—The Western Empire now moved rapidly to its fall, while the Greek Empire endured for another thousand years ; and this is to be explained by the great movement of Germanic tribes, the 'wanderings of the nations,' which in this period inundated the Roman realm with irresistible force. The Eastern

realm also felt the blows in which this advance of Asiatic hordes against Europe manifested itself; the Goths burst over the Lower Danube, the Huns brought desolation over the Caucasus into East Roman territory. But the consequences of the movement starting from the East necessarily made themselves felt most keenly in the West, where the Rhine-frontier had long ceased to place a serious hindrance in the way of the Germans.

The danger grew when the Visigothic king Alarich (395-410), who had originally forced his way from the Danube into the Eastern Empire and for a time occupied Illyria as a Roman vassal, led his countrymen against Italy, and Stilico, the minister of the incapable Honorius, found himself compelled to summon the legions from Britain and Gaul to the defence of the fatherland. The greatest provinces of the Western Empire were now left helpless before the flood of German tribes; Gaul, Britain, Spain, and even Africa in the course of the fifth century were inundated by the Germans, and newly created German states snatched from the Roman realm these most important provinces of the West. At last even Italy could no longer keep off from itself this invasion. A German king took from the head of a Roman weakling the imperial crown he could no longer defend and so could no longer wear. The doom of the Western Empire is thereby sealed (476).

§ 48. THE LAST WESTERN EMPERORS, 395-476 A.D.

Honorius, the younger son of Theodosius (395-423), entered after his father's death upon the government in Milan, while his elder brother *Arcadius* (395-408) ruled the Eastern half from Constantinople. The guardianship over the boy was held by the Vandal Stilico, the most vigorous man of this age, in whom Theodosius had shown his unreserved confidence by marrying to him his niece and adopted daughter Serena, and to whom when dying he had entrusted his son Honorius. The enmity between Stilico

and the Eastern *Praefectus Praetorio* Rufinus proved particularly disastrous to the realm by profiting the Visigoth King Alarich, who began to move in 395 against Greece. Although in this very year Rufinus was murdered (certainly not without the connivance of Stilico), the play of intrigue between Milan and Constantinople still went on and displayed itself notably in the manner in which Alarich was combated, so that the latter could settle as an acknowledged vassal in Illyria (397). When a few years later Alarich made ready to conquer Italy, Stilico vigorously confronted him and by the battles at Pollentia (402) and Verona (403) averted once more the Gothic peril. Similarly by the victory at Faesulae (Fiesole, near Florence) in 405 Stilico freed Italy from a second German invasion which was carried on by undisciplined masses of various German tribes under the leadership of Radagais. But for the protection of the fatherland he found himself compelled to withdraw the legions from Gaul and Britain. And now the Germans streamed into these lands; Vandals, Alans, and Suebi swept through Gaul into Spain, and rival Emperors arose in the deserted provinces. At this moment the only man who could still have saved the Empire of the West fell a victim to his enemies' intrigues (408). A Roman national party succeeded in convincing the feeble Honorius that Stilico aimed at acquiring for his own son the Eastern half of the empire, in which Arcadius had just died, and induced the Emperor to cause sentence of death to be executed upon him.

After Stilico's death (409) Alarich, whose demands for the assignment of a fixed home had been rebuffed by Honorius, began hostilities anew, set up a rival Emperor in Rome, and twice conquered and sacked the old capital (409-410). After his early death (410) in Southern Italy at Cosenza on the Busento, his successor Athaulf made another plundering march through Italy and turned to Southern Gaul, where he occupied Narbo and married the sister of Honorius, Placidia, who had been carried away as hostage. His successor Wallia (415) continued his conquests in Spain and then

entered the service of Honorius (419), who in return allowed him to found a Visigothic realm on Gallic soil, the kingdom of Tolosa (Toulouse).

Honorius died childless in 423. With the aid of the Eastern Emperor *Theodosius II.* (408-450) an infant son of Placidia, who a few years before had married the usurper Constantius, was raised to the throne.

This was the Emperor *Valentinianus III.* (423-455). His mother, who was appointed Augusta, was to hold rule in his stead as guardian. At once a quarrel for dominant influence at the court broke out between two vigorous generals, Bonifacius the governor of Africa and Aëtius. During its course (428) the Vandals under Geiserich, summoned to his aid by Bonifacius, crossed from Spain, where they were hard pressed, into Africa, captured this province for themselves, and set up in place of Old Carthage a Vandal kingdom which after prolonged struggles was perforce acknowledged by Valentinianus. Another important province was lost to the Western realm during the reign of Valentinianus. In Britain Saxon tribes under Hengist and Horsa, who through their piracies had long been the terror of those regions, established an Anglo-Saxon kingdom, the power of which gradually extended over the whole island (449). It was only in Gaul that the energetic Aëtius, who guided the government, could maintain in some degree the credit of the empire amid constant combats with Franks, Burgundians, and Goths. To his generalship also it was due that a great danger to the empire from the side of the Hunnish king Attila was warded off. This mighty ruler, to whom all Slav and German races from South Russia to the Alps were subject, burst in the year 451 into Gaul; but by the battle on the Catalaunian Plains between Châlons and Troyes, where Aëtius in league with German allied tribes valiantly opposed him, he was checked from further advance. Aëtius could not indeed prevent Attila from making an irruption in the next year into Upper Italy, in which Aquileia and great stretches of the country were devastated. But the Hun

king quickly withdrew again into his own realm, and his death in 453, which had as its result the dissolution of the Hunnish kingdom, freed the Western Empire from a dangerous enemy. The weakling Valentinianus gave ill thanks to his saviour; Aëtius, the last support of the Western realm, fell a victim to the envy of the Emperor and a clique of courtiers (454). In the very next year a like fate befell Valentinianus (455).

The Last Days of the Empire of the West (455-476).— After the death of Valentinianus III., who left no son, the imperial throne was seized by a succession of usurpers who for the most part had short reigns and were spiritless tools in the hands of German captains or of the more vigorous court of the Eastern Empire. A decisive part like that of Stilico and Aëtius was played for some time by a German general Ricimer (died 472), who bestowed the Imperial dignity he himself despised upon several noble Romans. Under these phantom Emperors the new German settlements on Roman soil gained an ever firmer footing and became more and more dangerous to the empire. Italy in particular had to suffer heavily from the attacks of the Vandal Geiserich, who with others subjected Rome in 455 to a terrible sack (hence the proverbial 'Vandalism').

The last of the Western Emperors, Romulus Augustulus, a lad of seventeen, who by the irony of fate united in his name that of the first king and that of the first emperor, was dethroned by Odoacar, a German captain of mercenaries, and a German kingdom on Italian soil took the place of the Imperial government.

Conclusion.—To end 'Roman history' with the fall of the Imperial throne of the West, as has become customary in modern historical treatment, has no intrinsic justification. Roman history long lives on in the Empire of the East; even in the 6th century one of its greatest rulers, the Emperor Justinian (527-565), combined in a united empire large portions of the western half. But efforts of this kind had no lasting effect, and the German states in the peninsula of the Apennines made influence from the East more and more impracticable. In this sense we may say that the dethronement of Romulus Augustulus put an end to the history of the 'Roman Empire.' The history of the

Eastern Empire we may then regard as a continuation of Greek history, or we may characterise it separately as 'Byzantine history.'

The boundary between antiquity and the middle ages is not to be fixed by any particular event. The establishment of German states on Roman soil brings in a new era, guided into new paths by Christianity, which the Germans also quickly took up. The ancient culture gives place to a new one based on Christian conceptions. Thus we may regard Justinian's suppression in 529 of the pagan school of philosophy in Athens as a landmark on the border of the old and the new age.

LITERATURE

I. REPUBLIC

Theodor Mommsen, *Römische Geschichte*, 8th German ed. [English translation by W. P. Dickson, new ed., London 1894].—B. G. Niebuhr, *Römische Geschichte*, vols. 1–3, reaching to the end of the Punic War, a work that marks the beginning of modern scientific study in this domain, but not suitable for unprofessional readers [English translation by J. C. Hare and C. Thirlwall, 2nd ed., Cambridge 1831–1842].—A. Schwegler, *Römische Geschichte*, 3 vols., extends only to 366 B.C. (much under the influence of Niebuhr).—W. Drumann, *Geschichte Roms in seinem Uebergange von der republikanischen zur monarchischen Verfassung*, 6 vols., 1834–1844, a series of biographies of great men.—Carl Peter, *Römische Geschichte*, 4 vols., 2nd ed., 1865–1869.—W. Ihne, *Römische Geschichte*, 8 vols., 1868–1890 [English translation London 1871]. Both the last-named works are based on opposition to Mommsen and approach the standpoint of Niebuhr.—B. Niese, *Grundriss der römischen Geschichte nebst Quellenkunde*, in Iwan Müller's *Handbuch der klassischen Altertumswissenschaft*, Bd. 3, Abteil. 5, a model of compressed severely scientific exposition.—[H. F. Pelham, *Outlines of Roman History*, London 1895.—C. Seignobos, *Histoire du Peuple Romain*, Paris 1894].

II. AGE OF THE EMPERORS

Lenain de Tillemont, *Histoire des empereurs*, 6 vols., Paris 1690 (2nd ed., Brussels 1707-1739, 16 vols.).—Gibbon, *History of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire*, first appeared 1776 [latest and best edition by Prof. Bury, 1896 *f*], written in opposition to Tillemont's one-sidedly Christian and Catholic standpoint; a work of vast importance, which to this day is far from being antiquated.—H. Schiller, *Geschichte der römischen Kaiserzeit*, 2 vols., 1883-1887, reaching to the death of Theodosius the Great.—Hertzberg, *Geschichte des römischen Kaiserreichs* (in Oncken's *Allgemeine Geschichte in Einzeldarstellungen*, 2 Hauptabt, 1 Teil. 1880). V. Duruy, *Histoire des romains*, Paris 1870-1885 [English translation edited by J. P. Mahaffy, London 1883, &c.], to be recommended to unprofessional students from its thorough treatment of matters of culture and numerous illustrations.—[J. B. Bury, *History of the Later Roman Empire*, London 1889.]—H. Richter, *Das weströmische Reich unter den Kaisern Gratian, Valentinian II. und Maximus (375-388)*, 1865.—A. Güldenpenning, *Geschichte des oströmischen Reichs unter den Kaisern Arkadius und Theodosius II.*, 1885.

III. SEPARATE ACCOUNTS

[W. Warde Fowler, *Julius Caesar*, New York 1892.—J. L. Strachan-Davidson, *Cicero and the Fall of the Roman Republic*, New York 1894.—J. A. Froude, *Cæsar*, London 1886.]—V. Gardthausen, *Augustus und seine Zeit*.—H. Schiller, *Geschichte des römischen Kaiserreichs unter Nero*, 1872.—F. v. Gregorovius, *der Kaiser Hadrian*, 3rd ed., 1884 [English translation by M. E. Robinson, London 1898].—J. Burckhardt, *die Zeit Constantins des Grossen*, 2nd ed., 1880.—Güldenpenning and Iffland, *der Kaiser Theodosius der Grosse*, 1878.—[T. Hodgkin, *Italy and her Invaders*, 2nd ed., Oxford 1892.]

History of Culture: L. Friedländer, *Darstellungen aus der*

ROMAN HISTORY

Sittengeschichte Roms in der Zeit von Augustus bis zum Zeitalter der Antonine, 6th ed., 1888-1890; a work brilliant in every respect.—[S. Dill, *Roman Society in the last Century of the Western Empire*, London 1898.]

On the Sources of History: C. Wachsmuth, *Einleitung in das Studium der alten Geschichte*, 1895.—H. Peter, *die geschichtliche Litteratur über die römische Kaiserzeit bis Theodosius I. und ihre Quellen*, 2 vols., 1897, a work that not only finely characterises the writers of the Imperial age but often shows the history of that age itself in a quite new light.

THE END

Printed by BALLANTYNE, HANSON & CO.
Edinburgh & London

zum
illiant
Century

ung in
r, die
t bis
k that
l age
e new